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1. Introduction 
 
 
In a context where over-indebtedness and financial exclusion have been recognised as 
problems in Australia, it is undesirable that those who can least afford it, pay a high cost for 
short-term consumer credit. 
 
Evidence points to an increase in consumer debt in Australia
1
 and consequential over-
indebtedness which has been shown to lead to a wide range of social problems.
2
 There is also 
evidence of financial exclusion, where consumers suffer a lack of access to mainstream 
financial services, and in Australia this is particularly the case with regard to access to safe 
and affordable credit.
3
 Financial exclusion can only exacerbate over-indebtedness, given that 
financially excluded, predominantly low income consumers
4
 , have been shown to turn to 
high cost credit to meet their short term credit needs. This is a problem that has been 
explored most recently in the Victorian Consumer Credit Review.
5
 
 
As part of the response to problems of over-indebtedness and financial exclusion, state 
governments have explored the possibility of imposing a ―cap‖ or ―ceiling‖ on interest rates, 
to ensure that credit products with exorbitant interest rates attached are not offered on the 
market. A number of government discussion papers and reports have been published 
exploring the benefits and disadvantages of such a regulatory response.
6
 Although some 
governments have recently made decisions to introduce an interest rate cap, or expand an 
existing one, the issue is still a ―live‖ issue in the context of the recent decision to transfer 
responsibility for regulating consumer credit from the State and Territory Governments to 
the Commonwealth Government.
7
 In its Action Plan for the transfer of responsibility, the 
Commonwealth Government has announced that ―an examination of State approaches to 
interest rate caps‖ will be conducted in phase two of the plan, and any legislation required in 
phase two is to be in place by mid-2010.
8
 
 
This report will again explore the arguments for and against an interest rate cap, but will 
draw on survey results and qualitative stakeholder interviews in doing so. It will also present 
information about the nature of fringe lending products in Queensland based upon that 
empirical research. 
                                                 
1
 See http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/D05hist.xls  
2
 Department of Trade and Industry, UK (2003), pp74-78. 
3
 Connolly & Hajaj (2001); Chant Link & Associates (2004) 
4
 Connolly & Hajaj (2001), p 22. 
5
 Consumer Affairs Victoria (2006) 
6
 See for example QOFT (2000), QOFT (2006), Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs (2003), Ministerial 
Council on Consumer Affairs (2006), Office of Consumer and Business Affairs (SA) (2006). 
7
 See COAG (2008). 
8
 See http://www.treasury.gov.au/consumercredit/content/default.asp?NavID=014&titl=Consumer%20Credit.   
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Chapter 2 provides some context for this discussion, while chapter 3 outlines the current 
regulatory framework pertaining to the regulation of short term credit in Australia. Chapter 
4 summarises key arguments for and against an interest rate cap, drawing on the literature 
on the topic. 
 
The research method, encompassing literature reviews as well as a survey and qualitative 
interviews, is explained in chapter 5.  
 
For the sake of comparison, chapter 6 describes the finance options available in Queensland 
apart from micro or ―fringe‖ lending products. Chapter 7 then describes in some detail the 
characteristics of those micro or ―fringe‖ lending products, based upon information provided 
through the surveys. 
 
Chapters 8 to 11 analyse the perspectives of consumer advocates, micro-lenders, mainstream 
financial institutions and regulators on the question of interest rate caps and their likely 
impacts. These perspectives are drawn from in depth, qualitative interviews conducted in 
2006. 
 
The report is concluded in chapter 12 with a discussion of the potential benefits and 
disadvantages of interest rate caps as a regulatory response. A key benefit of capping is the 
fact that (subject to effective enforcement of a cap) it will remove the possibility of 
consumers paying a high cost for credit. Conversely, however, there is a risk that this will 
result in an absence of short-term credit products from the market, or only more harmful, 
illegal short term credit products being available. Is capping merely a paternalistic exercise in 
depriving low income and other consumers of access to a product on the basis that “we now 
what is best for them”, or is it likely to be an effective mechanism to protect consumers 
from harm? 
 
The evidence as to whether the introduction of a cap automatically leads to a departure of 
fringe credit providers from the market is unclear. Even if this is the result, however, there 
is an argument that the absence of fringe credit products, which while desired and well-
managed by some consumers are potentially harmful to others, is a good outcome. A point 
has been made by the Consumer Action Law Centre that just because there is a demand for 
a product in the marketplace, does not necessarily make it a good idea for that product to be 
supplied.
9
 
 
In regulating to prevent the harms associated with high cost credit, is an interest rate cap 
going to be the answer? Should there be greater focus on the problems of rollovers and 
renewals of micro-loans, and the taking of security over household goods? Should the fringe 
credit industry be consulted to arrive at a cap and regulatory model that they are more 
likely to comply with and less likely to seek to avoid? There is considerable debate and 
                                                 
9
 Ashton (2008), p30. 
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disagreement amongst stakeholders as to the answers to such questions, which will be 
outlined in this report.  
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2. Context 
 
 
In this part, we provide a brief context for a discussion of our research findings. Issues 
associated with high cost credit are complex, and cannot be considered in isolation from the 
broader picture of the consumer credit market in Australia.  
 
At a national level, we are seeing increasing levels of household debt being carried by 
Australians, with Reserve Bank of Australia figures showing that consumers owed $800 
billion to banks alone in April 2008, an increase from $566 billion in April 2005.
10
 This 
figure has been showing an upward trend for at least the last 10 years.  
 
At the same time, interest rates have been rising, and housing affordability is decreasing. 
Recent media reports on foreclosure levels in Sydney and Melbourne highlight the 
significant consequences of unsustainable levels of household debt for families.
11
 Increasing 
housing costs are also rampant in the private rental sector,
 
and there is simply not enough 
public housing to meet the demand for low-cost housing.
 12
 
 
Other basic living expenses 
(petrol, basic food items, utilities, etc) are becoming more expensive over time, and 
individuals are expected to shoulder more in terms of education costs, medical costs, 
retirement savings, and other items that were previously funded largely by the state.  
 
In this environment, some households are becoming overcommitted and burdened with 
unsustainable debt, and some lenders provide credit too readily. High debt burdens can 
particularly impact on households on low incomes. However, it is often low income 
households, those living in poverty, who have a great need for finance (at least in small 
amounts). 
 
As a report by the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK notes: 
 
Households on very tight budgets are among those most likely to need to borrow, being less 
likely to have savings safety nets in a case of emergency or to be in a position to save towards 
essential services.
13
 
 
According to a report prepared for the Queensland Council of Social Services, 
―approximately 10 percent of Queenslanders live in circumstances where their basic needs 
                                                 
10
 See http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/D05hist.xls. 
11
 See for example, „RBA probes housing loan stress levels‟, Australian Financial Review, 7 February 2007, p 1. 
12
 See for example, „Rent spike hits families‟, Courier Mail 18 December 2006, at 
http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,20947777-3102,00.html. 
13
 Department of Trade and Industry, UK (2004), p 10 
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are not being met‖14 – a small loan can help to bridge the gap between income and basic 
expenses, at least on a temporary basis. 
 
These consumers are often excluded from the mainstream consumer credit market because 
they are not seen as a good credit risk; their incomes are too low; and/or because small loans 
are not offered by mainstream institutions. Most mainstream lenders have minimum 
personal loan amounts of between $3000 and $5000, however, a person on a low income 
may want to borrow only $500 or $600 to, for example, pay for the car registration, or to 
replace a broken fridge or washing machine.
15
 Chapters 7 and 8 of this report discuss in 
more detail some of the characteristics and situations of customers of fringe lenders. 
 
These small amount loans are available in the fringe or micro-credit market but at a much 
higher cost of credit than is available in the mainstream market, as can be seen from our 
results in Chapter 7. The result is that those who are the most in need of affordable finance 
are paying the highest costs. In turn, the repayment obligations for high cost loans can 
impose even greater financial strain on households, and can increase their financial 
vulnerability. 
 
These customers can be regarded as suffering from financial exclusion, in the sense of 
exclusion from the mainstream market. Financial exclusion in the Australian context has 
been defined as: 
 
―the lack of access by certain consumers to appropriate low cost, fair and safe 
financial products and services from mainstream providers.‖16 
 
To date, however, there has not been an adequate assessment of the extent of financial 
exclusion in Australia, and there is criticism of an approach that assesses financial exclusion 
on the basis of ownership, or lack of ownership, of particular financial products.
17
 
 
As can be seen in chapter 10 of this report, community and consumer advocates are 
concerned that financial exclusion is becoming a more significant problem,
18
 and that there 
is a lack of public recognition or response to the issues raised. This contrasts with the 
situation in both the United Kingdom and the United States, where government agencies 
have implemented programs and policies designed to combat financial exclusion and its 
detrimental effects.
19
 
                                                 
14
 University of Queensland Social Research Centre (2006), p 34. 
15
 See for example, Wilson (2002), p 66-67.  
16
 Chant Link (2004), p 58 
17
 Howell & Wilson (2005), p 131-2 
18
 See also Chant Link (2004), pp 82, 107. 
19
 Eg in the UK a growth fund of £36 million was established in December 2004 to increase the availability of 
affordable personal loans through not-for-profit lenders such as Community Development Financial institutions 
(CDFIs), see Department for Work and Pensions (2007); the Community Investment Tax Relief Scheme offers tax 
relief to individuals or organisations that invest in CDFIs, see Parker and Lyons (2003); and in the USA the 
Community Reinvestment Act operates to encourage investment by banks in community development and the 
provision of loans to low income members of the communities in which they operate, see Squires (ed) (2003). 
  
 
Interest rate caps: protection or paternalism?  6 
 
 
On the other hand, the MISC report suggests that the focus should be on consumers who 
are financially stressed, rather than those who are financially excluded.
20
 Indicators of 
financial stress include asking for help from welfare, asking for help from family or friends, 
inability to pay bills on time, inability to pay rent/mortgage, inability to raise $2000 for 
something important.
21
 
  
At the same time as a potential increase in overcommitment and financial exclusion, the 
capacity of services such as financial counsellors to respond to the need and assist those in 
debt and financial hardship are limited because of the lack of funding, even as the demand 
for their services is increasing.   
 
There is little publicly available data on the market for fringe or micro-lending, including 
data on the number and frequency of loans made; the demographics of customers; and the 
reasons for using this form of lending. The consumer credit statistics published by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority do not cover 
this form of lending. The industry members and associations have not publicly disclosed 
comprehensive information about industry operations and scope, although some data about 
products from individual lenders has been made available in submissions (for example, to 
the Victorian Consumer Credit Review).
22
 Media reports suggest that the sector is growing 
at a rapid rate, and this is certainly the trend that was predicted in early reviews of the fringe 
lending sector.
23
  
 
The most comprehensive publicly available analysis of the industry to date is a report 
prepared by MISC Australia and commissioned by the Victorian Government (“the MISC 
Report”).24 This report reviews the available data and the estimates on the size and scope of 
the micro-credit industry in Australia, and in overseas jurisdictions. It highlights 
inconsistencies and lack of rigour in the existing estimates used by researchers and policy 
makers, and suggests an estimate of $10 billion as a potential domestic market flow (annual 
new credit commitments), if data from the United States can be accurately projected onto 
the Australian market.
25
  
 
There has been some Australian research on the customers of fringe and micro-lenders, 
however, these have generally been on a small scale. For example, the Wilson research on 
payday lending involved short surveys with 78 customers and in-depth interviews with 12 
customers,
26
 and we are not aware of any other published studies of Australian payday 
lending customers. This study and other studies of fringe lending and micro-finance 
                                                 
20
 MISC Australia (2006), p 18.  
21
 MISC Australia (2006), pp 21-22. 
22
 See Consumer Affairs Victoria (2006), pp. 38, 106. 
 
23
 See comments in Wilson (2002); QOFT (2000) 
24
 MISC Australia  (2006) 
25
 MISC Australia (2006), pp 50-57. 
26
 Wilson (2002) pp 15-16. 
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customers
27
 are very important and have made a significant contribution to understanding 
many of the issues around fringe lending, and the circumstances of some fringe lending 
customers. The findings are also generally consistent with research on fringe lending in 
other countries.
28
 
 
The MISC report also highlights the lack of detailed studies on customers of micro-lenders, 
and proposes an extensive research project, with a potential dataset of over 6,000 customer 
responses Australia-wide.
29
 At the time of writing this report, it is not known whether this 
research has commenced. 
 
It is hoped that, as governments increasingly recognise the importance of evidence-based 
policy making, additional resources will be allocated to research on issues around fringe 
lending and financial exclusion. This report itself hopes to contribute to the store of 
knowledge on this sector.  
                                                 
27
 For example, Scutella and  Sheehan (2006). 
28
 For example, Lott and Grant (2002)  
29
 MISC Australia (2006),p 120-121. 
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3. Regulatory framework 
 
 
 
In this part of the report, we summarise the regulatory framework governing the cost of 
consumer credit in Australia, including recent reviews and announcements by State and 
Territory Governments.  
 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
 
The primary regulatory instrument governing the consumer credit industry in Australia is 
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC). The UCCC is implemented as a Schedule to 
the Consumer Credit (Queensland) Act 1994, and each of the other Australian States and 
Territories have passed legislation implementing the UCCC in their jurisdiction.
30
  
 
Apart from interest rate caps imposed in some States as outlined below, the only direct 
constraint on the cost of consumer credit that is imposed by the UCCC is found in section 
72. This section provides a remedy for some costs if they are unconscionable: 
 
The Court may, if satisfied that … 
 
 a change in the annual percentage rate or rates …; or 
 an establishment fee or charge; or 
 a fee or charge payable on early termination of a credit contract; or 
 a fee or charge for prepayment of an amount under a credit contract;  
 
is unconscionable, annul or reduce the change or fee or charge … 
 
Consumer advocates have questioned the effectiveness and practicality of this provision,
31
 
and we are aware of only one case that has considered the application of s 72. In 2005, in a 
case instituted against City Finance and Cash Solutions franchisees, the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal found that establishment fees of between one-third and one-half of 
the principal were not unconscionable. In this case, the Director of Consumer Affairs had 
asked the Tribunal to find that the  
 
“effect of section 21(1)(b), combined with section 72(1)(a) and (3) of the Code, is that 
a credit contract must not impose fees that are unconscionable; and, in particular, 
                                                 
30
 Note that, in Tasmania and Western Australia, amendments to the template legislation do not come into force 
immediately. Instead, the proposed amendments must be the subject of a Governor‟s order, and the draft order 
must be approved by both Houses of Parliament. 
31
 Niven and Gough (2004), pp 18-19 (re: establishment fees), p 21 (re: early termination fees).  
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must not impose an establishment fee which is greater than the credit provider‖s 
reasonable costs of determining an application for credit and the initial 
administrative costs of providing the credit, or the average of these costs in respect of 
a class of contract.”32 
 
The Tribunal found that the Code did not include an implied obligation to refrain from 
charging an unconscionable establishment fee; it simply means that a lender is at risk if it 
charges an unconscionable establishment fee.
33
 The Tribunal also noted that the question of 
whether or not a fee was unconscionable would depend on the circumstances, and that the 
fact that a fee exceeded a credit provider‖s costs would only be one factor in considering 
unconscionability.
34
 By implication, then, the Tribunal could not determine in the abstract 
whether a particular establishment fee, charged to all potential borrowers, was 
unconscionable. 
 
The Tribunal also found that in this case, the application fee, establishment fee and loan 
maintenance fees, could not be characterised as interest,
35
 and therefore were not required to 
be included in the calculation of whether the loan was consistent with the interest rate cap 
in Victoria.  
 
As the Report of the Consumer Credit Review in Victoria notes: 
 
The result of this case demonstrates the practical difficulty and uncertainty 
surrounding one of the few provisions in the Code designed to place some restriction 
on what is often a significant credit charge.
36
 
 
More broadly, the UCCC also prohibits unjust credit transactions (section 70). Again, 
however, this provision has had limited impact in practice on high cost credit. Section 70(2) 
provides that, in assessing whether a transaction is unjust, a court or tribunal may have 
regard to: 
 
(m) whether the terms of the transaction … is justified in light of the risks undertaken by the 
credit provider; and 
(n) the terms of other comparable transactions involving other credit providers, and if the 
injustice is alleged to result from excessive interest charges, the annual percentage rate or 
rates payable in comparable cases.  
 
However, cases decided under s 70 have tended to focus on issues of procedural injustice, 
and, until recently, there were no cases that found a transaction to be unjust because of 
excessive interest rates, fees or charges. A case decided in the Queensland District Court in 
                                                 
32
 Director of Consumer Affairs v City Finance Loans (Credit) (“City Finance case”) [2005] VCAT 1989 (30 
September 2005), para 27. 
33
 City Finance case Para 29 
34
 City Finance case para 31, 32. 
35
 City Finance case para 16-22. 
36
 Consumer Affairs Victoria (2006), p 110. 
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early 2008, found that a transaction could be re-opened as unjust under s70, in part because 
of an interest rate described as “simply not justified” and “simply unjust”. The case 37 
concerned a loan to a Mother and son as co-borrowers, for a total amount of $15,500 which 
was used for return airfares for a friend of the son‖s, car repairs for the son‖s car, and the 
purchase of Christmas presents. The applicable interest rate was 204% per annum. The son 
was described as a risky borrower with a poor credit record who could not obtain finance 
through mainstream lenders. Both the magistrate at first instance and the judge who heard 
the appeal, agreed that a higher than usual commercial rate of interest was justified to reflect 
the level of risk associated with this borrower. However they also agreed that a rate of 204% 
p.a. was not justified. The magistrate re-opened the transaction and fixed the interest rate at 
30%. The District Court judge upheld the decision to re-open the transaction but fixed the 
interest rate at 48%, taking judicial notice of the fact that that was the interest rate cap 
adopted in other Australian jurisdictions and that was soon to be adopted in Queensland. It 
is important to note that the judgment makes it clear that a high interest rate in itself would 
not be sufficient to declare a transaction as unjust, and that other factors were important in 
this case, namely the unequal bargaining positions of the parties, the fact that there had been 
no negotiations with respect to the interest rate, and the fact that the loan was secured by a 
car and the borrower had in fact lost his car as a result of the transaction. 
 
The Uniformity Agreement 
 
The UCCC does not deal with all matters pertaining to consumer credit. An agreement 
between all States and Territories setting out the framework for uniform credit laws 
provides that a number of matters are to be treated as non-uniform matters, and each 
jurisdiction given the freedom to regulate or not regulate in relation to those matters.
38
  
 
The non-uniform matters include ―the fixing of maximum interest rates payable under 
consumer credit contracts‖.39 To date, only Victoria, New South Wales, and the ACT have 
introduced regulations fixing maximum interest rates. Queensland followed in mid-2008, 
when part 2 of the Consumer Credit (Queensland) and Other Acts Amendment Bill 2008 
commenced. Subject to the prohibition against unconscionable fees and charges (see above), 
all other States and Territories have left it to the market to determine the cost of consumer 
credit. However, as we discuss below, some jurisdictions are considering regulating in this 
area. 
 
The Victorian, New South Wales and ACT regulations all differ slightly, and they are 
outlined below.  
 
NSW Consumer Credit Act 
 
                                                 
37
 Cash Solutions (Australia) Pty Ltd v Turner & Anor  [2008] QDC 108 
38
 See clause 12 Australian Uniform Credit Laws Agreement 1993 („Uniform Agreement‟), available at 
http://www.creditcode.gov.au/display.asp?file=/content/original_credit_code.htm.  
39
 Clause 12, Uniform Agreement. 
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Under s 11 of the Consumer Credit (New South Wales) Act 1994 (“the NSW Act”), the 
regulations may prescribe a maximum annual percentage rate (APR) for a credit contract or 
class of contracts. In reliance on this provision, the regulations provide that: 
 
the maximum annual percentage rate for a credit contract to which the Code applies is 48 
per cent.
40
 
 
The maximum APR is effectively an ―all-inclusive‖ APR, as interest charges and all other 
credit fees and charges under a credit contract must be taken into account in calculating the 
APR.
41
  
 
In 2002, when the ―all-inclusive‖ APR was first introduced, it applied only to short-term 
consumer credit contracts; that is, contracts with terms not exceeding 62 days.
42
 However, 
in March 2006, further amendments to the Act came into force, extending the requirement 
to include all fees and charges in the calculation of the APR to all credit contracts covered 
by the Consumer Credit Code, regardless of their term.
43
 The relevant NSW Minister 
described the changes as necessary because: 
 
There is recent evidence that the fringe lending market—a term used to describe 
credit providers who offer relatively small high-cost loans—has reinvented itself from 
"payday lending" by increasing the term of loan products to a period greater than 62 
days. This has allowed fringe lenders to continue to impose fees and charges far in 
excess of reasonable costs. … This bill will address those predatory lending practices 
by closing a loophole and requiring all consumer credit loans regulated by the 
Consumer Credit Code, with the exception of certain products offered by authorised 
deposit-taking institutions, to include fees and charges in the calculation of the 
maximum annual percentage rate, regardless of the term of the loan.
44
 
 
A contract is void to the extent that it imposes an annual percentage rate in excess of the 
prescribed amount, and any amount paid under the contract may be recovered.
45
  In 
addition, it is an offence for a credit provider to enter such a contract.
46
 
 
 
Australian Capital Territory Consumer Credit Act 
                                                 
40
 Consumer Credit (New South Wales) Special Provisions Regulation 2002, regulation 7(1). 
41
 Consumer Credit (New South Wales) Act 1995 s 11(2); Consumer Credit Consumer Credit (New South Wales) 
Special Provisions Regulation 2002, regulation 7(2). 
42
 Consumer Credit (New South Wales) Amendment (Pay-day Lenders) Act 2001, schedule 1, amendment to s 11. 
43
 Consumer Credit (New South Wales) Amendment (Maximum Annual Percentage Rate) Act 2005, schedule 2, 
amendment to regulation 7. 
44
 NSW Parliament Hansard, Legislative Assembly, Second Reading Speech, The Hon Diane Beamer, Minister 
for Fair Trading, 19/10/2005, p 18907, at 
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/8bd91bc90780f150ca256e630010302c/858e002428
d0f1fcca2570a80007a52f!OpenDocument, viewed 12/02/2007. 
45
 Consumer Credit Code s 21(2). 
46
 Consumer Credit Code s 22; Consumer Credit (New South Wales) Act 1994, s 11(2). 
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The ACT approach to regulating interest rate caps is similar to that in NSW. Section 8B(1) 
of the Consumer Credit Act 1995 (ACT) provides that the regulations may prescribe a 
maximum APR, and the relevant regulation sets the maximum APR at 48%.
47
 In calculating 
the APR, all interest charges and other fees and charges must be taken into account.
48
 
 
As with NSW, the all-inclusive APR originally applied only to short-term credit contracts, 
but in 2005, the requirement was extended to all credit contracts covered by the Code, 
irrespective of their term.
49
 Again, the explanation given for the 2005 change was to plug a 
gap exploited by short-term credit providers: 
 
This ensures a fairer system where hidden fees and charges do not enable credit 
providers to charge their customers extortionate amounts. The act has also been 
amended to remove references to short-term credit contracts as the section now 
applies to both short and long-term credit. This is to ensure that short-term credit 
providers do not evade the operation of the section by providing credit outside the 
short-term time lines.
50
 
 
A provision of a credit contract that seeks to impose an APR of more than 48% (including 
fees and charges) is void, and it is offence to require payment of the prohibited amount.
51
  
 
Victorian Consumer Credit Act 
 
Although Victoria also imposes an interest rate cap, the approach differs from that taken in 
NSW and the ACT. 
 
In Victoria, there is a maximum interest rate of 48% on unsecured loans;
52
 and a maximum 
interest rate of 30% on loans secured by a mortgage.
53
 A credit contract that is covered by 
the Code and exceeds the 48% limit is not enforceable, and must not be entered into by a 
credit provider,
54
 and a mortgage that secures a loan that exceeds the 30% limit is void.
55
 
However, the cap is on interest rates only, and the legislation does not require fees and 
charges to be included when determining the interest rate.  
 
The recent Consumer Credit Review in Victoria noted that: 
 
                                                 
47
 Consumer Credit Regulation 1996 (ACT), regulation 5(1). 
48
 Consumer Credit Regulation 1996 (ACT), regulation 5(2). 
49
 See Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (No 4) (ACT), Schedule 1, Part 1.8, 
amending section 5 of the Consumer Credit Regulation 1996. 
50
 Legislative Assembly for the ACT, Hansard, 20 October 2005, p 3912, The Hon John Stanhope, Chief Minister 
and Attorney General, at http://www.hansard.act.gov.au/hansard/2005/week12/3912.htm, viewed 12/02/2007. 
51
 Consumer Credit Act 1995 (ACT), s 8B(3). 
52
 Consumer Credit (Victoria) Act 1995 s 39(1). 
53
 Consumer Credit (Victoria) Act 1995 s 40. 
54
 Consumer Credit Act (Victoria) Act 1995 ss 39(1), 39(3). 
55
 Consumer Credit (Victoria) Act 1995 s 40. 
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The annual interest rate charged for small amount credit is often as high as the law 
permits – 48 per cent for unsecured credit and 30 per cent for secured credit (the 
security usually being a car or household goods). While the rates substantially exceed 
the market rates for fixed term credit (currently less than 10 per cent) or indeed for 
credit cards (currently most non-store credit card interest rates are below 20 per 
cent), the fact that the term of small amount loans tends to be fairly short means that 
the actual dollar amount of interest payable does not form a major part of the cost.  
 
Usually, the main cost component for the consumer is in the form of fixed fees and 
charges, such as establishment fees, or simply a dollar amount on a sliding scale, 
depending on how much is borrowed …56  
 
Later the report notes that: 
 
the effective rate of interest can lawfully exceed the ceiling because fees and charges 
are not part of the interest calculation.
57
 
 
As we discuss later, stakeholders view this as a major limitation on the effectiveness of the 
interest rate ceiling in Victoria.  
 
Recent amendments to the Queensland Consumer Credit Act 
 
Under the Consumer Credit (Queensland) and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008, and the 
Consumer Credit (Queensland) Special Provisions Regulation 2008, Queensland has followed 
the NSW model, in that the interest rate cap is set at 48% per annum. The legislation 
provides that: 
 
for calculating the annual percentage rate of a credit contract….not only interest 
charges but all credit fees and charges under the credit contract are to be included. 
  
The legislation came into effect on 31 July 2008. 
 
Review processes in other jurisdictions 
 
At the time of writing (and subsequent to the empirical research conducted for this report), 
South Australia has commenced review processes on the merits or otherwise of introducing 
controls on the cost of credit.
58
 In the case of South Australia, this discussion is being 
examined in the context of a broader review of payday lending.  
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In South Australia, the Parliamentary Economic and Finance Committee initiated an 
inquiry into the provision of consumer credit and investment scheme. Relevant to this 
report, the Committee examined: 
 
5. Fringe credit providers and the emergence of “payday lenders” and other forms of 
short-term credit; … 
8. The current consumer credit and finance regulatory regime.
59
 
 
 
In its final report, the Committee recommended to the Minister: 
 
Consideration of capping annualised interest rates and fees/charges. The Committee 
does not necessarily endorse the 48% cap, but is of the opinion further research is 
needed of cap or restraint mechanisms in use nationally and internationally.
60
 
 
On 21 October 2007, the Minister for Consumer Affairs announced that the Government 
would introduce new legislation ―designed to crackdown on unscrupulous operators in the 
payday lending industry‖, and that would include introducing a maximum interest rate cap 
that encompasses fees and charges.
61
 At the time of writing, the proposed legislative 
amendments do not appear to have been released for comment or introduced in Parliament. 
(An earlier Bill designed to cap interest rates was introduced into the SA Parliament by an 
Opposition member in November 2006, but the Bill appears to have lapsed.
62
) 
 
It has also been reported that the Western Australian government intends to introduce an 
interest rate ceiling, inclusive of fees and charges,
63
 although it does not appear that the 
Government has publicly announced such an intention.  
 
At the national level, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Management Committee (which 
includes representatives from all states and territories) has a current project on fringe 
lending. A discussion paper was released in August 2003, and it noted that an interest rate 
cap was one policy option, but that ―At this stage a national interest rate caps is not 
supported and it is up to individual jurisdictions to determine the issue‖.64 
 
A Regulatory Impact Statement has subsequently been released, and this expresses a similar 
view that the issue should not be considered at the national level at this time: 
 
As interest rate caps are specifically excluded from the uniformity agreement, there is 
no regulatory power to implement them at a national level. National 
implementation of interest rate caps would need to be by amendment of the 
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uniformity agreement at a ministerial level. It is therefore not appropriate to conduct 
a regulatory impact analysis of this option. For those States and Territories that have 
not implemented interest rate caps, consideration of the impact of such proposals 
will need to be undertaken at a State level. 
 
Given the exclusion of interest rate caps from the uniformity agreement, further 
analysis of this option has not been undertaken.
65
 
 
Consequently, the Consultation Package (including draft legislation) released in August 2007 
does not include any amendments that would introduce an interest rate ceiling.
66
 
 
General Fair Trading Legislation  
 
In addition to the UCCC, each State and Territory‖s Fair Trading legislation prohibits 
misleading or deceptive conduct, unconscionable conduct and other unfair trading 
practices.
67
 
 
Similarly, at the Commonwealth level, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001 (Cth) (“the ASIC Act”) regulates consumer credit. The ASIC Act prohibits various 
unfair practices, including misleading or deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct,
68
 
but it does not impose any specific controls on the cost of credit.  
 
While the prohibitions against unconscionable conduct could theoretically be relied upon to 
address issues of high cost credit, in practice, successful cases have focused on procedural 
unconscionability. Courts have tended to shy away from determining that a credit contract 
(or other consumer contract) is unconscionable simply because the price might be 
considered excessive.
69
 As the Queensland discussion paper notes, these provisions: 
 
… have been of minimal practical assistance to consumers in the area of high interest 
loans.
70
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4. Commentary on interest rate caps 
 
 
In August 2005 the Centre for Credit and Consumer Law released a background paper 
which analysed the literature on interest rate caps and identified the arguments given for and 
against capping.
71
 More recently the Consumer Action Law Centre has prepared a draft 
literature review as part of a report on payday lending, which reviews the more recent 
literature and again analyses the arguments given for and against capping.
72
 In this chapter 
we will summarise those key arguments drawing on these reports as well as other literature. 
  
Key arguments against the introduction of an interest rate cap can be summarised as 
follows:- 
 
1. A cap will exacerbate financial exclusion, by removing an option for people who 
cannot access credit through mainstream services.
73
  
 
This argument has been articulated as a warning that: 
 
Policy makers and regulators must be mindful that setting caps on fees or setting 
implied interest rates arbitrarily low could easily curtail or eliminate the flow of 
credit to the high-risk borrowers who need it most.
74
  
 
The argument was accepted by the UK government when it introduced the Consumer 
Credit Act 2006 without a cap:  
 
The government analysed independent research and decided not to introduce an 
interest rate ceiling in the UK. Introducing caps would harm the very consumers 
they are supposed to help. Caps would reduce the range of credit products available, 
force vulnerable consumers to use inappropriate alternative products or even to go 
outside the regulated market to loan sharks. However, we will look again, for 
example, if presented with fresh evidence that overturns the original findings.
75
 
 
The CALC review is quick to dismiss this argument noting that: 
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While individual consumers in financial hardship may very well desire the 
opportunity to obtain credit no matter how bad the terms, as a matter of policy it is 
not at all clear that the withdrawal of loans with exorbitantly high interest rates is a 
bad thing.
76
 
 
This view is supported by the findings of a US organisation that surveyed people in North 
Carolina following the termination of payday lending in that state, to ascertain whether the 
payday lenders were missed by those people.
77
 The interviewees were comprised of 159 
households that had had a recent financial crisis, and 240 households that had not. It is 
worth setting out at some length some of the key findings. 
 
The vast majority of households surveyed- more than three out of four- said the 
elimination of payday lending had no effect on their household. This percentage 
declined only slightly for those families that experienced financial distress (71%) or 
who had been payday borrowers in the past (68%). The overwhelming majority of 
households – almost nine out of ten- said payday lending was a ―bad thing‖. This 
strong negative rating held true for households that had experienced a financial 
hardship or had borrowed from a payday lender in the past. Respondents who felt 
they were better off without payday lending well out-numbered those who thought 
they were better off with it. For the full sample, twice as many respondents said the 
absence of payday lending has had a positive effect on their household than said it 
has had a negative effect. The 159 respondents who actually experienced a recent 
financial shortfall- arguably those most likely to consider a payday loan and miss its 
availability- had responses similar to the overall survey population...former payday 
loan borrowers generally felt the absence of payday lending to be a good thing, 
rather than a bad thing.
78
 
 
 
The argument that a cap will exacerbate financial exclusion depends upon current high rates 
reflecting the true cost of fringe lending such that an interest rate cap will cause fringe credit 
providers to withdraw from the market. This is certainly the assertion of fringe credit 
providers themselves, for example Cash Doctors‖ assertion that: 
 
Cash Doctors‖ average cost for providing a loan to date is $100. If Cash Doctors 
charged a mainstream unsecured loan interest rate of 12% on a $200 loan over our 
average loan period of 24 days, $1.58 of gross revenue would be generated, resulting 
in a $98.42 loss on the loan. If Cash Doctors charged the proposed capped interest 
rate of 48% per annum, $6.31 gross revenue would be generated yielding a $93.69 loss 
on the loan.
79
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While most commentators accept that that is the case, there is no empirical evidence as yet 
to support the argument that fringe lending cannot continue on a sustainable basis under a 
48% cap, given sufficient loan volume and greater efficiencies in product delivery. Fair 
Finance UK is an organisation that is operating a sustainable small loans social enterprise in 
London at rates of between 28% and 35% per annum
80
 and National Australia Bank is 
currently engaged in an experiment in partnership with fringe lender Mobile Finance Pty 
Ltd trading as Money Fast to demonstrate the actual costs of offering loans in the fringe 
market. They aim to “break even”, lending at a rate of 28.25% per annum.81 
 
There is evidence of interest rate caps leading to an absence of fringe credit providers in the 
market, one example being Quebec where there is a 35% cap and where no payday lenders 
operate.
82
 Such evidence: 
 
…may be used to illustrate the impact that regulatory decisions may have on the 
continued viability of the industry.
83
 
 
In relation to Quebec, however: 
 
It is important to highlight that Credit Unions have played a much more prevalent 
role in the Quebec alternative credit market, and accordingly, interest rate caps are 
not a complete explanation.
84
 
 
It seems likely that a viable, safe affordable alternative to fringe lending may be just as 
effective in discouraging fringe lenders from entering or continuing in a market, as an 
interest rate cap. 
 
New York is another example of a state without payday lenders however this is 
unsurprising given its general cap of 6% per annum (with an exception allowing banks to 
charge 16% per annum).
85
 This is clearly a rate aimed at prohibition not just regulation. 
 
2. Diversity and competition will be reduced by interest rate cap.
86
  
 
While there is evidence in chapter 7 of this report, of a diversity or range on the annual 
percentage rates of interest charged by fringe lenders, there is no evidence of competition on 
the basis of price in this market as will be discussed below. 
 
The CALC notes that such an argument has some basis in well functioning markets, but 
argues that the fringe credit market is not a competitive, well functioning market and that 
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fringe borrowers do not fit within the “rational actor” model that underpins the neoclassical 
economic theory driving this argument.
87
 
 
A related argument is that if a cap is introduced, credit products currently offered at below 
the capped amount will gravitate upwards towards the cap.
88
 This argument is not borne out 
by evidence and there is certainly little likelihood that mainstream products will  
“gravitate upwards” towards this ceiling, given strong reputational concerns in that sector.  
 
 
3. Interest rate caps are easily avoided, difficult to enforce and waste regulatory 
resources.
89
  
 
The effectiveness of the cap in New York in prohibiting payday lenders from operating 
there is said to be not so much about the cap, but more about effective enforcement. New 
York regulators believe that: 
 
New York has managed to exclude payday lenders only through conspicuously 
aggressive enforcement…the large national providers know that they would face 
litigation immediately if they opened stores in New York.
90
 
 
Mann and Hawkins argue with regard to New York that: 
 
The difference, it seems, is not in the usury limit but in the ability of regulators to 
bring and prevail in litigation to enforce them.
91
 
 
To be effective, a cap must be accompanied by effective enforcement which, it should be 
acknowledged, is likely to be costly. Mann & Hawkins give the example of Texas as a state 
with a 24% cap, but where the law is circumvented by fringe lenders operating in Texas but 
partnering with out-of-state banks.
92
 
 
There are concerns regarding the “blunt” nature of an interest rate cap, and suggestions that 
a “structured cap” based on calculations of all  costs (defined either under the heading of 
“fees” or “interest”) of lending, is preferable.93 This would enable regulatory control over the 
costs of fringe credit, but in a manner informed by actual costs as demonstrated by empirical 
evidence. It could be argued that this would allow fringe products to remain available to 
consumers but on fairer terms.  
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A similar idea is to allow the fringe industry to put forward its own suggestion for 
regulation with a view to arriving at a regulatory structure acceptable to both regulators and 
the industry, enforced under a model of “enforced self-regulation”, described as the public 
enforcement of privately written rules.
94
 Such privately written rules are likely to be well 
informed and therefore more effective and appropriate
95
 and clearly less likely to lead to a 
departure of fringe credit providers from the market. Importantly in terms of regulatory 
efficiency, this model would be less likely to lead to attempts by the industry to circumvent 
or avoid regulation through loopholes. One example is what is described by Mann and 
Hawkins as “explicit toleration”.96 In the United States, a group representing major payday 
lenders, has prepared a model bill
97
 which has been adopted in a number of States in the US, 
for regulating the payday lending industry.  
 
The model bill contains several notable features: loans can only be made for $500 or 
less, loans can only be renewed 3 times, borrowers can rescind a loan within a day, 
lenders must obtain licences to operate, lenders cannot use threats of criminal 
prosecution for check fraud, and most striking, fees are capped at 20% of the first 
three hundred dollars lent and 7.5% of any funds lent over three hundred dollars. 
98
 
 
Criticisms that might be raised against such a model would include the inappropriateness of 
setting a cap at the point where the products are profitable for suppliers, as opposed to the 
point at which consumers are adequately protected against the risk of finding themselves in 
“debt traps” and “debt spirals”. The focus of any capping measure should be on what is 
reasonable and affordable for consumers, and will not cause harm to vulnerable consumers. 
If a product cannot be offered at such a rate then it is arguable that it should not be offered 
at all. 
 
4. In the case of one type of fringe loan- the payday loan- the loan amount is so small 
that even a seemingly high rate of interest does not equate to anything more than a 
minimal debt burden on the borrower.
99
  
 
The CALC review notes however that their own research: 
 
...indicates that 40% of payday loans are for $500 or more (and 14% for $1000 or 
more). When one considers that payday borrowers can borrow $1000 or more 
per loan, and take out several loans per year from the same lender or a different 
lender, it becomes clear that it is often not the case that payday loans are for 
small dollar amounts, and for this reason it is not reasonable to conclude that the 
debt burden from these exorbitantly priced loans is relatively low.
100
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A related argument is that it is not the cost of the original loans that are problematic, so 
much as the rollovers and renewals of loans, and that this should be the focus of regulatory 
intervention as opposed to a cap: 
 
Policymakers and regulators should focus more of their attention on ways to limit 
rollovers and back-to-back renewals of payday loans, rather than focusing on the 
price of a single short-term advance.
101
 
 
The evidence presented in chapter 7 of this report confirms that an ability to be “rolled 
over” is a common feature of many fringe credit products, with 15 out of the 21 payday 
products examined and 76 out of the 102 non-payday products examined, having this 
feature. 
 
Key arguments in favour of a cap were:- 
 
1. Caps are a means of protecting people from usury and exploitation.  
 
The CCCL report quotes Ramsay‖s comment that: 
 
Ceilings are one attempt to ensure that individuals do not pay what are regarded as 
exploitative rates for credit.
102
 
 
This may be particularly important in a non-competitive market where borrowers find 
themselves in an unequal bargaining position with little choice between products.
103
 This 
problem is compounded by the current heavy reliance on disclosure regulation to protect 
consumers. Mandating disclosure by credit providers
104
 as a means of consumer protection is 
based on an assumption that if borrowers have all of the relevant information they will be 
in a position to make rational and appropriate choices. This is not going to adequately 
protect vulnerable low income consumers who have no choice of product.
105
 
 
By limiting the amount that can be charged for credit, those who can least afford to pay 
high costs for credit are protected from doing so. In discussing the historical commitment to 
usury laws in the US, one commentator notes that: 
 
This commitment sounds in an ancient moral tradition sceptical of the advisability of 
high-cost loans to those with limited means.
106
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2. High cost credit reduces the asset-building capacities of low-income households 
through causing or exacerbating over-indebtedness.  
 
Whereas accessing affordable credit can assist people to asset build, high cost credit can lead 
to “debt spirals” and “debt traps”. CALC assert, with respect to payday lending, that: 
 
Payday lending causes a debt trap- that is, it causes consumers to take on debt loads 
that their income is insufficient to pay off. It also leads to debt spirals- that is, 
revolving and increasing debt.
107
  
 
The problems that arise due to “repeat borrowings” and the consequent over-indebtedness 
of low income consumers
108
 will clearly have an impact on their purchasing power and 
ability to acquire assets. 
 
In the US, one organisation has noted that: 
 
Those states which enforce a comprehensive interest rate cap at or around 36 percent 
for small loans have solved their debt trap problem; realizing a savings of $1.5 billion 
for their citizens while preserving a more responsible small loan market.
109
 
 
 
3. Lack of competition in the fringe market permits excessive pricing and inefficiencies. 
 
 A lack of competition is evidenced by a lack of price advertising by fringe lenders in 
Australia.
110
 Most advertising by fringe lenders promotes features such as ―easy access‖, ―no 
credit checks‖ and ―bankrupts okay‖, rather than the cost of the product.111 There do not 
seem to be competitive forces operating in the fringe market with respect to price. 
 
Research indicates that payday lenders almost uniformly charge the highest rate 
permissible in their jurisdiction.
112
 
  
Evidence also suggests that fringe lending is a highly profitable business for suppliers,
113
and 
there is no clear evidence as yet to suggest that fringe credit products cannot be supplied 
sustainably at a lower interest rate, such as at the 48% capped rate. In this regard we refer to 
the operations of Fair Finance UK and the NAB/ Money Fast experiment referred to above. 
 
An argument can be mounted that in an uncompetitive market regulatory intervention is 
both justifiable and necessary. 
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A government inappropriately cedes regulatory power to a private enterprise when it 
allows businesses to define the terms of commerce with consumers in realms in 
which competitive forces do not constrain the terms.
114
 
 
4. Demonstrating a demand for fringe products does not justify their continued 
supply. 
 
In this regard the CALC argues that we should not: 
 
Conflate demand with need….To argue…that wherever there is demand there ought 
to be supply, regardless of the social harm, is not helpful.
115
 
 
This is consistent with Bruch‖s comment that: 
 
Payday lenders say they are providing a valuable service that borrowers are entitled 
to receive. Those outside the industry heartily agree that payday lenders are 
providing a service; however, they submit that this service is predatory, usurious, 
and unconscionable, and that in some cases denying credit to an individual is in the 
individual‖s best interest.116 
 
This is a difficult argument in that it presumes to “know what is best” for low income 
consumers notwithstanding that they may be deprived of access to credit as a result. 
Financial exclusion, which in Australia is primarily about lack of access to mainstream 
credit particularly short term credit
117
, has been shown to have significant social 
consequences.
118
 Further, it has been argued that the provision of short term credit is an 
essential financial service which needs to be available to all members of the community in 
order to cover emergencies and smooth out the cost of large purchases.
119
 
 
Perhaps a better argument is one that acknowledges the need to “meet the demand” but to 
do so in a safe and affordable way through ensuring the availability of safe and affordable 
credit options. The argument would be that regulators need to construct a policy and 
regulatory environment to encourage and facilitate safe and affordable small amount lending 
to low income consumers, to offer real choice in the market place. The point has been made 
that: 
 
Despite an obvious market, competition has failed to provide low-income consumers 
with short-term credit at rates comparable to those for more affluent consumers. 
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Low-income consumers have identified the sort of financial product they require. It 
is a matter of social equity that it be provided to them at a fair and just price.
120
 
 
And further that: 
 
The time has come to comprehensively address the plight of low-income consumers 
in need of short-term credit, and it is unacceptable to adopt the stance…which 
amounts to resignation to the fact that payday lending, an exploitative form of 
lending, is the best that can be made available to these consumers.
121
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5. Method 
 
In addition to general literature reviews, the research involved: 
 
 a telephone survey of micro-lenders in Queensland; and 
 qualitative interviews with consumer advocates, mainstream and micro-lenders, and 
regulators. 
 
Survey of Micro-lenders 
 
The primary source of product data collection was the contacting of businesses located in 
Queensland and identified through the Yellow Pages and from a list of members of the 
Financial Services Federation. Seventy-five (75) telephone calls were placed over a twenty-
eight day period in 2006, and this resulted in forty (40) responses. The responses yielded 
both quantitative and qualitative data. 
 
Respondents to the survey were asked specific questions concerning a $300 personal loan 
product and a $1000 personal loan product. These amounts were chosen to serve as proxies 
for a small consumer loan and a large consumer loan respectively. Specific questions asked 
with respect to each product were: 
 
 What was the minimum and maximum available terms of the loan; 
 Was there a minimum income requirement; 
 What were the total repayments over the minimum and maximum terms; 
 Was there a default interest rate or other default penalty; 
 Were there membership, establishment, administrative or other fees; 
 Was security required to be provided by the borrower; 
 Was the loan able to be rolled over. 
 
 
Nature of businesses surveyed 
 
The study sought to collect data pertaining to consumer credit products with traditionally 
higher rates of interest or repayments. Consistent with the aim of the study no data was 
collected from businesses which promoted themselves as or whose names suggested they 
were residential or commercial mortgage providers, commercial lenders or business 
financiers, leasing financiers or specialists, investment financiers or patient financiers. 
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Statistical Relevance 
 
In order to estimate the potential number of consumer credit providers in the Queensland 
market a search of the Yellow Pages for “financiers” in Queensland was conducted, yielding 
324 results. These results were filtered using a process where those business names 
containing the keywords “cash”, “loans”, “finance”, “credit”, “money” and “payday” (or 
derivations) were retained and these results which also containing the keywords “home”, 
“mortgage”, “rental”, “leasing”, “business”, “investment”, “capital”, “equity”, “asset”, 
“management”, and “commercial” were disregarded. Results pertaining to businesses known 
to be outside the scope of the survey were also disregarded (see below Nature of businesses 
surveyed). This procedure yielded 136 discrete results.
122
 
 
This figure may be inflated because it is presumed that some businesses identified using the 
above criteria would provide an advisory and or investment service rather than lending. It 
may also be deflated because some businesses or franchisors may not list a separate number 
for each of their outlets or franchisees. It should be noted that of the 136 businesses, 67 are 
franchisees or similarly branded outlets, representing 13 franchisors or brands. 
 
Results were obtained from 40 of the approximately 136 credit providers. The aim of the 
survey was not however to yield sample data from which robust statistical inferences about 
the underlying product population could be drawn, but rather simply to provide qualitative 
and quantitative information about products currently available in the marketplace and 
their attributes. 
 
Locations of businesses surveyed 
 
Data was primarily received from businesses operating in the Greater Brisbane Metropolitan 
Area. Regions which yielded data include: 
 
 Brisbane 
 Southport 
 Gold Coast 
 Sunshine Coast 
 Ipswich 
 Hervey Bay 
 Rockhampton 
 Gladstone 
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The Annual Percentage Rate 
 
The annual percentage rate (APR) is a variable currently adopted by the Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code which serves as an annual reference percentage rate which must be disclosed in 
all consumer credit contracts.
123
 It is from this rate that the product‖s daily, monthly, 
quarterly or half-yearly rate is derived by dividing the APR by the appropriate 
compounding frequency.
124
 The relevant percentage rate of interest derived from the APR 
must be applied to the unpaid balance whenever an interest amount is calculated.
125
 A rate 
constantly applied to the original principal would appear deceptively low in light of the 
interest actually required to be paid. 
 
For the purposes of comparison rate calculation, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
stipulates that the APR must include all fees and charges in accordance with the following 
formula:
126
  
 
    APR = nr * 100 
 
Where: 
 
n is the number of repayments to be made per year under the credit contract, annualised so 
that it is assumed repayments would be made for an entire year, and 
 
r is the solution to the following: 
 
Where: 
 
j is the time, measured as a multiple (not necessarily integral) of the interval between 
contractual repayments that will have elapsed since the first amount of credit is 
provided under the credit contract, except that if the contract does not provide for a 
constant interval between repayments an interval of any kind is to be selected by the 
credit provider as the unit of time. 
 
t is the time, measured as a multiple of the interval between contractual repayments 
(or other interval so selected), that will elapse between the time when the first 
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 Consumer Credit Code (Queensland) s15 
124
 Consumer Credit Code (Queensland) ss25 & 26 
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 Consumer Credit Code (Queensland) ss25 & 26 
126
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amount of credit is provided and the time when the last repayment is to be made 
under the contract. 
 
Aj is the amount of credit to be provided under the contract at time j (the value of j 
for the provision of the first amount of credit is taken to be zero). 
 
Rj is the repayment to be made at time j. 
 
Cj is the fee or charge (if any) payable by the debtor at time j (j is taken to be zero 
for any such fee or charge payable before the time of the first amount of credit 
provided) in addition to the repayments Rj, being a credit fee or charge that is 
ascertainable when the annual percentage rate is calculated. 
 
This methodology equates the product‖s periodic payments and fees to an all inclusive 
periodic rate of interest from which the all inclusive APR is then derived in the standard 
way. It is also the formula adopted in New South Wales to prescribe an all inclusive 
maximum allowable interest rate for consumer loans.
127
 
 
This study adopted this methodology to calculate all inclusive APRs for each product to aid 
comparability. 
 
Mainstream lenders 
 
To provide a comparison, the websites of a number of mainstream lenders were also 
reviewed for information about product types and costs. Again, this was not a 
comprehensive survey, but the information was used for comparison purposes. 
 
 
Qualitative interviews 
 
A series of qualitative interviews were conducted with key stakeholders located both in 
Queensland and in jurisdictions that do have some form of interest rate cap (NSW, Victoria 
and the ACT). In total, 20 interviews were conducted (see Appendix A). 
 
 Nine consumer advocates in Queensland, NSW, Victoria and the ACT; 
 Five micro-lenders, operating in Queensland and/or NSW (three were interviewed 
together); 
 Six staff from Government agencies, in Queensland, NSW and Victoria (two were 
interviewed together); 
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 Seven representatives from five mainstream financial institutions with national 
operations (banks and finance companies); two institutions each provided two 
participants. 
 
Potential participants were identified through the research team‖s existing knowledge and 
contacts in this area. Unfortunately, the response rate from the microlenders we approached 
for interview was poorer than was anticipated.  
 
Potential interviewees were chosen as individuals with some relevant knowledge of the 
issue, but were not necessarily interviewed as a representative of their employer. This is 
particularly the case with the participants from government agencies – their comments 
should not be read as the views of their respective agencies or governments. 
 
The interviews were conducted in 2006. 
 
Interviews were taped and transcribed, and participants were given guarantees that no names 
or other identifying information would be disclosed in the published results of the research. 
The process for collecting data through the qualitative interviews was consistent with 
Griffith University‖s ethical research on humans‖ guidelines, and was approved by the 
Human Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Stakeholder interviews were semi-structured, in that the researcher followed a standardised 
interview guide, but participants were encouraged to divert from this guide where other 
insights were relevant. Separate interview guides were drafted for different groups of 
stakeholders, and the different guides are included at Appendix B. The semi-structured 
interview process was chosen to allow for some comparability between interviews and issues 
covered, but also to enable the researcher and participant to explore different aspects or 
identify new themes in some detail.  
 
The duration of interviews was generally between 30 minutes and one hour, and took place 
at a time and place of the participant‖s choosing. Most interviews took place at the 
participant‖s workplace. 
 
Interviews were transcribed by an external transcribing service, and interview data analysed 
to identify key themes and responses raised, and tabulated for ease of comparison. Themes 
were allowed to emerge directly from the data without preconceived notions of the expected 
responses, but as the research was designed to capture views about specific regulatory issues 
associated with this topic, there was also an element of pre-conceived themes in the data 
collection and analysis.  
 
This report includes extracts from the qualitative interviews. Where necessary, minor 
grammatical changes have been made to the extracts to ensure clarity.  
 
In reviewing the results, the timing of the interviews is very relevant.  
  
 
Interest rate caps: protection or paternalism?  30 
 
 
For example, for NSW participants, the interviews took place not long after the 48% all 
inclusive ceiling had come into effect for all credit providers. Thus, participants from NSW 
were not able to provide a detailed assessment of the impact of the legislation at the time of 
the interviews.  
 
For Queensland participants, the interviews took place at a time when there was some 
public discussion on the issue of an interest rate ceiling, but well before the Queensland 
Government had made a policy decision. At the time of the interviews, government officials 
were therefore still in the process of gathering information, and had not reached any 
conclusions on an appropriate policy response.  
 
The comments of participants should be viewed in the context of the timing of the 
interviews; as they reflect the state of knowledge and experience of the individuals at that 
time. 
 
Note also that not all participants answered each question; and in some cases, interviews 
took place with two representatives of an organisation, but one representative did most of 
the talking. 
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6. Finance Options in Queensland 
 
In this section, we summarise the range and price of finance options available in Queensland 
in late 2006. 
 
PRODUCTS 
 
Banking Products 
 
Banks, or approved deposit taking institutions as regulated by the Banking Act 1959 
(Commonwealth) have traditionally offered customers a wide range of consumer finance 
products including the personal loan, continuous credit products and overdrafts. These 
institutions are commonly referred to as “first tier” lenders and offer products featuring a 
rate of interest and other associated fees and charges competitive amongst the other first tier 
lenders. Banking institutions currently in operation in the State of Queensland include: 
 
 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
 Bank of Queensland Limited 
 Bank of Western Australia Limited 
 Bendigo Bank Limited 
 Citibank Limited 
 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited 
 Esanda Finance Corporation Limited 
 Heritage Building Society 
 ING Bank Australia Limited 
 National Australia Bank Limited 
 Suncorp Metway Limited 
 St George Bank Limited 
 Westpac Banking Corporation 
 
In addition, a number of credit unions also offer similar products to their members.
128
 
 
Personal Loans 
 
                                                 
128
 Large credit unions operating in Queensland include Credit Union Australia Limited, Queensland Teachers 
Credit Union Limited and the Queensland Police Credit Union Limited. 
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Personal loan products are offered by all first tier institutions. 
 
These products are generally available for any “worthwhile purpose”,129 but are specifically 
marketed as a source of credit for the purchase of motor vehicles, holidays, home 
renovations, furniture, weddings, debt consolidation and for educational expenses.
130
 
 
The credit available ranged from $3000.00
131
 up to an unlimited amount with provision of 
adequate security.
132
 The term of the loans ranged from one year
133
 to up to seven (7) 
years.
134
 
 
Interest rates on these products vary depending on the provider, whether or not security 
was provided, and whether the rate was fixed or variable. APR comparison rate ranges are 
given in the following table: 
 
Product Min APR Max APR 
   
Unsecured 
Personal Loan 
11.74%
135
 23.90%
136
 
Secured 
Personal Loan 
9.49%
137
 20.67%
138
 
 
The products were generally available with or without security, with a small interest rate 
premium on unsecured loans as is apparent from the above table. 
 
Application fees ranged from $125.00
139
 to $250.00
140
 and some products also required 
payment of ongoing administration fees.
141
 Various other miscellaneous fees and charges 
                                                 
129
 See for example “Personal loans from St George” 
<www.stgeorge.com.au/personal_loan/personal_loan_faqs.asp?orc=personal> 25/11/2006 
130
 See for example “Bank of Queensland Personal Loans” < www.boq.com.au/personal_ 
personal_loan_chooseloan.htm > 25/11/2006 and “Westpac – Understanding personal loans” 
<www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBPL+Choose> 25/11/2006 
131
 St George secured and unsecured personal loan products 
<www.stgeorge.com.au/personal_loan/compare_our_personal_loans.asp?orc=personal>  25/11/2006 
132
 Commonwealth Bank fixed rate secured loan 
<www.commbank.com.au/Personal/PersonalLending/FixedRateSecured.asp> 25/11/2006 
133
 See for example Bank of Queensland Personal Loans 
<www.boq.com.au/personal_personal_loan_compareloans.htm>  25/11/2006  
134
 NAB Personal loan <www.national.com.au/Personal_Finance/0,,82439,00.html> 25/11/2006 
135
 Bankwest unsecured personal loan “Bankwest Comparison Rate Schedule” <www.bankwest.com.au>  
25/11/2006 
136
 St George Bank 2 year $5000 personal loan “St George Comparison Rate Schedule” <www.stgeorge.com.au>  
25/11/2006 
137
 Bankwest secured personal loan “Bankwest Comparison Schedule” <www.bankwest.com.au>  25/11/2006 
138
 Westpac 2 year $5000 secured personal loan “Comparison Rate Schedule” 
<http://www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBPLWC+Rates+Schedule#PLUNS> 25/11/2006 
139
 NAB Personal loan “Personal Banking fees and charges” 
<www.national.com.au/Personal_Finance/0,,9733,00.html#loans> 25/11/2006 
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were also be payable depending on the particular product, including security fees, loan 
servicing fees, overdrawing fees and deferred establishment fees.
142
 
 
Motor Vehicle Loan 
 
The motor vehicle loan is a personal loan given for the specific purpose of purchasing a new 
or used vehicle that is then used as security pursuant to a bill of sale. Loan amounts ranged 
from $4000.00
143
 to $100,000.00,
144
 with some providers requiring the age of the car be no 
more than a fixed number of years.
145
 The product was available with and without the 
payment of a deposit by the customer.
146
 
 
These products are available for the same duration as the normal personal loan product, 
generally at a smaller rate of interest due to the presence of security. Comparison rates on 
these products varied between 8.22%
147
 and 21.07%.
148
 
 
Establishment fees payable ranged from free establishment
149
 to $250.00
150
 with some 
products also requiring the payment of a periodic account-keeping fee.
151
 
 
Continuous Credit Products 
 
Continuous consumer credit products are offered by all first tier institutions in the form of 
credit cards.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
140
 Westpac Unsecured Personal Loan “Choose the right loan – Unsecured personal loans” 
<http://www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBPLCR+Unsecured+personal+loans> 25/11/2006 
141
 See for example “ANZ – Fees, rates, taxes and terms” <anz.com.au> 25/11/2006  An application fee of $125 
and a quarterly administration fee of $25 is payable on all ANZ personal loan products. 
142
 See for example “Commonwealth Bank – Personal loan fees and charges” 
<www.commbank.com.au/Personal/PersonalLending/Fees.asp> 25/11/2006 
143
 Westpac Secured Personal Loan 
<www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBPLCR+Secured+personal+loans>  29/11/2006 
144
 Westpac Secured Personal Loan 
<www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBPLCR+Secured+personal+loans>  29/11/2006 
145
 See for example Commonwealth Bank Fixed Rate Secured Loan where the car must be under 5 years old. 
<www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBPLCR+Secured+personal+loans> 
146
 See for example ANZ Car Loans <www.anz.com/australia/persbnk/prdsrv/personal/carloans.asp> 
147
 Westpac 7 year, $70,000 secured motor vehicle loan “Comparison Rate Schedule” 
http://www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBPLWC+Rates+Schedule 
148
 St George Bank 2 year, $5000 variable secured motor vehicle loan “Comparison Rate Schedule” 
<www.stgeorge.com.au>  27/11/2006 
149
 BankWest Secured motor vehicle loan 
<http://www.bankwest.com.au/Personal/Personal_Loans/Car_Loan/index.aspx> 27/11/2006 
150
 Westpac Secured Personal Loan 
<www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBPLCR+Secured+personal+loans>  29/11/2006 
151
 See for example Bank of Queensland Car Loans which feature a monthly account maintenance fee of $5.00 
<www.boq.com.au/personal_personal_loan_car.htm> 29/11/2006 
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There is considerable diversity of product offering in this area. The most basic bank issued 
credit cards featured an annual fee of up to $45.00 per year and interest rates as low as 11.5% 
on purchases.
152
 Many of these basic credit cards also featured an interest free period on 
purchases, usually between 44 and 55 days.
153
 The full balance owing on the card must be 
paid each month for the interest free feature to apply. 
 
More advanced products feature built in loyalty programs that reward the customer for 
using the card. These cards feature a higher annual fee and interest rate. The highest interest 
rate on a first tier continuous credit product was an annual percentage rate of 19.24% on an 
ANZ Rewards, or ANZ Frequent Flyer Visa Card.
154
 
  
Overdraft Facilities 
 
An overdraft is a facility offered by a deposit taking institution that enables the account 
holder to accrue a debit balance in their account, essentially as borrowed funds. These are 
generally attached to business banking accounts but are also available for use with normal 
personal banking accounts. 
 
The overdraft credit available ranged from a set minimum limit of $500.00
155
 up to a tailored 
maximum amount dependent on the customer‖s capacity to pay.156 
 
The interest rate ranged from 8.74%pa for a mortgage secured product,
157
 to 14.22% for an 
unsecured product.
158
 There was an interest premium on unsecured overdrafts but these cost 
less to establish because there are no fees associated with the security.   
 
An overdraft establishment fee in the range of $250
159
 - $495
160
 was payable in addition to 
further monthly or quarterly fees in some cases.
161
  
 
                                                 
152
 See for example “Westpac low rate Mastercard and Visacard” <www.westpac.com.au> 25/11/2006 
153
 See for example “ANZ First: Low annual fee Visa”<www.anz.com.au/aus/ind/creditcard/range/first> 
25/11/2006 and “Westpac low rate Mastercard and Visacard”<www.westpac.com.au> 25/11/2006 
154
<www.anz.com.au/aus/RateFee/InterestRates/Rates>  25/11/2006 
155
 See for example St George Personal Overdraft 
<www.stgeorge.com.au/personal_loan/personal_overdraft.asp?orc=personal> 27/11/2006 
156
 Bank of Queensland Personal Overdraft <www.boq.com.au/personal_personal_loan_overdraft.htm>  
27/11/2006 
157
 Bank of Queensland Personal Overdraft 
<www.boq.com.au/personal_personal_loan_overdraft.htm#interest_rates>  27/11/2006 
158
 ANZ Personal Overdraft <www.anz.com.au/australia/persbnk/prdsrv/personal/overdraft.asp>  27/11/2006 
159
 Westpac Personal Overdraft 
<www.westpac.com.au/internet/publish.nsf/Content/PBPLCR+Personal+overdrafts>  27/11/2006 
160
 Bank of Queensland Personal Overdraft <www.boq.com.au/personal_personal_loan_overdraft.htm>  
27/11/2006 
161
 See for example ANZ Personal Overdraft where a minimum quarterly fee of $50 is payable. 
<www.anz.com.au/australia/persbnk/prdsrv/personal/overdraft.asp> 
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Non Bank Products 
 
Non bank institutions which offer similar consumer credit products and generally compete 
with banks through the flexibility of their product offerings are commonly referred to as 
“second tier” lenders. Their products are generally provided at higher rates of interest to 
compensate the lender for the extra risk associated with the loan. These lenders have a 
highly visible presence and compete with first tier institutions for the same customers 
through similar advertising mediums. Such lenders whose products are available in 
Queensland include: 
 
 GE Personal Finance Pty Ltd t/a GE Money – This provider offered a range of 2 to 7 
year secured and unsecured personal loan products in Queensland with comparison 
rates that ranged between 12.10
162
 and 41.77%.
163
  
 
 Motor vehicle personal loans for amounts between $2500.00 and $130,000.00 were 
also offered on terms of 2 to 5 years duration with annual percentage comparison 
rates between 6.14 and 31.09%.
164
 This product is also offered under the trade names 
Honda Australia Finance and MTAQ Auto Finance. 
 
 Continuous credit products were offered in the form of an up to 55 day interest free 
Mastercard with an annual fee of $35.00 and a low rate Mastercard offering an APR 
of 9.99% on purchases and 18.49% on cash advances with an annual fee of $58.00.
165
 
Retail specific continuous credit products were also offered (see heading Retail 
Specific Finance below). 
 
 Virgin Money (Australia) Pty Limited t/a Virgin Money – This provider offered a no 
annual fee Mastercard featuring an APR of 12.99% and up to 55 days interest free on 
purchases.
166
 The distinguishing feature of this card was the 12.99% APR also applies 
to cash advances. This was a considerably lower rate than is available on comparable 
credit card products. 
 
 Geneva Finance Ltd t/a G2 Finance – This provider offered a range of secured and 
unsecured personal loan products from two weeks to three years duration featuring 
comparison rates ranging from 28.57%
167
 to 49.95%.
168
 This provider is a rare 
                                                 
162
 GE Money 7 year, $50,000 secured personal loan “GE Money Personal Loans Comparison Rate Schedule” 
<www.gemoney.com.au> 
163
 GE Money 2 year, $2,500 unsecured personal loan “GE Money Personal Loans Comparison Rate Schedule” 
<www.gemoney.com.au> 29/11/2006 
164
 GE Money 2 year, $2,500 auto loan “GE Money Comparison Rate Schedule” <www.gemoney.com.au> 
29/11/2006 
165
 “GE Money – What sort of credit card are you looking for?” <www.gemoney.com.au/cardhome.html> 
29/11/2006 
166
 “Virgin Money Credit Card” <www.virginmoney.com.au/credit_card/> 29/11/2006 
167
 3 year $10,000 loan product “G2 Finance Comparison Rates” 
<www.g2finance.com.au/index.php/pi_pageid/68> 4/12/2006 
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example of a lender which has a payday type product offering at a second tier type 
rate of interest. For instance, the 49.95% comparison rate on the two week $250 loan 
returns interest and other fees to the provider of only $4.83. This small profit margin 
explains the paucity of payday product availability in the second tier lending market. 
 
Retail Specific Finance 
 
Many Queensland retailers utilise finance services provided by Buyer’s Edge, GE Creditline 
and Go Mastercard.
169
 The buyer applies for a card provided by one of these outlets when 
making the store purchase. The Go Mastercard was being offered to all customers who 
applied for the Buyer’s Edge or GE Creditline cards.170 In all cases the finance is provided by 
GE Capital Finance Australia Pty Limited at an annual percentage rate of 27.99% for cash 
advances or purchases linked to a specific promotion.
171
 The promotion took the form of 
deferred payment, an interest free period, or a combination of the two.
172
 The interest free 
period promotions varied depending on the retailer and product. Establishment fees, 
account servicing fees and payment handling fees could also be payable.
173
 If the customer 
did not wish to participate in specific promotions the card could be used as a regular no 
annual fee Mastercard with interest charged at 17.99% on purchases.
174
 
 
Another card marketed at the point of sale to retail consumers was the MyBuy Card, with 
finance provided by Hanover Consumer Finance Pty Limited. The applicable annual 
percentage rate was set by agreement between the financier and retailer. Various interest free 
periods were also applicable.
175
 
 
Store Cards 
 
Specifically branded store cards are relatively rare given the popularity of the generic retail 
finance providers mentioned above. However, businesses with strong customer loyalty do 
brand their own finance product. The Myercard featured finance provided by GE Capital 
Finance Australia Pty Ltd t/a GE Money at an annual percentage rate of 19.99%. An 
interest free period of 62 days applied to all purchases with enhanced interest free periods 
available through special periodic promotions.
176
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
168
 2 week $250 loan product “G2 Finance Comparison Rates” <www.g2finance.com.au/index.php/pi_pageid/68> 
4/12/2006 
169
 Retailers include Harvey Norman, Retravision, Bob Jane T-Marts, Beaurepairs, Chandlers, Betta Electrical, 
Forty Winks, Super A-Mart, A-Mart All Sports. <www.buyersedge.com.au>  20/11/2006 
170
 “Apply Now” <www.buyersedge.com.au> 20/11/2006 
171
 “Go Card benefits” <www.gomastercard.com.au/CardBenefits.htm> 20/11/2006 
172
 “Go Finance Options” <www.gomastercard.com.au> 20/11/2006 
173
 See for example “GE Creditline Fees & Charges” <www.gecreditline.com.au/AboutUs/fees.htm> 20/11/2006 
174
 “Go Card benefits” <www.gomastercard.com.au> 20/11/2006 
175
 “MyBuy for shoppers” <www.mybuy.com.au/mybuyforshoppers.html> 
176
 “Myercard” <www.myer.com.au/services/myercard.asp> 20/11/2006 
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The David Jones Card featured an annual percentage rate of 21.90% and an interest free 
period of 56 days, with additional interest free days becoming available through special 
periodic promotions.
177
 
 
Bond Loans 
 
This product is basically identical to a regular personal loan product marketed specifically 
for use to pay a rental bond. One such provider was the Australian Lending Corporation 
which advertised loans specifically for this purpose in Queensland newspapers including the 
Brisbane daily, The Courier Mail.
178
 This provider made such loans available at an interest 
rate of 14.00%pa with the payment of an additional establishment fee.
179
 
 
Micro-lending or Fringe lending products 
 
In addition to the above, there is a range of micro-lending or fringe lending products 
available in Queensland. These are discussed in the next chapter. 
                                                 
177
 “David Jones Card Features & Benefits” <www.davidjones.com.au/djcard_features.jsp> 20/11/2006 
178
 Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd, The Courier Mail, Wednesday, August 9, 2006 
179
 “ALC Finance – Australian Lending Corporation” <www.bondloans.com.au/faq.htm> 4/12/2006 
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7. Micro-loans in Queensland 
 
This section explores the range of fringe loans and micro-loans available in Queensland in 
2006. 
 
In addition to the credit products previously mentioned, there exist other products available 
in the Queensland marketplace from less visible lenders at significantly higher interest rates. 
Providers of these products are sometimes referred to as third tier lenders, or fringe lenders, 
because they operate on the periphery of the consumer credit market that is not catered for 
by first or second tier institutions. In order to ascertain the availability of these products and 
specific product attributes such as loan cost, duration, and whether they require security, a 
survey was conducted of a sample of credit providers believed to supply these products. The 
key aims of the data collection were: 
 
 To provide details of the type of consumer credit products available from non-bank 
lenders; and 
 
 To enable a range of annual percentage rates of interest, inclusive of all fees and 
charges, to be calculated to ascertain the true cost of a sample of these products. 
 
The method for this data collection is summarised in chapter 5 of this report. 
 
 
Minimum Duration 
 
This question was asked to determine whether there was a minimum period during which 
customers would be obligated to make repayments associated with these loans. 
 
The minimum duration of the products ranged from 1 to 26 weeks. Many respondents 
acknowledged the fact that in accordance with the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
(“UCCC”) the customer was free to pay the loan out in full at any time and therefore 
theoretically the minimum duration of the loan could be whatever the customer wanted, 
including as short as a single day.
180
  
 
Few respondents were prepared to offer the “large loan” (defined as a $1000 personal loan, as 
opposed to a ―small loan” defined as a $300 personal loan) on a payday basis, being generally 
a contract with 8 weeks or less duration (see payday loans below). 
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 Consumer Credit Code (Qld) s75 
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Maximum Duration 
 
Consumers pay more interest the longer the length of the loan, regardless of the interest 
rate. This question was asked to gauge the potential for indebtedness created by the product. 
 
The maximum duration of the small loan product ranged from 8 to 52 weeks. 
 
The maximum duration of the large loan product ranged from 26 to 78 weeks, the most 
common maximum duration being 52 weeks. 
 
Standard Duration 
 
Some respondents were unwilling or unable to provide the minimum and maximum 
duration of their loan products. They were however able to provide the duration of their 
most popular or standard products.  
 
The standard duration for the small loan product ranged from 4 to 36 weeks. The standard 
duration for the large loan product ranged from 26 to 40 weeks. 
 
Minimum Income Requirement 
 
Very few respondents stated a minimum fixed income requirement in order for the 
customer to be eligible for a product. Two respondents required that a customer have an 
income of $350 per week and $750 per fortnight respectively. 
 
The responses suggest a great deal of discretion is utilised by the credit provider. The most 
popular requirements were for a review of the respondent‖s finances to be undertaken, for 
their ability to repay to be assessed, for their weekly budget to be scrutinised, and for the 
provision of proof of income. One respondent required that the customer have no defaults 
listed for at least three months, while another subjected the customer to their own credit 
scoring procedure. 
 
Qualitative evidence obtained suggested that the respondents screened customers quite 
thoroughly. One respondent reasoned, 
 
 The money has got to come back to us otherwise it cannot go back out (Survey 
respondent no. 22) 
 
Another respondent provided, 
 
We give our customers a strict budget… we have non-customers ring us to help them with 
their budgets (Survey respondent no. 37) 
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Repayments 
 
Respondents were asked to provide information as to the total amount of repayments 
required to be made during the course of the small and large loan. The survey did not ask 
respondents for interest rates associated with the product but some respondents sought to 
provide this figure in addition. 
 
From the data obtained other variables including the monthly and annual percentage rates 
were able to be calculated. These have all been included in the results. The all inclusive 
interest rates were calculated in accordance with the formula used to calculate comparison 
rates under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
181
 Due to the nature of the formula, the all-
inclusive rate is unable to be isolated by algebraic manipulation. Iteration was therefore used 
to isolate the interest rate that equated the weekly repayments with an ending balance of 
zero if the required number of repayments were made. 
 
Some respondents were unable to confirm the compounding frequency on which their 
repayment figures were based. For uniformity of analysis it has been assumed in all cases 
that repayments are made on a weekly basis, and interest accrues and compounds daily on 
the reducing balance of the loan.  
 
It became apparent that some respondents who provided information as to their actual 
interest rates in addition to the total repayment amounts requested were not calculating 
these rates correctly. This mistake took the form of an interest rate which appeared to be a 
total interest divided by total principal calculation. This has the effect of understating the 
actual interest rate.
182
 
 
Some respondents also added all fees and charges to the initial principal when performing 
the interest rate calculation. This reflects the fact that these amounts are also usually loaned, 
but of course don‖t change hands. This has the effect of understating the actual interest rate 
on the principal because a smaller rate of interest on the larger figure consisting of principal 
and fees and charges will yield the same repayment schedule. This methodology is flawed 
because it applies the interest rate to the fees and charges as well as the principal during the 
course of the loan. The technique is also in breach of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
unless the amount of credit to be provided is specifically stated to be an amount that 
includes the principal as well as fees and charges.
183
  
 
Example: 
 
Loan 
Amount 
Duration Fee Weekly 
Repayment 
Total 
Repayments 
(inc Fee) 
APR  
                                                 
181
 See chapter 5 of this report 
182
 See chapter 5 of this report 
183
 Consumer Credit Code (Qld) s15 
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$1000 26 wks $350 65.85 1712.10 228.96% 
$1350 26 wks $350 65.85 1712.10 96%pa 
 
It can be seen that this product which provides the consumer with $1000 can yield a 
completely different APR depending on whether the fees and charges are also deemed to be 
loaned. In both cases an identical amount consisting of principal, interest and fee is repaid. 
For the purposes of the data compiled in this study the all inclusive APRs as well as the 
interest only APRs have been calculated on the principal sum only. 
 
Cogent analysis of the cost of these products requires that the payday loan product and the 
non-payday loan product be examined separately. 
 
 Payday Loans 
 
The data obtained on those products which may be considered payday loans is isolated in 
Table A (1), (2) and (3). These products are generally short term, high interest loans for small 
amounts which escape precise definition. The Working Party appointed by the Minister for 
Fair Trading to develop options for the regulation of the payday lending market in 2000 
defined payday loans as all forms of short term lending for personal, domestic or household 
purposes of up to 2 months duration.
184
 It can be seen that of the 40 credit providers 
surveyed, only 14 offered or found there was any significant demand for the $300 and/or 
$1000 product for this time period. Anecdotal evidence suggests that consumers prefer to 
pay as little as possible on a weekly basis, rather than repay a lump sum. As one credit 
provider surveyed indicated: 
 
The customers generally only care about the size of the weekly repayment.... for this reason 
we find that the lengthy loans are the most popular. (Survey respondent no. 9) 
 
The data collected indicates that the all-inclusive APR for the payday loan product in the 
survey sample ranged from 300% to 3380%. The range of total repayments as a percentage of 
principal is between 107-165%. This is a more accurate indicator of the actual cost of these 
loans to the consumer; however it is a poor indicator for the purposes of comparing loans of 
different duration as longer loans with similar APRs will produce a higher figure. The large 
standard deviation of 686% present in the APRs for the payday sample suggests that the one 
week loan product should be considered separately, being an inherently different product. 
 
Table A (1) One week small loans 
 
No. Principal Interest Fees Total APR Total 
 ($) all  payments all payments 
  inclusive   inclusive as a % of 
  (% / day)   (%pa) principal 
2 $500.00 1.4247  Nil $550.00 520 110 
18 $300.00 4.7014  Nil $399.00 1716 133 
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30 $300.00 9.2604 $170 $495.00 3380 165 
38 $300.00 1.8740 $28 $341.58 684 114 
 
The highest all inclusive APRs are attributable to the one week loans because of the effect of 
multiplying the weekly interest rate by a factor of 52 to obtain the APR. The weekly 
interest rate is generally a large fraction of the principal because the lender must recover all 
of their costs and return a profit in the single week. This anomaly has been well 
documented.
185
 Nonetheless there is a great diversity in the cost of the one week small loan 
in the Queensland market, the sample showing a range of APRs between 520 and 3380%. 
 
Table A (2) Other small payday loans 
 
No. Principal Duration Interest Fees Weekly Total APR Total 
 ($)  all  payment payments all payments 
  (weeks) inclusive    inclusive as a % of 
   (% / day)    (%pa) principal 
3 $300.00 4 1.0685 N $90.00 $360.00 390 120 
 6 $300.00 4 1.0790 $25 $90.18 $360.72 394 120 
7 $300.00 4 1.3509 $30 $94.33 $377.32 493 126 
11 $300.00 4 1.9190 $50 $103.45 $413.72 700 138 
22 $300.00 4 1.6044 $10 $95.84 $383.35 586 128 
24 $300.00 4 1.6767 N $99.38 $397.52 612 133 
31 $300.00 4 1.7852 N $101.25 $405.00 652 135 
32 $300.00 2 1.4247 $45 $180.00 $360.00 520 120 
34 $300.00 2 1.4247 $45 $180.00 $360.00 520 120 
35 $300.00 4 0.8219 N $87.67 $350.68 300 117 
 
 
It can be seen that the all inclusive APRs are not as large for the small payday loan product 
of greater than one week‖s duration. It is also instructive to note that many of the $300 
products of two or four week‖s duration have similar total repayments to the one week 
products listed, with much smaller APRs. The use of the APR to compare payday loans of 
different durations may therefore actually be misleading.  
 
Table A (3) Large payday loans 
 
No. Principal Duration Interest Fees Weekly Total APR Total 
 ($)  all  payment payments all payments 
  (weeks) inclusive    inclusive as a % of 
   (% / day)    (%pa) principal 
18 $1000.00 8 0.9459 N 166.25 1330.00 345 133 
22 $1000.00 4 1.3348 $10 313.63 1254.52 487 125 
30 $1000.00 1 3.0135 $170 1231.01 1231.01 1100 123 
32 $1000.00 2 1.4247 $150 600.00 1200.00 520 120 
34 $1000.00 2 1.4245 $150 600.00 1200.00 520 120 
35 $1000.00 4 0.8219 N 287.91 1151.64 300 115 
38 $1000.00 1 0.9462 $55 1068.15 1068.15 345 107 
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 See QOFT (2000), p12 
  
 
Interest rate caps: protection or paternalism?  43 
 
 
 
The data indicates that larger loans are also available on a payday basis. The all inclusive 
APRs on this product range from 300% to 1100%, identical to the small payday loan 
product. The total payments as a percentage of the principal sum ranged from 107% to 
133%; a result very similar to that of the small payday product. The large APRs of the one 
week small loan product are not present with the large loan product because the same fixed 
administration costs and profit associated with the small product over one week can be 
recovered as a smaller percentage of the large product whether over a short or longer period 
of time.  
 
 Non-payday loans 
 
The data obtained on those products which may be considered non-payday loans is isolated 
in Tables B(1) and (2). Most of the loan products offered by the credit providers surveyed 
were for periods in excess of two months, with a minimum repayment period of six months 
the most popular. 101 of these products were identified from the sample of credit providers. 
The all-inclusive annual percentage rate for this type of product in the survey sample ranged 
from 114% to 580%.The annual percentage rates are smaller than that for payday loans 
because the monthly interest rate (obtained by dividing the APR by 12) can be smaller while 
still returning a suitable profit to the credit provider because interest is payable over a longer 
period of time. Once again an analysis of the total repayments as a percentage of principal 
for these loans is instructive. The range lies between 134% and 307%. Thus it can be seen 
that, putting aside the possibility of payday loans being “rolled over”, or the funds being re-
lent, these loan products, when considered on an individual basis, are actually more 
profitable for the credit provider than the payday product, with the borrower on average 
paying more interest in both real terms and as a fraction of the original loan amount.  
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Table B (1)Non payday – Small loans 
 
No. Principal Duration Interest Fees Weekly Total APR Total 
 ($) (weeks) all  payment payments all payments 
   inclusive    inclusive as a % of 
   (% / day)    (%pa) principal 
1 $300.00 26 0.7562 $30 $21.76 $565.76 276 189 
 $300.00 40 0.7272 $30 $17.97 $718.80 265 240 
2 $500.00 26 0.3284 N $25.83 $671.58 120 134 
3 $300.00 39 0.4905 $100 $14.18 $553.00 179 184 
4 $300.00 26 0.5753 $25 $19.00 $494.00 210 165 
5 $300.00 26 0.6411 $25 $20.00 $520.00 234 173 
6 $300.00 21 0.7608 $25 $24.33 $511.00 278 170 
7 $300.00 12 1.0225 $30 $38.54 $462.51 373 154 
8 $300.00 26 0.6105 $50 $17.58 $457.05 223 152 
 $300.00 52 0.5421 $50 $13.45 $699.11 198 233 
10 $300.00 26 0.6723 $175 $20.44 $531.44 245 177 
 $300.00 36 0.5290 $175 $15.35 $552.60 193 184 
11 $300.00 26 0.9307 $50 $24.67 $641.50 340 214 
14 $300.00 16 0.8568 $30 $30.00 $480.00 313 160 
15 $300.00 13 0.9409 $73 $35.44 $460.73 343 154 
 $300.00 26 0.7410 $73 $21.53 $559.79 270 187 
16 $300.00 26 0.9501 $20 $25.00 $650.00 347 217 
 $300.00 39 0.8324 $20 $20.00 $780.00 304 260 
17 $500.00 26 0.4964 $50 $29.69 $772.00 181 154 
19 $300.00 24 0.7792 $15 $22.99 $551.76 284 184 
20 $300.00 24 0.7792 $140 $22.99 $551.76 284 184 
21 $300.00 24 0.7792 $140 $22.99 $551.76 284 184 
23 $300.00 26 0.6020 $100 $19.37 $503.62 220 168 
24 $300.00 13 0.9215 N $35.15 $456.95 336 152 
29 $300.00 26 1.0073 $175 $26.00 $676.00 368 225 
 $300.00 52 0.7371 $175 $17.00 $884.00 269 295 
30 $300.00 12 1.5893 $170 $47.69 $572.28 580 191 
32 $300.00 26 0.4813 $45 $17.60 $457.60 176 153 
34 $300.00 26 0.4813 $45 $17.60 $457.60 176 153 
35 $300.00 26 0.8219 N $22.84 $593.84 300 198 
36 $300.00 13 0.8219 $50 $33.69 $437.98 300 146 
 $300.00 26 0.6746 $50 $20.48 $532.38 246 177 
37 $300.00 26 0.7128 $175 $21.08 $548.08 260 183 
 $300.00 36 0.5290 $175 $15.35 $552.60 193 184 
 $300.00 32 0.6076 $175 $17.50 $560.00 222 187 
38 $300.00 52 0.5247 $28 $13.15 $683.80 192 228 
39 $300.00 52 0.4317 $175 $11.60 $603.20 158 201 
 $300.00 26 0.7052 $175 $20.96 $544.96 257 182 
40 $300.00 36 0.7499 N $19.00 $684.00 274 228 
 
 
The all inclusive APRs for the small loan product have a range of 120% – 580%, with 
repayments as a percentage of principal ranging from 134% to 195%. The wide range of 
APRs indicates a divergence of product offering in this market. However, it can be seen that 
the larger APRs are attributable to the products of shorter duration. Conversely, it can also 
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be seen for example that the products offered by provider numbers 15 and 16 have very 
similar APRs, but very different total repayments as a percentage of principal. This is due to 
the fact that provider 15‖s product is of 13 weeks duration, compared to the 26 week 
duration of provider 16‖s product. This again highlights the dangers of using only the APR 
to compare products of different duration. 
 
 
Table B (2)Non payday – Large loans  
 
No. Principal Duration Interest Fees Weekly Total APR Total 
 ($) (weeks) all  payment payments all payments 
   inclusive    inclusive as a % of 
   (% / day)    (%pa) principal 
1 $1,000.00 26 0.7545 $100 $72.51 $1,885.26 275 189 
 $1,000.00 52 0.7203 $100 $55.61 $2,891.72 263 289 
 $1,000.00 40 0.7266 $100 $59.87 $2,394.80 265 239 
2 $1,000.00 26 0.3123 N $51.00 $1,326.00 114 133 
3 $1,000.00 26 0.5112 $250 $60.08 $1,562.00 187 156 
 $1,000.00 39 0.4330 $250 $44.33 $1,729.00 158 173 
4 $1,000.00 26 0.6690 $58 $68.00 $1,768.00 244 177 
 $1,000.00 35 0.6621 $58 $59.00 $2,065.00 242 207 
5 $1,000.00 34 0.6214 $50 $57.47 $1,953.98 227 195 
6 $1,000.00 33 0.6608 $50 $60.36 $1,992.00 241 199 
7 $1,000.00 26 0.6099 $50 $65.00 $1,690.00 223 169 
8 $1,000.00 39 0.5421 $50 $50.00 $1,950.00 198 195 
 $1,000.00 26 0.5408 $50 $61.53 $1,599.78 197 160 
 $1,000.00 52 0.5234 $50 $43.76 $2,275.52 191 228 
9 $1,000.00 32 0.4070 $350 $48.28 $1,544.96 149 154 
 $1,000.00 36 0.3564 $350 $42.60 $1,533.60 130 153 
10 $1,000.00 26 0.4692 $175 $58.08 $1,510.00 171 151 
 $1,000.00 36 0.3784 $175 $43.64 $1,571.00 138 157 
11 $1,000.00 26 0.6105 $75 $65.00 $1,690.00 223 169 
12 $1,000.00 36 0.5129 N $50.32 $1,811.52 187 181 
13 $1,000.00 26 0.4932 N $59.24 $1,540.36 180 154 
 $1,000.00 52 0.4590 N $40.15 $2,087.80 168 209 
14 $1,000.00 26 0.5096 $70 $60.00 $1,560.00 186 156 
 $1,000.00 39 0.4853 $70 $47.00 $1,833.00 177 183 
15 $1,000.00 26 0.5490 $73 $61.94 $1,610.44 200 161 
 $1,000.00 52 0.5273 $73 $43.99 $2,287.24 192 229 
16 $1,000.00 26 0.6105 $50 $65.00 $1,690.00 223 169 
 $1,000.00 39 0.6510 $50 $56.00 $2,184.00 238 218 
17 $1,000.00 29 0.5839 $50 $60.00 $1,740.00 213 174 
18 $1,000.00 26 0.5014 N $59.62 $1,550.00 183 155 
19 $1,000.00 36 0.3870 $300 $44.04 $1,585.44 141 159 
20 $1,000.00 36 0.3870 $300 $44.04 $1,585.44 141 159 
21 $1,000.00 36 0.3870 $300 $44.04 $1,585.44 141 159 
22 $1,000.00 26 1.1510 $10 $95.27 $2,477.00 420 248 
23 $1,000.00 26 0.4150 $100 $55.56 $1,444.56 151 144 
24 $1,000.00 52 0.4300 N $38.58 $2,006.16 157 201 
 $1,000.00 26 0.6156 N $65.25 $1,696.50 225 170 
25 $1,000.00 26 0.5908 $385 $64.00 $1,664.00 216 166 
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26 $1,000.00 31 0.5451 $320 $56.00 $1,736.00 199 174 
27 $1,000.00 26 0.5615 $50 $62.55 $1,626.30 205 163 
 $1,000.00 52 0.5290 $50 $44.08 $2,292.16 193 229 
 $1,000.00 26 0.3468 $100 $52.48 $1,364.48 127 136 
 $1,000.00 52 0.2933 $100 $31.59 $1,642.68 107 164 
28 $1,000.00 26 0.6273 $350 $65.85 $1,712.10 229 171 
29 $1,000.00 26 0.6108 $375 $65.00 $1,690.00 223 169 
 $1,000.00 52 0.4192 $375 $38.00 $1,976.00 153 198 
30 $1,000.00 52 0.7756 $170 $59.13 $3,074.76 283 307 
 $1,000.00 26 0.8393 $170 $77.10 $2,004.60 306 200 
31 $1,000.00 26 0.6273 $350 $65.85 $1,712.10 229 171 
32 $1,000.00 26 0.4813 $150 $58.71 $1,526.44 176 153 
33 $1,000.00 26 0.3768 $60 $53.82 $1,399.32 138 140 
34 $1,000.00 26 0.4813 $150 $58.71 $1,526.44 176 153 
35 $1,000.00 26 0.8219 N $76.14 $1,979.64 300 198 
36 $1,000.00 26 0.5024 $50 $59.67 $1,551.42 183 155 
 $1,000.00 52 0.4790 $50 $41.27 $2,146.04 175 215 
37 $1,000.00 26 0.4830 $325 $58.74 $1,527.24 176 153 
 $1,000.00 36 0.3893 $325 $44.15 $1,589.40 142 159 
 $1,000.00 32 0.4185 $325 $48.83 $1,562.56 153 156 
38 $1,000.00 52 0.5119 $55 $43.11 $2,241.72 187 224 
39 $1,000.00 52 0.3225 $175 $33.03 $1,717.56 118 172 
 $1,000.00 26 0.5027 $175 $59.69 $1,551.94 183 155 
40 $1,000.00 36 0.5066 N $50.00 $1800.00 185 180 
 
 
The all inclusive APRs for the large loan product have a range of 107% to 420%. The total 
repayments as a percentage of principal ranged from 133% to 307%. This again demonstrates 
a divergence of product offering in this market, and it can again be seen that the products 
with the highest APRs are of the shortest duration. The product from provider number 38 
is a long duration product of one (1) year. Whilst this product possesses a mid-range APR of 
187%, the total repayments as a percentage of principal is an above average figure of 224%, 
again highlighting the importance of comparing loans using an APR and a measure of the 
total interest payable. 
 
Fees and Charges 
 
Both the payday and non-payday product were found to be available with or without the 
payment of an additional fee. The additional fee when levied took the form of either an 
administrative charge, establishment charge, application charge, or a cashing fee. The 
cashing fee involves the customer taking a cheque or other money order to a bank, which 
then provides the face value of the order less the cashing fee percentage which is retained in 
the lender‖s account. 
 
Table A indicates that the fees payable on the payday loan product ranged from $0 to $170. 
Table B indicates that the fees payable on the non-payday loan product ranged from $0 to 
$385. 
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The levying of a fee or charge in addition to the standard interest payments has a large effect 
on the real cost of the loan. Although the sample is not a representative one, it is interesting 
to compare the average all-inclusive APR to an interest only APR (excluding fees and 
charges). The average all-inclusive APR for the payday loan product is 718%, compared to 
an average interest only APR of 404% when fees or charges are removed. Thus it can be seen 
on average that fees and charges make up nearly 50% of the total cost of the payday loan 
products in this sample. 
 
The average all-inclusive APR for the non-payday loan product is 222%, compared to an 
average interest only APR of 173% when fees or charges are removed. Fees do add 
considerably to the average cost of these non-payday loans in the sample, but the effect is 
not as great as that on their payday counterparts because the total interest payments are 
generally higher. 
 
This data indicates the importance of using the all-inclusive APR rather than just an interest 
only APR calculation when ascertaining the true cost of a given product and for making 
comparisons between products. 
 
Default interest rate or charges 
 
None of the sampled products feature the imposition of a higher rate of interest by the 
credit provider in the event of default by the borrower. Interest in all cases simply continues 
to accrue at the usual rate, and this is permissible under the UCCC. 
 
Most credit providers do impose a fixed fee in each instance of default, ranging from $9.00 
to $36.00. In many cases this represents a direct debit dishonour fee, but the larger fixed fees 
also denote a payment to the provider. Some providers also require the default fee to be paid 
on a weekly basis until the customer‖s account is brought up to date.(Survey respondent no. 
2)   
 
Security 
Survey results reveal that the payday and non-payday products are offered with or without 
security, depending on the provider. The type of security required to be given includes 
motor vehicles or household items. There is only weak evidence suggesting that secured loan 
products are available at less cost to the customer. Again acknowledging that the sample is 
not representative, it is interesting to compare the average APRs between secured and 
unsecured products in this sample. The average all- inclusive APR for secured products was 
307%, whilst the average for unsecured products was 327%. The 20% APR premium on 
non-secured loans seems insignificant given the large spread of APR‖s across all products 
confirmed by a standard deviation of 343%. At any rate the premium is only 1.67% per 
month. 
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Rollover 
 
Credit providers were asked whether their loan products contained a facility whereby 
customers could borrow further funds before their existing loans were repaid, effectively 
rolling the existing loan over into a new loan. Giving the customer the right to roll over 
their loan furthers their indebtedness and may create a situation where a loan is continually 
rolled over whenever a customer is unable to make a repayment. This has the potential to 
perpetuate the repayments. The rollover risk is of greatest concern with the high APR 
payday loan products because if the product is continually rolled over the actual repayments 
will start to approach the extremely high APR. 
 
Of the 21 payday products for which data was obtained, 15 were able to be rolled over. Of 
the 102 non payday products, 76 were able to be rolled over. 
 
Most credit providers were only prepared to allow the loan to be rolled over where specific 
conditions had been met, for example, where the customer had made at least 50% of the 
repayments, had made 8 repayments in a row, 20 repayments in a row, or was “a good 
payer”.(Survey respondent no‖s 11,16,19 and 20) Others establish the loan as a continuing 
credit contract product from the outset so that the customer is able to continually withdraw 
provided the outstanding amount never exceeds the original principal. Some providers also 
levied a redraw fee. (Survey respondent no. 23) 
 
Microloan Product Summary 
 
Result Ranges 
 
Product Principal Available  Fees APR Total 
Type ($) Duration ($) all payments 
  (weeks)  inclusive as a % of 
    (%pa) principal 
Payday 300 1 Nil - $170 390-3380 110-165 
 300 2-8 Nil - $50 300-700 120-138 
 1000 1-8 Nil - $170 300-1100 107-133 
Small loan 300 12-52 Nil - $175 120-580 134-295 
Large loan 1000 26-52 Nil - $375 107-420 133-307 
 
 
In analysing the sample of microloan products from 40 lenders in Queensland, the following 
issues are worth highlighting: 
 
 The sample suggests that there is a diversity of product cost, duration, security 
requirement and rollover availability in the Queensland market for payday loan 
products and small and large personal loans from micro-lenders; 
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 Customers are generally required to have some form of income and be able to 
provide proof of income; 
 
 Secured and non-secured products are available but there is only weak evidence that 
the presence of security reduces the cost of the product; 
 
 There is a range of all inclusive APRs for similar products in these markets, 
indicating that competition may not be acting to produce convergence of price; 
 
 The payday loan products have the larger all inclusive APRs but require a smaller 
repayment as a percentage of the principal loaned than their non payday 
counterparts, they are thus less expensive in real terms; 
 
 Small loans have larger all inclusive APRs than large loans, but both products require 
similar repayments as a percentage of principal; 
 
 Most products are only available with the payment of a fee in addition to the normal 
interest charges. This fee has on average a large effect on the all-inclusive APR 
attributable to some products. Fees make up, on average, almost 50% of the total 
repayments on the payday products in this sample; 
 
 Most products are provided on a continuing credit contract basis or are able to be 
rolled over at the request of the customer; 
 
 The APR is a suitable device for comparing the cost of similar or different sized loan 
products repayable over similar timeframes; 
 
 The APR can be misleading if used alone to compare products of similar size over 
different durations. A complementary measure which takes into account total 
interest payable should also be utilised;  
 
 Some credit providers do not understand the correct use of the APR. They 
determine annual rates for their products by simply dividing total repayment by 
principal. This is misleading because it ignores the reality that interest is applied to a 
diminishing balance, and yields an artificially low result. 
 
Given that the sample is not representative, this conclusions cannot be directly extrapolated 
to the microloan market in Queensland. However, the information provides a useful 
snapshot of the types of products available in 2006.  
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8. The views of consumer advocates 
 
 
 
In this research, we interviewed consumer advocates based in Queensland, where there were 
no upfront controls on the cost of credit at the time of interviews, and consumer advocates 
based in New South Wales, Victoria, and the ACT, where an interest rate cap or caps is 
imposed on credit that is regulated by the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”). The 
specific questions asked of the consumer advocates are set out in appendix B.  
 
This chapter summarises the views and perspectives of these consumer advocates in relation 
to the merits or otherwise of controls on the cost of consumer credit.  
 
All of the consumer advocates interviewed for this research worked for organisations that 
provided legal and/or financial counselling casework and advice services. Many (but not all) 
of the consumers that come into contact with these services would be living on a low 
income, or would be otherwise disadvantaged in the consumer credit market. For the most 
part, consumers contact these services when they are in financial difficulty and/or have a 
complaint or concern about a financial product or service. Therefore, consumers who are 
managing their credit commitments, and who are happy with their choice of product and 
provider, are unlikely to come into contact with these services.  
 
The experiences and responses of the consumer advocates are consequently coloured by the 
experiences of the consumers with whom they work. This has lead to criticisms that the 
comments of consumer advocates do not represent the experiences of consumers generally 
(or even, on this topic, the experiences of consumers of fringe loans generally). On the other 
hand, the experiences of these consumers can point to problem areas, even if it is not 
necessarily possible to quantify the extent of these problem areas without further research, 
including research into the experiences of a broad cross-section of fringe lending customers.  
 
 
The position of low income and vulnerable consumers in today’s consumer credit 
market 
 
Consumer advocates uniformly raised concerns that consumers living on low incomes are 
often disadvantaged in today‖s consumer credit market. Their credit needs are not normally 
met by mainstream lenders; they have limited choice in product and provider (or believe 
that they have limited choice); and their finance needs are often attended to with a degree of 
urgency that does not normally facilitate reflection on purchasing decisions (even assuming 
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the likelihood that consumers behave in the ―economically rational‖ fashion that underpins 
most consumer protection legislation).
186
   
 
 
Reasons why consumers take out high cost credit 
 
Consumer advocates pointed to a range of circumstances in which individual consumers, 
particularly those living on a low income, are likely to take out high cost credit – that is, 
credit with effective annual interest rates that are considerably higher than those offered by 
mainstream lenders. (Chapters 6 and 7 of this report show a range of interest rates on 
products available on mainstream and  micro-loan or “fringe” lenders in Queensland in 
2006, and a comparison highlights the considerable differences in costs.) 
 
One key reason given was that many consumers, particularly those on low incomes, are 
seeking relatively small loans, at least initially. Often, consumers are seeking to borrow 
sums less than $1,000 or $2,000. For example, one advocate noted that, in relation to payday 
loans: 
 
The typical amount to start off is usually two to five hundred dollars. That is the typical 
amount. And it’s usually for car rego or, you know, it can be bond loans …(C6, p4) 
 
However, many mainstream lenders shy away from offering small loans. For example, data 
at cannex.com.au shows that while some (small) credit providers – usually locally based 
credit unions – have minimum loan amounts of $1,000 or less; most of the banks and larger 
institutions, with a wider geographic reach, have a minimum personal loan amount of 
$3,000 - $5,000.
187
  
 
Advocates also noted that consumers may be using high cost loans because they are not seen 
as credit-worthy by mainstream organisations (they have a poor credit record; their income 
is too low). This can be the case for both small and large loans, with the consumer advocates 
interviewed also discussing cases of high cost loans for larger amounts, including in the case 
of consumers who are borrowing to purchase housing (or to refinance an existing housing 
loan). 
 
For example, advocates referred to larger loans, secured by housing or expected litigation 
proceeds (crimes compensation payouts). In these examples, a number of the consumer 
advocates interviewed raised concerns that, while these loans might be offered at interest 
rates that are below the maximum that applies in some jurisdictions, they are offered at an 
unreasonably high cost, given the nature of the security standing behind the loan. 
 
                                                 
186
 Note the work of behavioural economists that is challenging these assumptions as discussed in Howells (2005) 
and Willis (2008).  
187
 Data from www.cannex.com.au, Selected Personal Loans – Unsecured, 25 July 2007, at 
http://intranets.cannex.com.au/surveys/perunsec.htm.    
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[Lenders] are cropping up all the time and in particular with the personal injuries' payouts 
… For example [if] you were about to get a victims of crime compensation payout and you 
were desperate for the money, in the case of victims of crime payments if the person who 
the order’s name is against can't pay the government will pay, so it's pretty guaranteed 
that you'll get the money even though it might take a little while to get that money. But 
we're finding that the interest rates in those particular loans typically run over 100 
percent. So when you think of how secure that lending is there's no way... There isn't any 
risk at all.. (C4, p12) 
 
 
There are a number of reasons why low income consumers might turn to high cost lenders 
for credit. High cost lenders might be more prepared to lend to consumers with low 
incomes, or with poor credit records, than would be mainstream lenders.  
 
… the people who use this type of the end of the market aren’t the mainstream people, 
they’re the low-income disadvantaged groups. Simply because if they weren’t in that group 
they usually use the mainstream credit, which of course is much lower cost. Plus a 
definition of the people who use fringe loans is that they can’t get into mainstream credit, 
and that’s true based on my casework experience.(C2, p1) 
 
Further reasons cited are the speed and convenience of the services provided by many high 
cost lenders.  
 
One advocate also commented particularly on the use of high cost loans by those with a 
gambling addiction, with the speed, anonymity and convenience considered to be a high 
priority for these borrowers. These borrowers may not necessarily be on low incomes; 
indeed for some, the opposite situation may be true. However, they are excluded, or self-
exclude, from mainstream institutions, and their addiction will often make them vulnerable 
to exploitative practices.  
 
… I think that 95 per cent of the clients I would see don’t have - they’re very intelligent 
people, they’re in good paying jobs, so it’s not a matter of not being able to read the 
contract, it’s a matter of they don’t because they’re so desperate to get the money. And I 
think that’s where the protection is needed...they have this belief that next time they’ll be 
okay so if they can just make it over to then. They’ve probably exhausted all their 
borrowing from family members or from run of the mill lenders so they go into the next 
quick loans. It’s an important factor for clients, they’re quick and they’re usually fairly 
autonomous, they don’t have to go through the channels that they would do if they were 
going to get another credit card..(C5, pp7,8) 
 
In relation to loan purpose, consumer advocates generally referred to loans being taken out 
for meeting essentials: bills, car expenses, educational needs, and daily expenses. However, 
there were two exceptions. As noted above, one consumer advocate pointed to the use of 
high cost loans by those with a gambling addiction. 
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Another consumer advocate questioned the assumption that high cost loans were used to 
cover normal living expenses (need): 
 
The second issue I think that really needs to be discussed is that the vast majority of fringe 
lending loans that I see are not for need, they’re for want. They aren’t for absolute basic 
necessities; they’re like for Christmas presents, gambling and things like that that aren’t 
actually needs. Funnily enough, which is a good thing, when they’re actually needs and 
they fit the NILS criteria and so forth, the expectation is they are getting that assistance … 
through a NILS program. The big problem is where the money is required for something 
that isn’t a need. That’s where the fringe lending market moves in.(C2, p5) 
 
This type of comment was not reflected in the comments by other consumer advocates. 
And indeed it may also be locality specific, in that NILS programs and other alternatives to 
fringe lending programs may be much more accessible in some jurisdictions and localities 
than in others.
188
  
 
It also may reflect differences in view as to what qualifies as a ―need‖ and what qualifies as a 
―want‖. 
 
Consumers are desperate for finance 
 
Almost all advocates interviewed highlighted the desperation of the borrowers who took 
out high cost loans, and in fact, their comments suggest that they believe that this is a key 
feature of the fringe lending market.  
 
According to the advocates interviewed, this desperation arises because of inability to save 
small amounts regularly to meet expected lump sum expenses (car registration, etc); threats 
of loss of secured property, or disconnection from essential services or housing due to non-
payment of bills.  
 
In most cases, advocates suggested or implied that this desperation operates to dissuade the 
borrower from shopping around; create a perception (if not reality) of limited options; 
encourages use of lenders who can approve loans very quickly, within the one day; and 
dissuade consumers from giving consideration to the true cost of the loan.  
 
There was also a suggestion by a number of advocates that this desperation and vulnerability 
can be consciously or unconsciously played upon by high cost lenders to offer very high 
cost products: 
 
I think there is an element of they are marketing these products to people who are not 
turned off by high excessive cost. Its finance at any cost and so whether its 48 percent or 
100 percent unfortunately its not a market, or they are targeting consumers who are less 
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likely to be put off by the extremely high cost of credit and the difficulty that they will have 
paying even in the short-term.(C9, pp1-2)  
 
Problems with loans – affordability, unfair, rollovers, securities 
 
Consumer advocates interviewed consistently raised a number of key problems (as they saw 
them) with high cost loans: 
 
 borrowers often do not have the capacity to repay the loans; 
 the common use of rollovers and extensions creates unmanageable debt spirals;  
 lenders are exploiting vulnerabilities and desperation by offering loans that are 
unreasonably priced; 
 consumers do not understand the cost of the loans, and indeed, in some cases the cost 
is not accurately described; 
 the taking of securities, particularly security over household goods, is an unfair 
practice. 
 
These are discussed further below.  
 
Capacity to repay 
 
The consumer advocates interviewed raised concerns that borrowers often do not have the 
capacity to repay high cost loans. They noted that, for consumers on a low income, 
particularly those in receipt of government benefits, repayments on a high cost loan can 
often be impossible to meet, even from the outset. 
 
And the other thing is it's the very fact that they're charging that high interest rate that 
actually makes the possibility of default just so much more real. Because if you're paying 
on $1000 15 percent like you would on a credit card, you're paying back $150 a year in 
interest, which is about $3.00 a week, which most people can afford. Or even if you did 30 
percent, still $6.00 a week. The chances of people having to default on that because of 
capacity to pay issues are very slim. However, when you have interest rates of 240 percent 
that increases your interest to $50 a week on a $1000 loan. Now you're going to have 
capacity to pay issues. So the chances of the person defaulting are just increased 
dramatically when you put those sorts of figures in place.(C4, pp8-9)   
 
And similarly: 
 
I mean the next big issue is that they are usually on low incomes right? And the pie of their 
income is not very big and as a result any payments to a loan usually impacts terribly on 
them paying other bills, getting food and those sorts of things. I mean for example a big 
credit provider fringe lender is [micro-lender] and they run straight on the one-third rule - 
that one third of your income can go straight to repayments to them so they'll end up with 
one third. Now that seems reasonable if you're going to get a personal loan from a bank 
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and you have an income that is actually a wage income rather than Centrelink. But when 
you're talking about Centrelink a third of your income is an absolute fortune, a big slice 
of the pie. Whereas Centrelink is actually apportioned and worked out basically to cover 
essentials of rent and food and bills, and you take that slice of a one-third to the credit 
provider, the fringe lender and that just causes poverty.(C2, pp2-3) 
 
Well, it doesn’t allow to save because if you’re on the Centrelink benefit the benefit is the 
amount you need to survive on, nothing extra. And if they do have a little part time job 
usually that is paying for the extras that they can’t afford because of the Centrelink 
payment that everybody just takes for granted. You know, so it is very difficult. Very 
difficult. So I think there should be more products out there that low income people can 
access.(C6, pp21-22) 
 
Rollovers and debt spirals 
 
Consumer advocates suggested that this situation is exacerbated dramatically if rollovers or 
extensions of high cost loans, or refinancing or new loans, are permitted by the lender (or a 
new lender) and taken out by the consumer. 
 
In this context, consumer advocates also suggested that, while consumers might take out a 
short-term loan with the intention of repaying it within the required timeframe, in fact, 
they overestimate their ability to do so, with the result that a rollover, extension or 
refinance is sought; the costs increase; the short-term loan in practice becomes a longer term 
loan; and consumers enter debt spirals from which it is difficult to escape without a 
substantial change in their financial position, or bankruptcy.  
 
Largely because experience has shown that vulnerable consumers are not put off by 
excessive or exploitative rates of interest and in their short-term need for access to credit 
will not necessarily take into account the likelihood that they will end up with revolving 
high-cost credit thereby compounding already high rates of interest. It's been pointed out 
in a number of studies that that's very common behaviour that people will take on say 14 
day so called pay day loans with the full intention of paying off those loans at the end of 
the fourteen day period. But then simply take out another one simply because they're 
unable to raise the money to pay off the outstanding amount at the end of that period.(C9, 
pp1-2) 
 
The most obvious impact is it's a debt trap – they never repay the loan. So I see consumer 
after consumer who basically ends up in a revolving debt trap where they keep renewing 
the loan and adding more to the loan because they can never repay the original loan. (C2, 
p2) 
 
… and the back to back loans and what they do is, I find with fringe credit providers, they 
offer these back to back loans, some loan may not be paid off and they’ll say, “Okay, we’ll 
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give you another one which is another lot of fees and then another lot of interest rates on 
top of that. (C6, pp3-4) 
 
One consumer advocate also suggested that consumer preference is generally for longer-term 
loans (at reasonable repayment rates), rather than the very short payday loans, but they take 
out payday loans because these are what the market has delivered. And the market delivered 
short-term loans due to the initial exclusion of these products from the UCCC.
189
 
 
… because my experience from talking to lots and lots of consumers over the phone is they 
always wanted longer-term loans; they didn't want a payday loan because usually the loan 
was too big to pay each pay day. They wanted to be able to pay it over a longer term, but 
the payday lenders arose simply to avoid the Consumer Credit Code so they could charge 
what they liked.(C2, p3) 
 
 
Price of loans is exploitative and uncompetitive 
 
Another concern raised by a number of consumer advocates interviewed was that the price 
of these high cost loans was in fact exploitative. They suggested that credit providers were 
taking advantage of the vulnerabilities of consumers to offer products at a very high cost, 
where the absence of a competitive market for these types of loans results in excessive and 
unfair profits – the products were priced unfairly. 
 
 
Because competitive sources don't work at all in relation to the low end of the market. The 
only competition is who can charge the most. So the competition has just completely failed. 
(C2, p1) 
 
[In relation to loans secured by compensation payments] … So it ends up costing you 
$50,000 to have $20,000 two weeks earlier. So it's incredibly unfair and it relies on 
keeping people uninformed, but also really relying on the desperation of people, in 
circumstances where there's very very low risk. It's lower risk than a bank, than securing 
against property.(C4, pp2-3) 
 
 
Consumer advocates questioned whether credit providers were operating efficiently, and the 
suggestion that it would be appropriate for policy makers to work out what the cost of 
provision for these loans was, and then set an interest rate cap relevant to this figure. 
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… people in Victoria for instance are saying let's work out what's a reasonable profit and 
cap according to that – that is just absurd. We're not in the business of working out 
profits. What regulators should be in the business of doing is making sure that consumers 
are protected from exploitative lending and so putting the cart before the horse that way is 
just absurd.(C2, p10) 
 
See I think that says that they're saying we're providing the product inefficiently and the 
market should pay for it and I don't think that's a valid argument really.(C4, p16) 
 
One consumer advocate also noted that the high cost of the loans meant that consumers 
were not getting any value from the loan, and that this impacted on their ability to save and 
meet other calls on their income: 
 
I don't think they're getting anything for it at the moment, because if you pay – say you 
take out $1000 loan and end up paying $60 a week or something and you're paying $50 
interest and $10 a week off your principal, it's still going to take you two or three years at 
$60 a week to repay $1000. You're not getting much benefit for that. It would have a huge 
impact on being able to save. These loans are unfair. Say you can't charge that and we'd 
have so many of those people not getting into that situation.(C6, p16) 
 
Understanding the cost of loans 
 
A related concern raised by consumer advocates was that consumers often do not 
understand the real cost of a high cost loan.  
 
This can be because interest rates in this sector often seem to be disclosed according to the 
repayment term (ie 20% per month), and to the extent that consumers make comparisons, 
they make it with annual interest rates.  
 
Now the other thing that we've really found in our work is that people get quoted the 
interest rate, they get told 20 percent and we've actually done some cold calling on that, 
20 percent. Even if they're told that's per month, but generally they're told the interest rate 
is 20 percent. They don't realise it's 20 percent per month, so they compare 20 percent to 
15 percent and they think well that's not too bad, I can afford that or that's fair. Whereas 
when they get in there and get the money and then subsequently realise it's 240 percent 
they think they've been severely ripped off and it's too late for them to do anything about 
it.(C4,pp8-9) 
 
[Are they quoting them as annual interest rates or monthly interest rates?] They 
actually do whatever interest rate that the person is taking the payment out and usually 
it’s monthly, which sounds quite reasonable and, I mean, people are gobsmacked when you 
sit down and actually do the interest with them. And some know it and feel ashamed, like, 
how could I have got caught up in that, you know? (C5, pp5-6) 
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Consumer advocates also pointed to common scenarios where consumers in fact do not 
look at the cost of the loan at the time of signing, largely due to their immediate need for 
finance. In these circumstances, consumers will take out the loan almost regardless of the 
cost. They don‖t necessarily have any understanding of the real cost of the loan, but even if 
they did, it would be unlikely to factor heavily in their decision making process. 
 
Unfair taking of low-value securities 
 
A final major concern that consumer advocates raised about the provision of high cost loans 
was the unfair taking of securities, to secure repayment of the loan. Concerns were raised 
both about the taking of vehicles as security (ie comparing the value of the vehicle to the 
size of the loan), and even more vehemently, about the taking of security over basic 
household goods, including furniture, whitegoods, pots and pans, and other items that 
would not be available to an unsecured creditor in the event of the consumer‖s 
bankruptcy.
190
 
 
The primary concern raised was that these types of low-value securities were not being 
taken with a view to the credit provider taking possession of the goods and selling them to 
recoup their costs in the event of a consumer defaulting on their loan. Instead, consumer 
advocates were concerned that these low value securities were used to (unfairly) ensure that 
consumers prioritise their loan repayments over their other living expenses. 
 
And then they always, if they can, take security then over a car and it always amazes me 
because one people are very desperate to keep their car, so even if the loan is $8000 and the 
car is only worth $1000, because they are so reliant on that car they'd do anything to pay 
that money, not to lose the car. And that's the whole reason why some of those lenders take 
security over household goods. They can't get any money from that, it's just a ploy to put 
pressure - unimaginable pressure – on people to pay up, because the last thing that you 
want to be doing is having someone come into your house, or the threat of someone 
coming into your house and taking the TV the kids are watching.(C4, pp8-9)
 
 
 
 
[In relation to security over household goods] …. a lot of these people get to the point that 
because they have to pay these debts otherwise, “Right, I’m going to lose the pots and pans, 
I can’t cook. The kids’ blankets, the car”, they tend to say, “Well, look, I’ll go to the Salvos 
for a food parcel because I can’t afford to live.(C6, p9) 
 
 
As discussed below, many of the consumer advocates interviewed suggested that credit 
providers should not be permitted to take security over basic household goods.  
 
 
Personal impact – short-term and long-term (demand for loans) 
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Underlying all of these concerns was the common view held by the consumer advocates 
interviewed that, in most cases, high cost loans have a deleterious impact on borrowers, at 
least in the long-term, but also often in the short-term. Most pointed to a situation where 
repayments on high cost loans divert limited household resources to loan repayments, 
impacting on the ability of households on low-incomes to meet their basic living expenses 
because, in reality, there is little fat or buffer in their income/expenses equation to allow for 
the (relatively) large loan repayments that are required under most of these high cost loans.  
 
Consumer advocates pointed to immediate financial and non-financial costs for consumers, 
including an inability to meet basic expenses, and stress and negative impacts on personal 
relationships.  
 
If the situation is that you are not able to pay for what you've got to pay for week to week 
then it's not going to improve your situation, and on top of that a credit payment as well 
and if it's a high cost credit payment then it's just going to tip you over the brink. Though 
in the short term I suppose what happens is you just cut back your expenses on other things, 
but if you're not living very high then those other things are going to be basics and things 
for your children, things for their education, nutrition so that's the short-term. The long-
term effect is that you just have to bail out and then you can't cope at all and then you 
become bankrupt so you lose any assets that you have, if you even have assets. You're much 
worse off than before and that's financial. And then on top of the financial things you 
have all the non-financial things like the stress that it causes an individual when they are 
slowly going under and the impact upon their relationships. So the impact of high cost 
credit is considerable.(C3, pp2-3) 
 
 
I think it’s the high cost obviously leads to some people being unable to pay, it then leads to 
penalty fees. It just makes things worse and possibly worsens their situation and given that 
most people who are using this credit are in some sort of financially desperate situation to 
start with it just exacerbates it.(C8, pp7-8) 
 
I only spoke to someone yesterday who said that's the very thing they were doing, they 
were paying back a loan to [micro-lender] and they were having to go down and get food 
parcels because the loan was secured against their car and they couldn't afford to lose it. So 
does that mean that other agencies are just picking up the tab for lending and for them 
being able to recover that interest? Because it's not only going to affect food, it's also going 
to affect whether they can pay their school fees, or their electricity bills or their phone bills, 
or their phone gets cut off; or whether they can remain at the place that they're living in, 
so whether that makes it more difficult to make rental repayments. But I know that often 
happens where people have said to me I have to get food parcels because I don't have 
enough money because the money is coming out for this loan.(C4, p12) 
 
Of course, to some extent, these are the impacts more generally of living on a low income:  
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But of course the underlying reasons why people are there [accessing high cost credit] is that 
they either don't have sufficient income to manage ongoing expenses and are not likely to 
be able to augment that income in sufficient time to pay off the loan, and certainly unable 
to do so to cover the high rates of interest that are often levied as well. (C9, p2) 
 
Consumer advocates recognised that there was a demand for these high cost loans, and that, 
at the time, consumers often believed that the loan had a positive impact –  in that it enabled 
them to re-register or repair their car, or replace broken whitegoods, or prevent essential 
services from being disconnected. However, consumer advocates were concerned that, in the 
long-term, the existing financial position of most borrowers, and the high cost of 
repayments, in fact, ended up making the consumer‖s financial position worse. 
 
… so it is fulfilling a need, but the reality is that the cost of that product is more likely than 
not to compound the financial difficulties of borrowers in that situation. It's a product 
that preys on their desperation and need for short-term cash, but really because of the high 
cost either of fees or interest or both that are associated with that product, it only ends up 
in most cases compounding their financial difficulty.(C9, p2) 
 
 
… I think one of the key arguments on pay day lending is that the evidence suggests that 
having that sort of credit available, first of all, the main use of it is because people are 
financially desperate and in a spot and they have a shortfall with rent or bills or some 
other sort of thing. Dean Wilson’s research here didn’t cover a lot but we haven’t much 
else to go by, you know, he basically said by looking at the number of people who had 
borrowed again a number of times in a year all had refinanced their loans; if you add all 
of them up then … and if you assume that if someone has to borrow that many … you 
know, if someone had to get a loan every couple of months then you can probably make 
an assumption that the original loan that they got didn’t necessarily help them. It 
temporarily helps but then they’re sort of in a worse situation and they have to keep using 
these loans. (C8, pp3-5) 
 
 
Now I can understand – and I'm sure this is the point that they're making is – if you're 
desperate to register your car you will want to borrow $500 to register your car. However, 
if you get that money and can't afford to pay it back you end up losing your car anyway 
and the whole way to get your kids to and from school any way, how has providing that 
credit actually helped those people? It hasn't helped them at all and what we need to do is 
develop alternative ways to make access to credit affordable ...(C6, p12) 
  
On the other hand, some consumer advocates did acknowledge that some consumers might 
gain some benefits from high cost loans, where, for example, the alternative to the loan 
might be more costly, or where the consumer was less vulnerable and speed was an issue.  
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For example if you go somewhere that’s giving you a loan for a fridge and it’s a very … 
let’s say it’s a very responsible lender or whatever, even if there’s quite a bit of interest on 
there there’s a benefit, you’re paying it off over time, you know, it’s actually having a 
fridge … having a fridge is going to mean savings in the long run or whether you’re 
buying a cheap car to go to work or, you know, the sorts of things people might get with 
say a loan from the Brotherhood or something. I actually think that it’s not just one’s low 
cost and one’s high cost; I actually think that the Brotherhood…type loans go back a bit 
like they do in the old days where you actually had to have a purpose for getting a personal 
loan. So first of all there’s a genuine, specific purpose. Secondly that purpose often means 
savings in the future, whether it’s enabling you to get to work or cook more meals at home 
or whatever it is.(C8, p6) 
 
Here a distinction seems to be drawn between very high cost loans, and loans that are more 
costly than mainstream loans, but not unreasonably so. 
 
Overall, however, the consumer advocates interviewed appeared to reflect the view that, 
particularly in the long term, very high cost loans are ultimately detrimental to consumers. 
 
Broader – society wide - impact of loans 
 
Consumer advocates also raised concerns that very high cost loans can have a negative 
impact more broadly, particularly in the sense that consumers with insufficient income to 
meet their loan repayments and their daily living expenses look to assistance from charities 
and community service organisations, and/or government welfare agencies. 
 
 I also think that it also puts a strain on welfare agencies because a lot of these people get to 
the point that because they have to pay these debts otherwise, “Right, I’m going to lose the 
pots and pans, I can’t cook. The kids’ blankets, the car”, they tend to say, “Well, look, I’ve 
got [to go] to the Salvos for a food parcel because I can’t afford to live”. So there’s also an 
impact on welfare agencies too. And scary thing about it is that they’re going without food 
and the children are going without food because they have to pay. And they’re going 
without school needs, but, you know. Yes, it’s an impact on… on the whole of society, 
really, the whole of the community. (C6, p9) 
 
Need for regulation 
 
Consumer advocates were asked whether there was a need for controls on the cost of credit 
in order to protect low income and vulnerable consumers. The unanimous response from 
the advocates was that there was a real need for controls. Although the interviewers did not 
specifically identify interest rate caps as one form of cost control, all advocates responded 
with the view that an interest rate cap was an appropriate form of control.  
 
In making the case for an interest rate cap, the advocates interviewed pointed to concerns 
about the negative impact of high cost loans on individuals and the broader community; the 
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vulnerability of fringe lending customers to unaffordable loans; exploitative pricing; the 
risks of roll-overs and back to back loans, and of debt spirals, and other matters discussed 
above.  
 
Impact on credit providers  
 
The consumer advocates interviewed were primarily focused on the impact of high cost 
loans on low income and vulnerable consumers, and of the potential beneficial impact for 
this group if high cost loans were prohibited through the mechanism of an interest rate cap.  
 
The advocates interviewed were aware of the comments made by lenders in this sector to 
the effect that they are or would not be able to offer small loans in an environment where 
interest rates were capped at (for example) 48%, including fees and charges, and that 
consequently these lenders would go out of business if such a regulation were introduced (or 
would seek to offer non-Credit Code loans).  
 
The advocates responded to these concerns with the following points. 
 
Some of the advocates interviewed were sceptical of the veracity of those claims, and felt 
that the industry players were either not trying to develop a business model that would 
work within an environment of capped interest rates and/or were not operating efficiently. 
They accepted that a cap would have an impact on these lenders, in that it would reduce 
their profit margin, but were not convinced either that all would be put out of business, or 
that those credit providers who would be or were put out of business were businesses that 
were operating efficiently in any case.  
 
A number of advocates were of the view that at least some business would continue to 
operate, even if interest rates were capped at 48% (including fees and charges): 
 
[There‖s not going to be suddenly a hole in the market because everybody closes 
down?] No, because I still think at 48 per cent, if they cap it at 48 per cent they still make 
a lot of profit and it makes it easier for some of their clients to service the debt. (C6, p16) 
 
One advocate also suggested that if businesses were not offering a valuable product for the 
community they would not stay in business anyway: 
 
Any industry that does not represent clearly in the community what they’re about doesn’t 
stay around for long anyway.(C5, pp16-17) 
 
Other advocates conceded that the introduction of an interest rate cap, including fees and 
charges, might have the effect of making it impossible to offer small, short-term loans in a 
commercial setting. However, they felt that the impact of these high cost loans was such 
that removing the loans from the marketplace was key, even if it was not in fact possible to 
offer these loans commercially within an interest rate capped environment.  
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One advocate noted: 
 
So to me this isn't a question of reflecting the actual cost of the service provision, it's just 
that if that is the real cost of service provision in that space, and you're not able to offer a 
product or service at a rate less than that and you're specifically targeting a lower income 
or vulnerable group of people then that's loan sharking, that's actually what it is. You're 
preying on that vulnerability. (C1, p5) 
 
Again, this type of response was consistent with views that greater efforts need to be put 
into developing alternatives to high cost loan products, and/or to the need to access small 
amount loans, and/or to educating mainstream lenders that vulnerable consumers are not 
necessarily a bad risk, as long as the repayments are actually affordable.(eg C4, p12)  
 
Some of the advocates interviewed were also sceptical of claims that the loans were high cost 
because the class of borrowers was high risk (because of low income, poor credit history, 
etc). They suggested that comments about risk were inconsistent with the fact that many 
loans were secured with property, or were effectively secured through a direct debit 
arrangement. One advocate also noted that there was no evidence available about the actual 
level of defaults and risk compared to mainstream lenders.(eg C4, pp7-8) This same advocate 
also expressed the view that it was important to consider the average of the loans on which 
the lenders are able to receive an income: 
 
So say they lend $4 million and they end up getting across the board – say they end up 
getting $1.5 million a year on those loans, well they're making […] loads of money. Do 
you know what I mean? It's not even accurate to say well we've got a ten percent failure 
rate, default rate, if in fact you're still making across the board 50 percent on the money 
that you're lending, or recovering 50 percent a year on the money that you're 
lending.(C4, pp7-8) 
 
Advocates also noted that it is incorrect to assume that consumers who are living on a low 
income are necessarily high risk borrowers. Important here is the affordability of 
repayments, with one advocate commenting that levels of default on the part of fringe 
lending customers might be  
 
…because they went to these dodgy credit providers in the first place.(C4, p12) 
 
In discussion about the impact on individual credit providers, two advocates were also 
cognisant of the fact that, if lenders were unable to operate commercially, they might end 
up in the advocate‖s office, seeking advice, or seeking unemployment benefits. There was 
some sympathy for this outcome; however, the advocates who raised this took the approach 
that the negative impacts of those lenders continuing to offer high cost loans were ―too 
great‖. (eg C5, p16; C6, p11) 
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What about exclusion and the loan sharks? 
 
Consumer advocates were asked whether the introduction of an effective interest rate cap 
has or would lead to greater levels of financial exclusion. Advocates were also asked whether 
the introduction of caps has resulted in consumers turning to loan sharks for finance.  
 
The general response of consumer advocates to concerns about financial exclusion in the 
sense of a lack of access to short-term credit was, as discussed above, that the inherent harm 
in these products outweighed potential benefits, and that the market was a safer place 
without them. In relation to ―loan sharks‖, consumer advocates gave a number of different 
responses.  
 
Consumer advocates in those jurisdictions that did have an interest rate cap did not identify 
an increase in the use of loan sharking (however defined). Factors included the fact that the 
cap in some jurisdictions was not a cap on the total cost of credit: 
 
So there’s no loan sharking because I mean the loan sharks are mainstream because there’s 
no real cap.(C8, p10) 
 
Others suggested that provision of high cost loans was, by definition, loan sharking.  
 
Others noted the possibility that, if there was demand for small loans, and interest rate caps 
caused one source to dry up: 
 
So if the demand for money to be provided at extraordinary high interest rate – if that 
demand is high enough well then that will create another source of supply.(C3, p4)  
 
However, no advocate pointed to evidence of an increase in the use of so-called loan sharks 
following the introduction or extension of an interest rate cap; one advocate noted that 
those using loan sharks might be less likely to seek advice or assistance from legal or 
consumer organisations than those seeking finance from other organisations, and so might 
not come up on the radar of consumer organisations or regulators.(eg C3, p4)   
 
Another consumer advocate was very critical of the argument that the cost of credit should 
remain unregulated (in Queensland) so as to prevent consumers from seeking finance from 
loan sharks: 
 
The argument often is you'll send all these people underground to dodgy lenders. I mean 
we don't have any evidence of that. The evidence isn't that the problem is any worse in 
NSW and Victoria where there is a cap, to that in Queensland where people still go to 
those lenders. It's like saying God we won't make robbery illegal because people might 
then murder. Murder people to stop the robbery from coming out. It's not very helpful. I 
just don't think that's a very helpful analogy at all, and there just isn't that much evidence 
that would suggest that that's actually happening.(C4, p9) 
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Form of regulation 
 
Consumer advocates were asked a series of questions designed to explore what form an 
interest rate cap, if introduced, should take. The overwhelming response was that any cap 
introduced needed to be a cap on the total cost of credit, rather than simply a cap on the 
interest rate. Consumer advocates noted that the Victorian regulation placed no real limit on 
the cost of credit in that jurisdiction, and as one advocate noted: 
 
While you can charge whatever fees you like there’s very little point [in capping the 
interest rate]. The only people who are going to breach the cap are just going to be ignorant 
because they’re going to document something as fees rather than as interest.(C8, pp12-13) 
 
The model used in NSW, where the cap or ceiling was based on the total cost of the loan, 
including fees and charges, was preferred.  
 
In terms of the size of any cap, all of the advocates interviewed were in favour of a cap of no 
more than 48%, including fees and charges, and a number were in favour of reducing the cap 
even further.  
 
Well, I know that 48 has been bandied around and I think that’s too high. I would go 
perhaps no higher than 40.(C5, p10) 
 
 
However, consumer advocates had mixed views about the merits of: 
 
 linking any cap to a reference rate; 
 imposing a different cap for unsecured vs secured loans; 
 imposing a different cap for loans of different values.  
 
 
Exploiting loopholes 
 
Consumer advocates in those jurisdictions that had an interest rate cap were asked whether 
experience had demonstrated any loopholes or practical problems with the legislation.  
 
In the main, three issues were identified: 
 
1. A cap that is imposed on interest rates alone, without also controlling the cost of fees 
and charges, was ineffective in putting the brake on the cost of credit. Attempts to challenge 
the fees and charges of one credit provider were unsuccessful, leading one consumer 
advocate to comment in relation to the City Finance case: 
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So I think, you know, you’d be crazy to be a regulator and start trying to enforce the cap if 
you have a look at what happened in that case. So it’d be a waste of time; they’d just 
reword it [the contract document]. While you can charge whatever fees you like there’s 
very little point.(C8, pp12-13) 
 
2. In NSW, the all inclusive interest rate cap originally applied only to short-term loans 
(less than 62 days). However, this lead credit providers to offer loans for 63 days, simply to 
avoid the regulation. This loophole was removed by the recent amendments, which imposed 
the cap on all credit provided under the UCCC.  
 
And then NSW quite rightly went and tried to find a loophole and introduced an effective 
cap and then the market moved to where it wanted to be in the first place which was over 
62 days ... And then of course that became another loophole which has now just recently 
been plugged in the last – 1 March – (making a comprehensive 48 percent cap across the 
board).(C2, p3) 
 
3. In NSW, the extension of the all inclusive cap to all credit providers has lead some 
credit providers to find ways to offer credit outside the boundaries of the UCCC, for 
example, through business purpose declarations. However, consumer advocates suggested 
that these are loopholes that exist in the UCCC generally, and are not specific to the interest 
rate caps regulation. For example: 
 
[Has experience with the cap demonstrated any loopholes or other practical 
problems with the legislation?] It's too early to say. I'm certain there will be the old 
problem of avoiding the code. There are quite a few fringe lenders who successfully 
excluded loopholes in the consumer credit code, so I expect that will continue.(C2, p4) 
 
 
 
Not just about interest rate caps 
 
There was an overwhelming sense from the consumer advocates interviewed that, while 
regulation to cap interest rates was an important part of the response to the issues associated 
with high cost credit, it was not the only response. Instead a more holistic approach was 
needed, one that addressed the range of issues associated with fringe credit.  
 
Particular mention was made of the regulatory approaches of: prohibiting unfair contract 
terms; requiring assessments of capacity to repay; prohibiting the use of irrevocable direct 
debit authorities; prohibiting the taking of security over household goods (so-called 
―blackmail securities‖) and low-value vehicles; and prohibiting or limiting the extent to 
which loans can be ―rolled over‖ without any reduction in principal.  
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Again if you have a suite of responses that range from a blunter instrument like a cap 
through to a more active and user-friendly unfair contracts prohibition then what you 
don't pick up with one you can pick up with another.(C1, p7) 
 
Absolutely and I think segmenting out individual elements of the regulatory structure is 
actually not altogether helpful. The cap is part of a range of mechanisms that if you want 
fair outcomes you have to touch all of the bases. So it seems to me that you don't get there 
entirely by a cap, because there will still be people – if there's credit available above and 
beyond that – who would purchase it. The question is should there be, and if you're going 
to introduce something like a broader concept of unfair contract terms, then cost will 
factor in part of what builds a picture of unfairness.(C1, p2) 
 
One consumer advocate also was of the view that the suggestion in the recent Consumer 
Credit Review in Victoria
191
, that all credit fees and charges be reviewable on the grounds of 
―unreasonableness‖ (Option 5.3)  was worth looking at, whether or not an (effective) interest 
rate cap was in place.  In particular, this was seen as a response to concerns that some loans 
might be unreasonably high cost, given the underlying security, even though they might not 
be in breach of any interest rate cap.(C8, pp14-15) This advocate also noted that the 
recommendation incorporated a suggestion that regulators and consumer agencies would be 
empowered to take action to challenge unfair fees.(C8, p16)  
 
Another advocate raised concerns that the Victorian proposal would not be an effective 
solution because of the concerns about access to justice issues, and the barriers that prevent 
individual consumers from taking legal action to address unfairness.(C2, p6) 
 
One advocate also mused about the possibility of imposing geographical restrictions on the 
location of lenders, noting for example, that they open up near gambling venues and 
Centrelink offices.(C6, p17)   
 
Non-regulatory approaches, including better hardship policies from service providers, and 
increased access to no interest and low interest loan schemes were also seen as key 
components of the policy response.  
 
It does remove what was very much a stop-gap measure that was being used by some 
consumers. Now what that does of course is increase the onus on policy makers and others 
to come up with alternative ways to assist consumers who are in those sorts of financial 
difficulties, and whether that's improving access to financial counsellors, improving access 
to hardship policies offered by various service providers and utility companies, and/or 
improving access to low-cost other forms of short-term finance such as limited overdrafts 
are all policy issues that should be considered as a consequence of the exit of pay day lenders 
from that market.(C9, p3) 
 
 
                                                 
191
 Consumer Affairs Victoria (2006) 
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A call to the mainstream lenders 
 
Consumer advocates interviewed generally expressed their concerns about financial 
exclusion of low income consumers from the consumer credit market. However, from their 
perspective, inclusion was about inclusion on fair and reasonable and affordable terms.  
 
A number of advocates specifically spoke of the need for mainstream lenders to get involved 
in this market, and provide alternative, affordable options for low income consumers 
seeking relatively small amount loans. Advocates noted that low income consumers were 
not necessarily poor credit risks – what was important was that the repayment amounts 
were reasonable and affordable. 
 
Alternatives suggested included: 
 
 low, fixed limit (eg $500) credit cards; 
 limited overdrafts; and 
 educating mainstream lenders to the lower risk (or at least lower than assumed risk) 
of this customer group.  
 
The distinction between lack of access because mainstream lenders choose not to offer a 
suitable product, and lack of access because of poor credit histories was specifically 
acknowledged by one consumer advocate. However, the advocate noted that in some cases, 
a poor credit record may arise due to the inability of the borrower to meet the excessive 
costs of a high cost loan.(C4, p17) By implication, it may not, therefore, be an indicator of a 
borrower‖s capacity to meet a more affordable arrangement. The advocate also noted that a 
poor credit report might also reflect inaccurate default listings on the credit reporting 
database(s)(C4, p17) (The issue of credit reporting was also specifically discussed by lenders 
and government agencies in this research.)  
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9. The views of micro-lenders 
 
 
For this research, we interviewed five fringe lenders; three of those interviewed operated 
different businesses within the one franchise group. Each of the lenders interviewed was in 
the business of providing small loans, for relatively short periods of time (for example, 6-12 
months). However, they were not involved in payday lending, where loans might be 
provided for 2 or 4 weeks. They saw this form of lending as a different model to what they 
were doing. As one participant noted, in relation to the different models of lending: 
 
Well micro-lending doesn't relate to what the ANZ Bank does and payday lending sort of 
relates to what we do, but not really. And payday lending doesn't relate in any way to 
what banks are doing.(ML1, pp32-33) 
 
The fringe lenders that we interviewed for this research were keen to talk about this issue, 
and to promote a regulatory response that acknowledged the demand for small loan 
products, and the actual costs of providing those products on a commercial basis.  
 
 
Micro-lenders – business models, operations, products and services 
 
The micro-lenders interviewed were happy to provide information about their business 
models and operations, and the types of products and services they offered.  
 
A summary of the types of products offered by the lenders interviewed is provided in the 
tables below. Note that these loan products are in the range of products identified in our 
survey research with micro-lenders (see chapter 7).  
 
Loan A (ML5) 
Minimum amount $300 
Maximum loan amount $5,000 
Average loan amount $1,990 
Interest rate  43% 
Comparison rate  
Establishment fee $175-$375, depending on size of loan 
Other fees Change direct debit arrangements - $10 
Default fee - $20 
Security Mostly – vehicle or household securities 
Loan type  
Average loan term About 30 weeks 
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Redraw permitted  
 
 
 
Loan B (ML1-3) 
Minimum amount $300 
Maximum loan amount $5,000 
Average loan amount $1,990 
Interest rate  39%  
Comparison rate 170% (6 mth loan, $1000) 
Establishment fee $140 - $650 (depending on size of loan) 
Other fees and charges  
Security Yes – normally vehicle. Company policy 
against using household securities 
Loan type Principal and interest personal loan 
Average loan term  
Redraw permitted Yes, after 20 weeks of good payment. 
Will require another credit check – fee 
charged. 
 
 
Loan C (ML4) 
Minimum amount No specific minimum, in practice, 
smallest amount borrowed is $200-$300 
Maximum loan amount $2,000 
Average loan amount  
Interest rate  20% / mth, annualised to 240% 
Comparison rate  
Establishment fee $30 - $50. 
Other fees and charges Pass on actual cost (eg dishonour fees 
from bank) 
Security Will do some unsecured loans, but most 
are secured. Vehicle is normally the 
security given.  
Loan type Personal loan, fixed period 
Average loan term 6 months 
Redraw permitted  
 
 
Loan D (ML4) 
Minimum amount No specific minimum, in practice, 
smallest amount borrowed is $200-$300 
Maximum loan amount $2,000 
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Average loan amount  
Interest rate  20% / mth, annualised to 240% 
Comparison rate  
Establishment fee Establishment fee: $30 - $50. 
Other fees and charges Pass on actual cost (eg dishonour fees 
from bank) 
Security Some unsecured, but normally require 
security, and normally use vehicle 
Loan type Continuing line of credit 
Average loan term Repayments styled so as to repay full 
amount in 6 months 
Redraw permitted Yes, credit limit is approved; once 
they‖ve paid pack a certain %, then 
eligible for redraw up to the limit 
 
 
In relation to the products offered by micro-lenders, there seem to be two distinct models: 
 
 (relatively) lower interest rate, but higher fees; and 
 higher interest rate, but lower fees.  
 
In the tables above, Loans A and B are an example of the first model; Loans C and D an 
example of the second model.  
 
As one lender noted, these two models can often operate in a similar way, if the loan 
repayments are met within the terms of the contract, but there can be a substantial 
difference if the borrower subsequently seeks another loan.    
 
And there are really two camps of micro-lending. One is for example the camp where it's 
low application fee, high rate of interest. Then you've got the other camp, … high 
application fee, low rate of interest. The costs work out exactly the same where you're 
talking straight take a loan, repay it back, finished. The costs differ significantly where for 
example you take a loan, you repay it back, you re-borrow more money. In our instance 
you pay your upcoming application fee of $30 or $50, you pay your interest over time; you 
come back and say I need more money. There is no other application fee you pay interest 
over time. If you go to somewhere that charges the high up-front fee you pay, for example, 
[a] $350 application fee, which is another generalisation. I don't know many places that 
do. You pay four percent a month over time. You come back to re-borrow more money, 
another $350, four percent over time. And then if you want to repay early during that 
time well you've paid your $350 up front, you don't get any refund of that. So if you 
borrow your money today and pay back tomorrow it still costs you that $350, plus one 
day's interest at four percent.(ML4, p25) 
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In terms of the business model, most of the micro-lenders interviewed emphasised the high 
administrative and setup costs associated with these small loans. These costs reflected: 
 
 The time taken to undertake detailed checks of the potential borrower‖s financial 
position, and capacity to repay. None of the lenders interviewed used an automatic 
credit scoring method as used by the banks and other large lenders. For example, one 
lender noted: 
 
So we take a lot time going behind the points scoring, talking to employers, relatives, 
references, looking at bank accounts, testing the information they give us on expenses, 
income, even visit the people to confirm what they say in relation to where they are living. 
It wouldn’t come as any surprise to you that sometimes people lie when they’re applying 
for money so we spend a long time. The audit we had done says that the amount of time 
spent on applications can vary anywhere between 3 ½ hours to 6 ½ hours to get an 
application done. So there’s a lot of time put in it, as a result of that the costs upfront to us 
are very high.(ML5, p6) 
 
… we do more checks than the banks do for a home loan. And so that goes to costs.(ML2, 
pp16-17) 
 
 The fit-out, accommodation, and office costs of these small operations, with costs 
being higher in city centre localities.  
 
 The small scale of operations. One lender provided two examples of the first 12 
months of start-up business; one averaged 30 new loans and 13 extensions per month; 
the other averaged 11 new loans and 4 extensions per month. Average costs per loan 
(excluding start-up costs) were $314 and $613 in the first year.(ML2) 
 
 
One lender also noted that its business model is: 
 
… designed around this principle that we lose money on the smaller loans. The 
larger loans recoup some profit. In the middle is roughly where it is at around 350, 
400 around the middle, which is very much around these costs, which are when 
you're here. So it's a bit like when you go to a supermarket and I use the words of 
my old boss and they're not derogatory, he goes 'We prostitute some lines to bring 
the people in, have minimal margin. We have our high mark-up items in fruit 
and veg there, but at the end of the day we make X percent profit.' And that's how 
our model has to work. Because we could not charge $300 establishment fee on a 
$300 loan.(ML2, pp16-17) 
 
As shown in the loan examples above, most of the lenders interviewed focused on secured 
loans, with the most common security being the borrower‖s vehicle. One lender had a 
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company policy not to take securities over essential household items. However, this lender 
questioned the logic of the concern about household securities, in light of the facts that: 
 
 some borrowers do not own a vehicle; 
 there is no legal or other restriction on borrowers pawning essential household 
items.  
 
For example:  
 
One thing the government has to realise is not everyone has a vehicle and some people 
don't have a vehicle because they don't drive; they might be quite well-off but they don't 
drive, they can't drive. So in our case we don't use essential household items, we use non-
essential household items. But if you bring in legislation which says you can't use and 
expand the range of household items …, Is it better for them to lose possession of those goods 
and pawn them off, because they need finance or have them secured with the possibility of 
losing them if they don't repay the debt?(ML2, p11) 
 
Another lender did take security over essential household items; however, this participant 
did express some disquiet about this practice, and noted that it would be interesting to 
compare the default rates on unsecured loans to those secured by household goods.(ML5, 
pp15-16)  
 
The participants also raised concerns about the efficacy of taking security over household 
goods: 
 
So in every conversation I had, they say, you know you want to over-commit people so 
you can repossess their goods. Nothing could be further from the truth from anyone. We 
don't want their goods; they're not worth anything. In here I put half the time you've got 
a loan for $1000 and you've taken household items, you get some [crappy] old TV that you 
wouldn't put in your own house, and if you do try and sell it the second-hand guy says oh 
yeah I'll give you $20 for it.(ML1, p34) 
 
 
Also: 
 
But in reality you know you might secure household items but you've got to go through a 
lot of hoops to actually take those items.(ML3, p21) 
 
Credit risk and impact on cost of products 
 
The lenders interviewed for the research also noted that their customers typically 
represented a higher credit risk than those of mainstream credit providers, and that this also 
impacted on the cost of the credit products offered: 
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We're a high-risk lending entity because we lend to the people who may have credit 
problems, which means they have the propensity to fall over or they don't necessarily 
always have the means to pay, or it's someone who is more likely to go out and spend the 
rent on something frivolous; for whatever reason we may not get paid. So our rate of 
return or rate of bad debt is worse than for example the banks. Our security is more 
tenuous and we used to take security over a car, it's much easier to dispose of or destroy a 
car than it is a house. They're not always insured for the correct value and they generally 
lose value rather than appreciate. So you've got a number of factors, which say okay you 
are a high risk group for lending to these people in the first place, and without being too 
general it's … if you do something of great risk you deserve great return. I think that's just 
the way it is, you get danger pay for this you get whatever for that. So therefore if you're a 
high-risk lender you should be able to get an increased rate of return.(ML4, pp14-15)  
 
 
However, one interview also reported a relatively low default level: 
 
[And what about default rates?] … it’s fairly low. The percentage of capital written off 
when we did a lot of work for a particular purpose last year was something like 1.7% of 
capital written off. The 80% of the clients we have pay every week on time or every month 
or every fortnight whatever it is on time every time. Of the remaining 20% you’ll find 
that 80% of those will fall behind by one or two payments and we then talk to them and 
try and get them either back on track or at least to maintain their two payments behind 
the whole way through. So 80% of those you have no trouble with. So its 20% of the 20% 
which is what 4% or something that we have real trouble with. So the actual number of 
clients who default vary between franchises depending how big they are from almost 
nothing up to some who have 10 or 12% of people that they have trouble with, but that 
really varies almost within inverse proportion to the size of the franchise, the smaller the 
number of loans the quicker you can get on to them as soon as they miss a payment. Of 
course the quicker you get on to them the more chance you’ve got of coming to an 
arrangement with them whereby they’re happy and we’re happy as well. (ML5, pp9-11) 
 
 
And another participant praised the money-managing skills of low-income earners: 
 
But the other thing you find is that people with the best budgets are on the lowest income 
to a degree because they need to squeeze the last dollar out of everything, and they have a 
really good budget, but they don't have the income to have anything left over.(ML4, p12) 
 
 
 
Responsible lending 
 
Credit assessment 
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Participants were at pains to counter any perception that they were engaged in irresponsible 
lending. They stated firmly that they properly assessed a person‖s ability to repay a loan, 
and did not lend money in circumstances where the person was assessed as being unlikely to 
be able to meet the loan repayments.  
 
As explained above, these lenders did not use the automated credit scoring models used by 
mainstream lenders. Instead, they individually assessed an applicant‖s financial position and 
credit history (as far as possible – see comments on credit reporting below).  
 
Well we obviously look at peoples' flow ability when they come in and our application 
form was designed to say okay look show us all your income; show us all your outgoings, 
we will break it down very systematically. We'll look at what you have left; we'll base 
how much you can afford to repay based on what you have left, how much you can afford 
to pay then dictates how much we lend to you. Say for example the repayments on a $1000 
loan are about $65 a week. If you can only afford $40 you won't get $1000, you'll get six 
or seven hundred I think it is.(ML4, pp8-9) 
 
We don’t have any point scoring. We look at everyone individually. Even though we 
know that young males are probably higher risk than young females simply because they’re 
a young male makes no difference to us. We try and assess each person. The result of that is 
that there are no preconceptions at all. The people we don’t lend to are people that we 
believe can’t repay or won’t repay.(ML5, p23) 
 
In assessing capacity to repay, one lender explained that it focused on ensuring that: 
 
…their payments don’t exceed two thirds of that unexpended income after they take into 
account you know the movies and everything they go to. We’ve found that people won’t 
change their habits to pay a loan back. (ML5, p 28) 
 
 
Lenders also explained the efforts they took to check the reliability of a potential borrower‖s 
financial position, noting that there might be a tendency to under-estimate expenses: 
 
… we ask them to bring in bank statements and the reason for that is not only to confirm 
that they are getting money into their account but to look at any other information, we 
tell them this, we look at any other information on the bank account and the bank 
statement that might be of significance. For instance, for people who are withdrawing 
money from holes in the wall at Jupiter’s Casino then that’s something we can raise with 
them and say that “look we’re concerned that every Thursday afternoon you take $200 out 
of Jupiter’s, why?” we just want to try and get a handle on that. If they walk in with a 
lotto ticket in their pocket, we ask them how often do you do that, you know try and get a 
full picture of what they do. We’ve got one of our franchisees at [town] -we struggle with 
trying to get accurate information from people about their living expenses, they always 
downplay them- She came up with a scheme of saying to people when you know when a 
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single woman with three kids and she says I spent $50 a week on food, while we both 
know that’s garbage. If you say to people: ‘look you’re not being truthful to me’, quite 
often people get quite offended and say ‘I’m a very careful budgeter I know how to do this’. 
They really get offended. So she suggested we turn into a sort of joke and say ... ‘where do 
you buy your bread from?’. You know, that sort of thing. So [we]  try and draw them out 
and if they won’t and we know that they say they’re only spending $50 a week on food, 
when we’re doing the assessment, we disregard that and put in a figure that’s reasonable 
based upon external data from, you know, cost of living and various things like that. And 
so we try and get an accurate figure and say to them we think you can only afford this 
amount of money and go from there. So every application is different though. (ML5, pp 
23-24) 
 
This individualised credit assessment also meant that lenders did not automatically reject 
applications from people whose main source of income was a pension or benefit, or who 
had a poor credit report. The lenders emphasised that each application was considered on its 
individual merits. For example one lender noted: 
 
We don't lend to people who are currently bankrupt of course because you would be 
cutting your own neck type of thing. But if you've been discharged from bankruptcy; you 
have defaults on your CRA, not if they're current unless you're borrowing the money to 
get out of that situation, or there's a good explanation for it which we will check out, then 
we will lend to this type of person.(ML4,p13) 
 
Another way in which one participant also assisted consumers was to pay creditors and bills 
directly, rather than providing a cash loan to the borrower: 
 
So if someone comes in, for example bonds are a big one. Bonds for rentals. They can pay 
their rent, but they can't get a bond together. So when they apply we say find a house, 
figure out how much the bond is, tell us who the real estate agent is, and we pay the bond 
direct to them. That way it doesn't go through them and then suddenly disappear.(ML4, 
pp10-12) 
 
This type of exercise took more time and lead to the increased administrative costs of 
operating a small loans business.  
 
One lender also raised the issue of what he termed ―debt-shifting‖, as a phenomena that adds 
to the complexity of credit assessment, but also to the risk of lending (in terms of likelihood 
of repayment): 
 
Debt shifting is where you've got a landlord or Energex or Telstra are threatening to 
either evict you or cut you off, and you come to us for a loan. These people, all they are 
doing is shifting the debt. They haven't got the ability to pay the landlord, the back rent or 
Energex, but the landlord and Energex have got more power than us because they can cut 
off the power, they can evict the person. So they come to us and these people are the people 
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who predominantly tell us lies, they suppress the truth, they expand the truth and they 
outright lie. We've got to assess that to see whether they are telling the truth. If we give 
them a loan all we've done is shifted their responsibility to Energex to [the lender]. And 
that's where part of our job is very hard; that's where the girls have really got to assess that. 
In the [suburb] office now we've virtually got a policy that we won't pay people's back-
rent. If they can't afford to pay the landlord and that's a roof over their head, they're 
definitely not going to pay us. (ML2, p 10) 
 
Purpose of loan 
 
Lenders also placed some restriction on the types of purposes for which they would provide 
loans. For example, one lender explained: 
 
We don't lend for frivolous things. If someone wants to go on a holiday or buy a new 
stereo or whatever, or buy Christmas presents for the kids, no look sorry we're not going 
to lend you money because you're going to waste it on something that's not a 
necessity.(ML4, pp10-12) 
 
The same lender also implicitly criticised lenders that suggested that consumers could 
borrow money for what the participant saw as ―frivolous‖ purposes, suggesting that there 
was now less consumer demand for loans for such purposes than there had perhaps been in 
the past: 
 
But it's starting to get to the stage where people understand what's important and what 
it's going to cost and they don't really come in unless they need to. Back in the early days it 
was a case of oh you lend money I'll just come and get some money type of thing. And 
some places do still target that. Probably a good example is the [Company x] ads. Need 
money to take a girl on a date; go and see a concert; get married type of thing. Well from 
our point of view okay sure that's fine that's an important part of your life, but don't put 
yourself in a bad situation to get that, it's a want it's not a need, it's not a necessity.(ML4, 
pp10-12) 
 
Taking a different approach, one lender indicated that it focused on the customer‖s ability to 
repay, rather than on the purpose of the loan: 
 
If we go through the process of assessing their ability to repay it doesn't matter what the 
emergency is or what the requirement is right now, if the credit provider does the 
assessment, does the checks and they can afford to repay it then yes they should be entitled 
to obtain credit.(ML2, p 43) 
 
Rollovers 
 
Another aspect of responsible lending is the extent to which customers in default are 
permitted to rollover or extend loans (possibly incurring additional fees).  
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One lender explained: 
 
We have it that if you pay back a minimum of 40 percent …,Say, for example, you get 
your balance down to $600, you're eligible for redraw back to the $1000. So if they're able 
to prove to us that they can make consistent repayments and get that principal down, then 
we'll consider them eligible for a redraw. So that's the formula we use. We don't say 
you've got to pay back the full 1000 before you can have more, but by the same token we 
don't want to be someone's personal ATM, in which case they come in and they borrow 
back and then they make a repayment, and then they borrow that payment back and they 
go backwards and forwards. So they've got to reduce it down to a certain amount 
otherwise you get see-saw lending and people get themselves into trouble, once again. A lot 
of what we do is based around getting people to be stable and not get themselves into 
trouble, because then we don't get paid and they get chased and everyone loses (ML4, pp 5-
8) 
 
 
Assistance if difficulties emerged 
 
The lenders interviewed also explained that they continued an individualised credit 
management approach through the life of the loan, and took a sympathetic approach to 
hardship applications (whether formally characterised as such or not). Again, they 
contrasted this with the approach of larger, mainstream lenders: 
 
And the other thing is we're more sympathetic. If you missed one of your car payments 
with the bank their system would automatically default you. Whereas we don't, we protect 
their credit history. We talk to them and if they're not out and out dubbing us we try to 
protect their credit history. We don't list them as a default. We say to them okay make the 
payment up at the end of the loan or do this, or make a token payment of $10 instead of 
$110. So we're protecting their credit history, we're giving them a chance to prove that 
they are good clients.(ML1, p26) 
 
 
We also encourage the clients as much as we can, a lot of the people that come to us, don’t 
know what a budget is so we prepare a budget for them and give that to them at the time 
they settle the loan and say this is what you told us you spend, this is what you told us you 
earn. The loan payment is a particular amount this is keep to this, if you have any 
problem please come back to us. I do all the training for the Consumer Credit Code 
compliance for franchisees and I tell them that, treat every discussion with a borrower in 
relation to payments as an application under section 66 and frankly agree to everyone 
unless what they are asking is totally unreasonable just agree to it, it’s better to get, if the 
payment is $20 a week, it is better to get $15 than get nothing ….(ML5, pp9-11) 
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Again, this type of approach added to the cost of providing a small loan service, and the 
approach was contrasted with that of mainstream lending institutions, and proffered as a 
reason why mainstream lenders were no longer in this space: 
 
These people generally come in and they take a lot of time to deal with. We’re not talking 
about sophisticated borrowers at all. They’ve got to be coached through their application 
form. They’ve got to be asked questions, they don’t write things down and they don’t put 
things down unless you specifically ask them how much do you spend on alcohol, how 
much do you spend on cigarettes, what does it cost you to run a car?   … So they take a lot 
of time to coach through.  
 
And they’re not generally the world’s best payers. They might miss one or two so you’ve 
got to ring them up and say look, you know you’ve missed your payment … 
 
So they’re a very high service need type of borrower. Banks don’t want to know about 
that. They don’t even want people to come into the bank anymore. They specifically say 
we don’t want people in our branches; we want you to use internet banking and telephone 
banking. Well that just doesn’t work for these people at all. (ML4, p 29) 
 
This lender also noted: 
 
Banks are not geared to do what we do. In fact banks don't even understand what we do. 
(ML4 ,p 20) 
 
 
Micro-loans as an essential service for financially excluded consumers 
 
All of the micro-lenders interviewed highlighted what they saw as the essential nature of 
their service. They noted that they provided finance to help consumers manage unexpected 
expenses or bills, and argued that without access to this type of finance, their customers 
would be in an even more difficult situation.  
 
Low income consumers, with limited capacity to save, were obviously a part of their 
customer base: 
 
So it's an unfortunate part of society that just live hand to mouth, but if they weren't able 
to get access to this type of credit then the car would be unregistered and how am I going to 
get kids to school; how am I going to get to work? Or the car is my work, how am I going 
to drive around type of thing? And then they go without or something suffers until they 
get the money to come in or sort something out. (ML4, pp 10-12) 
 
However, lenders also explained that the circumstances of their customers varied widely. 
Their customer base included both pensioners and wage earners; consumers on higher 
incomes, but with a blemish on their credit record (they would, for example, consider 
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lending to some who had been discharged from bankruptcy (ML4, p13); and others excluded 
from mainstream institutions because of the consumer‖s preference for small loans, and/or 
the lender‖s inflexible criteria in relation to a borrower‖s credit history.  
 
One lender explained: 
 
Generally it’s [the customer base] – to make a generalisation, it’s upper lower-class to lower 
middle-class. We have a couple of different accounts. We’ve got pensioners because we will 
lend to pensioners … the other account is the average wage earner who lives week to week. 
We find a lot of our borrowers do not have the capacity, the know-how, the force of will to 
save …(ML4, pp 8-9) 
 
Consumers on higher incomes also borrow from micro-lenders. One explained: 
 
…we’ve had people that have been earning literally you know $60,000 - $80,000 come and 
apply for loans and they do it for all sorts of purposes. We’ve had bank managers come 
and apply for a loan through us simply because they don’t want their employer to know 
that they’re applying for a loan. (ML5, pp 2-3) 
 
Borrowers who have unsuccessfully sought finance from other lending institutions were also 
part of the micro-lenders‖ customer base: 
 
… in one franchise we looked at the average was there were seven prior enquiries over a 
particular period of time for the people that were applying. (ML5, p 6) 
 
In this context, lenders indicated that the relatively high cost of credit in this sector was not 
a key driver for potential borrowers.  
 
Obviously the cost of credit is a major issue because people will need money for whatever 
reason. If everyone offered the same produce then that's one thing, but not everyone offers 
the same product and not everyone offers the same product to the same people. Now where 
you're talking about regulating the cost of credit you've got to be fully aware of who is 
offering what products to what people, at what times for what reasons, at what costs. 
Unfortunately government is not aware of all these things. (ML4, p 2) 
 
It's a bad term for our industry but we're lenders of last resort. If you can get the money 
from someone else go get it from someone else, if you can get it from your neighbour, your 
mother, your uncle whatever do it because it will cost a lot of money. If you can't get it 
from anywhere else it's better to pay the cost of credit than go without, because it's 
something you need. (ML4, p 12) 
 
According to the lenders, loan purposes also varied considerably. However, micro-lenders 
suggested that the majority of loans were provided for meeting essential living expenses, for 
example: 
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 to meet unexpected or lump-sum car-related expenses (tyres, repairs, insurance, 
registration, fines, etc) (eg ML1, p 18; ML4, p 11). 
 Bond loans (eg ML4, p 11), 
 Fridges and other whitegoods (eg ML4, p 11) 
 
Urgency was also a key factor, and the ability of micro-lenders to provide finance quickly 
was attractive to their customer base. 
 
We get a lot of single mums. We do get pensioners and the reason for doing it is usually 
car repairs, anything to do with their car. If they can't get their car fixed they can't get to 
their job, as simple as that really isn't it? (ML3, p 18) 
 
 Okay, so medical procedures, debts, education, funerals, sick relatives. It’s generally fairly 
urgent sort of stuff, we don’t have many people coming and saying look I’ve got a trip I’d 
like to go on next Christmas. It’s generally the car has broken down I need to get to work 
tomorrow. That sort of thing. So it’s generally fairly urgent. (ML5, p8) 
 
[Is credit an essential service?] Absolutely, you know you can see from that list the sort of 
things that people get it for, they access small amounts of money for essential services 
generally. You know I’ve put this in submissions all over the place but fixing a car – it’s 
not because they want the car it’s because they need to get the kids to school or to work or 
similar, very very rarely do we have people coming saying I want to borrow money to go 
on a trip or something like that. (ML5, pp 21-22) 
 
One micro-lender also noted that loan purposes varied quite markedly between different 
regions of Queensland, reflecting differences in the nature of local economies and the make-
up of the population (ML4, p 11).  
 
 
Customer satisfaction 
 
Importantly, micro-lenders also reported a high level of customer satisfaction with their 
services: 
 
So many of our customers are grateful that we exist. For example one of our customers, 
he's a perfect payer, he's got a job but I think he's got a $100 default on his credit. While he 
must be a 40-year-old male he needed dental work and basically he came in, got the loan 
and every six months or so he comes back, it's another $1000 so he can get more dental 
work done. The guy is just so grateful that he can get that done... (ML2, p 26) 
 
The level of customer satisfaction was also reflected in the demand for their products. 
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Practical impact of an interest rate cap 
 
Overall, the micro lenders interviewed were highly critical of the prospect of governments 
introducing interest rate ceilings, particularly if they were of the size and form introduced in 
NSW (48%, inclusive of fees and charges). The lenders objected on both practical and 
philosophical grounds.  
 
On the practical side of the equation, lenders emphasised that a 48% cap, incorporating fees 
and charges would simply make it impossible to run a micro-lending business as a going 
commercial entity: 
 
This is a harsh reality cost; let's have a look at what it costs to run these businesses. (ML1, 
p 6) 
 
As discussed earlier, this was because of the relatively high administrative costs associated 
with offering small loans, short-term loans, particularly given the service-intensive model 
used by most lenders; and the limited period in which lenders could recoup the costs of the 
loans. 
 
In an environment with an interest rate cap, lenders suggested that legitimate micro-lenders 
would be forced from the market, leaving consumers with significantly reduced options: 
 
The other is okay I'm a consumer; the government has just wiped out micro-lending. I 
need $600 to fix and register my car, where do I get the money? I go to the bank and the 
bank doesn't want to know about me. Sure they've got their little boutique pairings off in 
the back hills of Victoria, but that's never going to be across the board. Banks are not 
geared to do what we do. In fact banks don't even understand what we do. So you can 
wipe banks off your list. In fact if you want less than about five grand, they'll just say 
apply for a credit card. I need my car registered today what's 28 days on a credit card 
going to do me – no good? I can go to the government, but I work so Centrelink is no 
good to me. How else am I going to get money out of the government, there's no other 
way. I can go to the other finance companies, well they've sort of dried up and I don't 
want to borrow five or ten grand, I want $600. I don't want to have to make repayments 
on five grand, plus I don't want to wait two weeks for it because if you can find a finance 
company with less than a week's turn around, generally you're going through a broker 
and they're going to charge you money as well, I can't afford that. Or I can go to a 
community group for example St Vincent de Paul or Salvation Army or Smith Family – I 
need some money to fix and repair my car. We can give you food vouchers or we can help 
you and assist with housing or we can give you clothing for your children. None of which 
is any good to me, I've got to get my car on the road, so what do I do? The answer is, there 
is no answer. Sorry, the one other option is I can go down to [pawnbroker] or any other 
pawnbroker and hand over every piece of furniture or whatever I've got in my house; get 
maybe enough to get my car back on the road, or I come back to a house with nothing in 
it. (ML4, pp 19-20) 
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Alternatively, micro-lenders would be forced to provide credit that was not regulated by the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”)– for example, by relying on a previous 
exemption under the UCCC for bills of exchange and structuring the transaction in that 
form.
192
 In relation to the NSW legislation, one lender (operating in that jurisdiction) noted: 
 
We had the option of either shutting down or continuing to do what we do under the 
same, effectively the same cost to the borrower as we were doing at the end of February 
and still operate effectively as we did so even though the lenders are not required to 
provide notices that are required under the Code and things like that but we still do it. 
[Okay, so can just explain to me what you‖re doing in NSW, you said you went for 
the Bill of Exchange?] The contract that we enter into, that the people enter into is not a 
Consumer Credit Code contract. It is a bill of exchange so we just do basically the same as 
we’re doing but under a [bill of exchange] … (ML5, pp4-5) 
 
This lender saw the Bills of Exchange option as the business‖s only option, despite indicating 
a preference for Code-regulated loans: 
 
And we want to, the Consumer Credit Code is really important because it gives 
protection to borrowers. At the moment we would be quite within our rights if someone 
had you know given us a car as security just then grab it you don’t have to give notice 
under the Bills of Exchange Act but we do, you know, it is very important I think that 
people know that they’re not going to have someone knocking on their door on Saturday 
morning at 6 o’clock getting a car. So we still give notice. I don’t think anyone has since 
1st of May given notice on any basis, the intention if it ever came up is we said we would 
give notice and we’re very keen to get back under the  Code to do anything we can to get 
back under the Code. (ML5, pp 4-5) 
 
 
Lenders were very sceptical about the possibility that the community based no-interest loan 
and low interest loan schemes could be scaled up to meet the demand currently being 
serviced by commercial micro lenders: 
 
I don’t think the market is going to provide sufficient money for NILS and so forth. … the 
banks champion the amount of money they’re providing –you know $3 million over three 
years for the whole of Australia –well that’s nothing, so you know I think they’ve got to. 
They do, in this $500 interest free loan for Centrelink clients. The only way this thing is 
going to be sorted out I think is if the Government does provide money but it’s 
really…The total amount that they allocated for a three year period was the same amount 
that alternative credit providers were offering in any one month. (ML5, p 26) 
 
 
                                                 
192
 As of 30 November, 2007, promissory notes and bills of exchange are largely now covered by the Code.  
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One lender also raised a concern that, with an interest rate ceiling, consumers would be less 
inclined to consider their purchases seriously: 
 
And if you start regulating the cost of credit then you end up with the instance where 
someone's not going to be fully aware of what they're getting themselves into and the 
reasoning for that is, if something is expensive to a person then they realise well there's 
something slightly different there, I've got to watch what I'm doing, or I've got to look at 
it carefully; I've got to understand what I'm buying. Most  consumers are aware of that, 
but if you see a whole table of things all at the same price then you don't pay too much 
attention, you're just going to pick up the first thing you see, how do you know what 
you've got? (ML4, p 3)  
 
There was a further concern expressed that prices would gravitate towards the ceiling: 
 
And what you'll find that people will gravitate to the ceiling rate and that will be it. So 
rather than saying here's a range that you can charge at, you're effectively saying for all 
practical intents this is what you will charge. Yes, you're creating an open licence to charge 
at that rate, because the government says this is the rate to the extent to which we consider 
it to be legal. Therefore you're saying if you charge this amount it's legal, so everyone will 
probably charge that amount. (ML4, pp 1-2) 
 
But at 48 percent all you're going to ensure then is that everyone in this market always 
gets 48 percent and that's another thing we see is happening. (ML2 ,p 24) 
 
 
One lender also objected to an interest rate ceiling on more philosophical grounds. Most 
notably, that it was inappropriate of the government to regulate the price of consumer 
goods; instead it should be left to market forces: 
 
If you have an open market economy where people are free to charge whatever they want 
people will buy what they're able to afford. (ML4, p 2) 
 
Likely compliance costs following the introduction of an interest rate cap were raised as an 
issue by most lenders, but not necessarily a major one (and certainly not in comparison to 
the profit implications of an interest rate cap).  
 
But compliance costs other than the strict money costs it would impose on us by dropping 
our rate of return, compliance costs are pretty much nil, because we're geared to be 
Consumer Credit Code compliant at the moment. If they introduced a new disclosure 
document for example it really wouldn't cost us too much because I draft all our 
documents anyway. If we had to change the way our program calculated interest that's 
something that might cost us a little bit, but we've got programmers on retainer to do that 
type of thing. So it's probably very low impact, low cost from a procedural point of view. 
So that's not a worry. (ML4, p 24) 
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Another explained: 
 
Compliance is probably the wrong word. There would be research and development costs 
for new products, new contracts.(ML2, p 32) 
 
And: 
 
in the overall scheme of things, we know that compliance is going to cost a particular sum 
a year, it might be $100,000 a year, we’ll just spend that where it needs to be spent. (ML5, 
pp 19-20) 
 
 
But possibly a role for an interest rate cap with a high ceiling? 
 
Despite concerns about the interest rate cap introduced in NSW, a number of the lenders 
were not necessarily averse to some form of interest rate ceiling, as long as it was ―realistic‖. 
The views of what might be realistic differed significantly from the current regulation in 
NSW: 
 
No I agree there needs to be a cap, but what it is I don't know. I mean 48 percent is 
obviously too low, but we do have to weed out these very high-end people who are putting 
people into difficulties. You've got to look at what it's costing people to run their 
businesses I guess. (ML3, p 6) 
 
As I said I'm fairly new to the finance industry and I was quite surprised at how much, 
once I got into the industry, interest rates can vary and how high they can go. So I think 
somewhere along the line there's got to be a cap. But since I've been in this industry and 
seen the amount of work involved, and the returns on the work that we have it would 
have to be a substantial cap, so that's my feelings. (ML2, p2)  
 
[So if we did have a cap – I'm trying to pin you down on this one – if we did have a 
cap, I mean do you think it would have to be as high as 500 percent?]  I know it's 
probably somewhere between 250 and 500. [Okay so it wouldn't be below 250?]  I don't 
think so. (ML2, p 41) 
 
Another lender suggested that a cap would need to be at least 170% (inclusive of fees and 
charges (ML1, p 41). 
 
 
One lender was reluctant to be pinned down on an appropriate size for a cap, however, this 
lender suggested that the competitive rate was 20% per month, and that this should be a 
minimum for any interest rate ceiling: 
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Most people in the industry charge around 20 percent a month. If people could come in 
and undercut that and make a decent rate of return, they would because there is that much 
competition it's not funny. …. The fact of the matter is they haven't. So as a roundabout 
way of saying it 20 percent is probably the least effective rate you can charge and exist and 
yes it is a pretty cut-throat industry. …  So any interest rate cap would need to come in 
above that. …. But it certainly couldn't be less than that because then you're asking people 
to exist below what the competitive rate is, so that's one way of looking at it (ML4, p 34) 
 
Alternative models 
 
Lenders were also asked for their views on alternative mechanisms for structuring an 
interest rate cap. While there was not a lot of discussion on the question, some comments 
were made. 
 
One lender was supportive of a floating cap, which was at least linked to the Consumer 
Price Index, in order to reflect the fact that expenses go up: 
 
The NSW legislation, again I've got to say the people who advise the minister have no 
brains because there's nothing written in there. Expenses are going to go up. Everything 
including the interest, the Tax Office even charge you is linked to the CPI. So they're 
saying here's your cap on what you can charge, but if there was any margin in there next 
year it's eroded by three percent, three percent, three percent. So their costs are going to go 
up and there's no allowance to float it up with CPI. So that's a horrendously misconceived 
model in the commercial sense. …So if there is a cap built in it has to at least take into 
account CPI increases. (ML2, pp 35-36) 
 
And another lender was less supportive of an all-inclusive cap, instead suggesting that 
separate caps on interest and on particular fees and charges was a more appropriate policy 
response: 
 
[Yes, so your beef is with the fees and charges being included?] Absolutely. [So do you 
object to the 48% interest rate cap?] Not at all. (ML5, p 5) 
 
[So it‖s a cap on interest rates and a separate cap on fees and charges?] We would have 
no objection to that whatsoever. (ML5, pp 14-15) 
 
 
Consumer credit regulation as one size fits all 
 
A major concern raised by the micro-lenders was that the UCCC, and proposals relating to 
Annual Percentage Rates and regulating the cost of credit in particular took a one-size-fits-all 
approach. Instead, they suggested that the differences between small amount, short term 
credit and other forms of consumer credit were significant.  
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In particular, micro-lenders were concerned that the use of an Annual Percentage Rate for 
short-term loans was misleading and/or confusing for consumers, and implicitly, lead to 
community concerns about the high cost of small loans: 
 
The trouble is the type of rules that are trying to be brought in are a bit like – and I go 
back to the comparative rate formula as a scenario – they brought in the comparative rate 
formula and it's akin to trying to measure the width of an atom with your car's 
speedometer. Insomuch as the comparative rate formula was designed for very big long-
term loans, not short-term loans. And hence as a measuring tool for a small item it's like 
trying to use your car speedometer to measure the width of an atom. Yes it's a 
measurement, but it's very inaccurate and that's what I think the legislators have got to be 
very mindful of is banks and small lenders cannot really work under the same rules and 
regulations, because what works for the banks that are 100 years old; very highly 
capitalised versus small business. (ML1, p 6) 
 
But to come back to if there is a form of credit cost trapping it needs to take into account 
the terms we're talking about. If you introduce something on a yearly scale it then 
measures favourably against the products, for example what the banks and other finance 
companies bring because they work around a yearly rate. Sure the repayments may be 
weekly, fortnightly, monthly but they're working in terms and numbers of years- whether 
it's five years or 30 years. If you then try and compare that to a monthly then you're 
effectively multiplying everything by 12 because we work on a weekly or fortnightly 
payment, but a monthly term and a six-monthly payout. So instead of year we're talking 
month. (ML4, p 32) 
 
They focused on the fact that she was paying 98 percent interest and that was Naomi 
Robson on Seven is it? And all she really wanted to focus on was the fact that 98 percent 
was outrageous and it probably is outrageous if you're used to paying 7.32 percent on your 
mortgage. But if you've got the expenses that we have and [micro-lender] [has] then it's not 
unreasonable. (ML2, p 9)  
 
One lender‖s response to this issue was to suggest that credit regulation be structured in a 
manner similar to the regulation of body corporates, with a core set of principles applicable 
to all lending, but then specific modules to reflect the different types of loans: 
 
I said a while ago – not that it will ever happen – effectively we should have a consumer 
credit code that's …similar to what's done for the Body Corporate Community 
Management Act. You've got a core Act and then you've got modules that apply. For 
example what they do is they have a residential standard module; they have an 
accommodation module; they have a commercial module and they have a small schemes 
module, which I haven't looked at in a while. Commercial doesn't relate to small schemes, 
commercial is designed for an office building, commercial is designed for something with 
eight lots or less or whatever it is. And both of them sort of relate to the residential 
standard module, but they've got their own intricacies. Well micro-lending doesn't relate 
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to what the ANZ Bank does and payday lending sort of relates to what we do, but not 
really. And payday lending doesn't relate in any way to what banks are doing. So you've 
got all these things, but they're all lumped under the Consumer Credit Code, which places 
it’s stake over the lot. It was designed to cover banks. Our industry has really cropped up 
since then … So we came in after the legislation came in and we found well okay we've got 
to comply with it, but it's not designed to meet what we do and you're trying to get a 
square peg in a round hole, which doesn't fit. So my first answer is no don't bring any 
caps in because it is anti-competitive for a start, but if you're going to bring a cap in 
you've got to reform the legislation to take into account what actually happens in society 
because it just doesn't fit. (ML4, pp 32-33) 
 
Other responses to overcommitment and financial exclusion 
 
In addition to their strong views about the legitimacy of, and need for, the services provided 
by micro-lenders, one lender had a number of suggestions (other than an interest ceiling) 
that would assist consumers and lenders to reduce overcommitment.  
 
These were: 
 
1. Improving the credit reporting system so that credit reports contain comprehensive 
information about a borrower‖s credit history: 
 
There needs to be a positive reporting database. For example Baycorp as we know only 
shows applications for credit and credit defaults. Now at that conference that I didn't end 
up going to down in Melbourne a couple of years ago I think one of the South African 
speakers talked about a model they were looking at where a central database was held for 
everyone's credit. And it contains key information to identify the person. It actually 
contained all their credit card details summarised, so for example you might have a total 
of $30,000 in credit cards. They also wanted to record how much you had consumed out of 
that total credit and a flag of credit cards of whether you'd been making repayments on 
time. The utilities, whether utilities had been paid because utilities they see as credit, 
whether they've been paid. And the model they were talking about there every credit 
provider had to subscribe to that credit database and so we would have to, as credit 
providers, report to that database on a monthly basis and say here is the current 
outstanding debt and yes or no were repayments made on time during the month. Again 
it's a cost benefit analysis. Would Australia be far better off if we had this database and 
people couldn't over commit themselves financially? Would the credit card debt continue 
to spiral out if another credit card company could already see that they've got a massive 
debt? (ML1, p 7) 
 
2. Allowing credit providers to access the Centrepay system;  
 
If you wanted to bring around, you personally, the greatest social change for Australia 
ever for welfare recipients you would campaign … the politicians to have loan repayments 
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to come out of Centrelink – out of their Centrepay. It would be social reform for this 
reason.  Centrelink the employer then can monitor the percentage of debt repayment to 
their income. So Centrelink could set a limit so again they can't lie and they can't over-
commit themselves. Secondly the payments would come out and you would save 
Centrelink recipients literally I would have to say hundreds of millions of dollars in bank 
fees every year. Those two things would change the face of social reform. But if the 
payments were coming out of Centrelink the banks would be down hundreds of millions 
of dollars, and welfare recipients would have hundreds of millions of dollars more to 
spend on the essential items and then the bad debt - like it just goes on and on – then the 
bad debt ratio for micro lenders like ourselves would reduce, therefore in theory you could 
supply cheaper product to the market if you knew you were going to get paid. (ML1, pp 
14-15) 
 
3. Mandating a maximum percentage of income that can be devoted to credit 
repayment: 
 
Okay I have a theory on this. Many years ago when my mum and dad got a home loan for 
the very first time the banks have this general ruling that you could not, if the loan 
repayment was more than 30 percent of your disposable income you couldn't get that 
prime lending loan. Now maybe part of the legislation is not to cap rates, but maybe part 
of the legislation is to say you can't commit more than X percent of any person's 
disposable income to debt retainment. Now that then would sort of change the way 
everyone – that would make everyone do a budget as a first thought.. (ML1, p 9) 
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10. The views of mainstream lenders 
 
 
For this research, we interviewed representatives from five mainstream lenders. In this 
category of ―mainstream‖ lenders, we included the major and minor banks, credit unions and 
building societies (authorised deposit-taking institutions), as well as the large finance 
companies, who provide a range of consumer credit products and other forms of finance.  
 
A key feature of the interviews with mainstream lenders was an acknowledgement that, at 
least in current and proposed forms, an interest rate cap was unlikely to have any direct 
impact on their business or product offerings. From that perspective, the participants were 
perhaps somewhat more detached observers of the debate than the other categories of 
participants.  
 
Need for interest rate caps 
 
Most of the participants expressed support for the idea of some controls on the cost of 
consumer credit, at least in principle. While the policy rationale for such controls was not 
necessarily clearly articulated, concerns around the social impact on low and income and 
vulnerable consumers seemed to be a driver: 
 
I think socially it is my view is that it is something that needs to be addressed. It’s just a 
trick of how you address it. (B1, p 25) 
 
What it will do is help those that currently aren’t caught, so your fringe credit providers 
that are generally charging the higher fees and charges, it will bring them into line, 
because I mean really that’s where the low income or vulnerable customers get into 
trouble. They can’t get the finance through the banks and therefore go through these 
payday lenders and so forth and that’s where they get stung with all the hefty fees and 
charges. So yes it will help regulate or it will be you know to the customers’ best interest if 
there is some sort of level playing field. (FC1, p 9) 
 
Pure economics is very fine in theory but in practicality then what happens is pay day 
lenders and those type of unscrupulous lenders then take advantage of people who are at 
their most vulnerable. So it’s a real challenge for the legislators to say ‘right how do you 
legislate so that the market can behave effectively and efficiently?’. So it’s supply and 
demand and all that sort of stuff works but how do you also protect people that 
traditionally would not be available for normal traditional finance. (B1, p 6) 
 
One participant was more critical of the policy reasons for an interest rate cap, and instead 
suggested that other strategies would better provide consumer protection: 
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I think when it comes to interest rate caps our view is we actually don’t see the rationale 
for an interest rate cap. What we actually think is the most responsible way and we 
consider it, we take responsible lending as one of our three strategic pillars in this 
organisation. Our three strategic pillars, one is about growth, one is about is returns and 
one is about responsible lending. We take our responsible lending obligations extremely 
seriously. We think the best way to protect consumers is to ensure that there is full and 
adequate disclosure of contracts. One of the things that we’ve talked about is at the end of 
the day two things would protect consumers. One is a competitive market and we believe 
consumer finance is a competitive market but, two, ensure that there is full frank 
disclosure and transparency and one of the ways of possibly doing that is bringing forward 
or including things like cooling off periods on contracts. Making sure that there is an 
appropriate amount of time for customers to absorb terms and conditions in contracts and 
give customers the option of independent advice. So we think that that is the most 
appropriate model rather than creating these caps that are really artificially set. (FC3, pp 
7-8) 
 
 
Impact on mainstream lenders 
 
Potentially, a contributing reason for support for controls on the cost of credit by 
mainstream lenders (or lack of opposition to it) was the view that any such regulation is 
unlikely to have any direct impact on mainstream lenders: 
 
In terms of this particular requirement and the difference between Victoria and NSW, 
look to date we haven’t had any impact at all but that’s because of the level at which it is 
currently sitting. (FC1, p 8) 
 
No not really, we don’t get close to the interest rate cap. We don’t want to get close to the 
interest rate cap. (B2, p 14) 
 
Look for us at [Company E] we don’t have any products that come near that [48%] but 
again we’re in a very benign interest rate environment so I’m sure we would all scream if 
rates go to what they were in the 80s. So if it were that scenario then 48% comes a bit 
closer. (B1, p 27) 
 
However, one participant did raise the hypothetical scenario of a mainstream lender‖s 
product coming close to a 48% (all inclusive) cap: 
 
We actually did a test of some of the products that we offer and it was theoretically 
possible- although highly unlikely- that we could actually reach that cap and it was an 
instance where a customer who had a credit card with a low rate credit card of 9.95% p.a. 
They had an annual fee, they used a number of different foreign ATMs, they then did 
certain types of transactions, then they didn’t make a payment, then they didn’t do this, 
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then they didn’t do that and before long the actual annualized rate was 48%, theoretically. 
The actual probability of that happening is very very low and that customer would have 
been picked up in our collections process and managed accordingly much earlier in the 
process. So although 48% p.a. sounds generous and you could argue extreme, theoretically a 
mainstream conservative lender could potentially go there, although it is very unlikely to 
occur. (B1, p 7) 
 
It is also worth noting here that the NSW legislation does not include default fees or other 
contingent fees in the calculation of the APR for the purposes of the cap. The likelihood of 
a mainstream lender breaching the cap in NSW (the jurisdiction with the strictest form) is 
therefore in practice even more unlikely than suggested by this participant.  
 
 
But will it be enforced? 
 
Even for those who supported some form of interest rate cap, there was a level of scepticism 
about the practicalities of implementing such a regime. In particular, concerns were raised 
about the likely level of compliance monitoring and enforcement: 
 
Yes I think there is a need to have interest rate caps but the government or whomever is 
setting interest rate caps, needs to set them in such a way that they can actually be policed 
and enforced as well. It’s no use saying okay well lets have no effective cost of finance 
above 50% or 40% when there’s no executive arm to actually go and monitor what’s 
actually happening. (B2 ,p 10) 
 
 
I think you need to look broader than banks or building societies and credit unions who 
traditionally, and that’s a broad statement, who tend to behave and treat people with 
respect because we’ve all got different stakeholders. We’ve not only got shareholders, we’ve 
got customers, we’ve got staff, we’ve got a group of stakeholders who ensure that we behave 
appropriately because if we don’t we soon lose customers and if we don’t have customers or 
shareholders who aren’t happy and we don’t have staff, so there’s a knock on effect. But 
there’s fringe players out there who get away with behaving outside the rules or outside 
what’s reasonable. So as a legislator how you legislate against that, it’s a challenge. Because 
usually the people who they have taken advantage of also don’t have the ability or 
competency even sometimes, that’s a broad statement, to actually know what their rights 
are, to know the process of how to reasonably and fairly treated (B1, pp 9-10) 
 
Participants also raised concerns about the extent to which any legislation on this issue will 
be circumvented: 
 
Look people who want to take advantage of people will try and find loopholes in whatever 
legislation is built…Which makes you wonder about the interest rate cap idea if they can 
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find a way around it anyway. Exactly, is it effective? So the regulators have got a real 
challenge. (B1, p 25) 
 
… generally those fringe lenders have innovative ways of getting around these things. 
(FC4, p 11) 
 
 
And what form should it take? 
 
In terms of the form and size of any cap, most mainstreamer lenders who answered this 
question were of the view that an all-inclusive approach to a cap was the most appropriate 
response. The alternatives, regulating the interest only, or setting a cap on interest and a 
separate cap on fees, were generally not seen as being effective or practical.  
 
I think that at the State level, I would personally be in favour and support appropriate 
interest rate caps, allied with this increased support in executive and sort of enforcement 
side to do that. I would say as a start set the bar higher- maybe make the interest rate caps 
at 50% or 60%, give people a sort of an opportunity to become responsible basically, an 
amnesty for 12 months and then say right while this amnesty is on you guys get your act 
together, or we’re coming after you. And from 1 January 2008 it’s game on. That would 
be my recommendation. (B2, pp 17-18) 
 
 
Absolutely critical, it’s the only way, otherwise people will say I’ve got a 1% interest rate 
and a $300 approval fee. So yes it’s the only way, effective cost of finance is the only way to 
operate. (B2, p 11)  
 
 
I think the Victorian model where interest rates were capped but some of the fees and 
charges stood outside that was an interesting, well intentioned approach which actually 
didn’t resolve the problem. We ended up with a lot more fees and charges. (B3, p 10) 
 
 
We’d be averse to having any regulation in terms of capping of fees. Happy to in terms of 
including that in a capped interest rate, which you know would include fees and charges 
but not actually regulating or capping fee charges themselves. (FC1, p 22) 
 
 
I agree from a regulatory point of view and a policy point of view, there doesn’t seem too 
much point in setting an interest rate cap if the credit provider can then structure things so 
they operate below that but then charge high fees and we’re talking about protection of the 
vulnerable so we can’t assume they’ll fully understand how much something is gong to cost 
them and therefore I think for it to be meaningful it should include fees and charges. (FC2 
,p11) 
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The view was not universal, however; one mainstream lender was in favour of a cap on 
interest, but not fees: 
 
I think if we were to have a cap it would be an interest rate cap without the fees. (FC3, p 
10)  
 
While one participant supported the quantum of an all-inclusive cap of 48% (similar to that 
in NSW): 
 
I think it’s a good idea to bring the 48% in Queensland. (FC1, p 9) 
 
One criticism of the NSW model, however, was that it effectively led to a “double 
regulation” of fees: 
 
NSW are sort of out there having a look at it at the moment. They’ve spoken to us and 
asked us questions about caps and features of our products and what not but it’s sort of 
curious to me that there is that cap there that includes fees where a number of fees are 
regulated already and it seems double regulation and I don’t see a lot of sense in that. 
(FC3, p 10) 
 
Another participant supported the idea of a cap scaled by reference to the size of the loan: 
 
That’s a very relevant point I think to caps, is that the cap should in my mind only apply 
to loans in excess of say 3-6 months or should be or possibly should be scaled relative to the 
period. For example if somebody wants 3 months’ money the costs from a financial 
services provider, the cost of origination of that loan, the discussion, the maintenance and 
then drawdown and repayment and all the rest are proportionately higher to you know, 
are a greater proportion, you have less time to recoup that for example through interest. So 
just using an effective interest rate, so if there was 3 months money I would say set a cap at 
70% as an example, 70% effective cost of finance, 6 months make it 50, 12 months make it 
40. So maybe scale it relative, you know such that the affordability should drive 
everything. You know 3 months’ lending at 70% effective cost of finance is more 
affordable than 12 month lending at 70% cost of finance if you know what I mean. I 
think my recommendation would be to scale it. (B2 pp 14-15) 
 
Another also noted that the size of the cap should be set with some regard to the costs of 
doing business: 
 
The one caveat that I’d make to that though is that I think in setting the regulation one 
would need to make sure that what is introduced isn’t so onerous that it’s going to impose 
a significant cost on the credit providers and therefore mean just that their costs of doing 
business go up so much that they do have to increase their fees and charges to such a level 
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that you approach that cap. If that was happening you’d need to look at a higher cap I 
think. (FC2, pp 11-12) 
 
 
The need to arrive at a uniform solution 
 
Concerns were expressed by some mainstream lenders that the lack of consistency, certainty 
and uniformity in credit regulation in Australia, added unnecessary complexity and cost to 
their role as credit providers. 
 
We’re on a wing and a prayer at times. I think that the biggest thing that we as an 
institution would like is certainty. When regulators bring out a piece of legislation 
without being cynical, it tends to be because of some sort of political pressure and 
politicians with all the goodwill in the world …are just reacting- some sort of knee jerk 
reaction- and I think given the complex nature of financial services, I think one of the 
tings that we would desire the most is consistency in approach and certainty in approach. 
(FC4, p9) 
 
Generally speaking in terms of laws obviously from a corporation’s perspective you want 
consistency across the States. You can imagine operationally trying to manage the 
different requirements in each State. It’s horrendous, we’d rather consistency. In terms of 
this particular requirement and the difference between Victoria and NSW, look to date 
we haven’t had any impact at all but that’s because of the level at which it is currently 
sitting…if a State was to bring on something that was really inconsistent with what’s 
currently in, then yes that may cause us some problems. (FC1, p 8) 
 
Is there a need for micro-lenders in the marketplace? 
 
Some mainstream lenders expressed views as to the value or otherwise of micro-lenders in 
the market place. One saw a need for micro-credit, because it was not a market in which this 
lender saw itself operating, but subject to regulation: 
 
We are not going to operate in that market, we’re looking at a fringe lending market here, 
so yes I think we need to look at regulating them, to a certain extent in that they need to 
be under the same obligations as the larger banks in terms of responsible lending, and part 
of that is affordable, but I wouldn’t want to see them wiped out because I don’t think we 
have an alternative and we need to provide a service to that part of the market. (B3, p10) 
 
Continuing the call for regulation of micro-credit was another lender who saw ―fringe 
players‖ as dragging down the reputation of banks and harming consumers in the absence of 
effective regulation: 
 
Yes I think also too though that the regulators do need to look at the fringe players. I know 
that’s a broad description, but I think it’s the fringe players that drag down the reputation 
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of the major players because you look in the media and stuff and bank bashing is still a bit 
of a hobby horse but really people now realise that banking is actually very competitive 
and if you want a good deal consumers are empowered to go to their financial institution 
and say I want more and given the way the market works, this happens. But that’s 
consumers who are empowered. Consumers who aren’t empowered are fair game for the 
exploitative lenders, and the unfortunate position at the moment is that they probably fit 
outside traditional credit criteria. (B1, p24) 
 
So whose responsibility is the provision of affordable credit? 
 
Some of the mainstream lenders interviewed are engaging in the provision of low interest 
loans to low income consumers, in partnership with community organisations. One of them 
expressed a view, however, that governments must play a key role in ensuring access to 
affordable credit for low income consumers. 
 
I think government is critical in this space in that a lot of these services were previously 
part of government’s responsibilities. We’re also seeing changes to the welfare system, such 
that we’re probably getting a higher number of people meeting the kind of requirements 
for the criteria of low income. We’re also seeing I think a higher proportion of 
casualisation and contracting in the workforce and I think that’s just a change in market 
requirements but which means that again we’re excluding more people. So if we are to 
meet the needs of all Australians I don’t think it’s up to the private sector to step up and 
fill that space. (B3, p 9) 
 
One lender not currently engaged in the provision of affordable credit to low income 
consumers, indicated a willingness to become engaged in this area as part of the lender‖s 
corporate social responsibility activities: 
 
Look I think it is something we would certainly be interested in considering given too 
particularly I was saying earlier that people at [company]actually get paid for the 
opportunity to go and spend time in the community so if the structure is there, we’ve got a 
very large pool of employees who combined have got a very long experience in the 
industry, there’s no reason why we couldn’t consider that. (B1, p15) 
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11. The views of regulatory staff 
 
 
 
In our research, we interviewed staff members from the relevant regulators in three states, 
New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Participants held senior policy or enforcement 
responsibilities in relation to consumer credit regulation in their jurisdiction. However, they 
participated as individuals, and their responses should not been regarded as statements of the 
respective government‖s positions or views. As outlined in chapter 3, each of these 
jurisdictions has a different regulatory response to the question of high cost credit: 
 
 NSW imposes a maximum interest rate of 48% (including fees and charges), on all 
credit regulated by the UCCC; 
 Victoria imposes maximum interest rates of 48% (for unsecured loans) and 30% (for 
loans secured by a mortgage), but does not impose a ceiling on loan fees and charges; 
 At the time of interviews, Queensland did not impose any ceiling on interest rates or 
credit fees and charges, although legislation similar to the NSW model has now been 
passed and came into force on 31 July 2008 in Queensland.  
 
The interviews with the staff of regulatory agencies were designed to explore the reasons for 
introducing, or not introducing a ceiling in those jurisdictions, and the impacts of the 
different regulatory approaches.  
 
History and reasons for a cap in current form 
 
A key influence on the form and status of a cap in each of the three jurisdictions was 
historical, in the sense that the regulations in their current form derived largely from earlier 
credit legislation (eg the 1984 Credit Acts in NSW and Victoria), which in turn, were 
derived from the Money Lending legislation, imported from the United Kingdom in the 
1920s. 
 
We’ve had a cap in New South Wales since the 80s, under the old Credit Act. When the 
Code came in, that [cap] was just brought forward. (R1, p 2) 
 
Partly an easy response to that is that the “Regulating the Cost of Credit” research paper by 
Ian Manning goes into the history.
193
 He actually quotes the exact time at which the 48 
percent came into operation in Victoria, which I haven't rehearsed or memorised. So I 
think the gist of the history of the thing is it's very much a reaction to the similar thing 
which was in place in the United Kingdom since the 19th Century over there and 
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certainly I think the debate – again Ian's paper can give you the detail – but I think the 
debates were about the usurious side of things. I think that's really where the 48 percent 
when it was introduced here came from. It was not so much considerations of market 
power or credit exclusion, it was really isn't there a rate above which credit surely is 
usurious and exploitative? (R6, pp 1-2) 
 
In implementing the current regulatory arrangements, there appears to have been some 
analysis of the appropriate size of the cap, at least in NSW. For example, NSW participants 
referred to a review by the Commercial Tribunal on the appropriate size of a ceiling: 
 
In the review, in the Commercial Tribunal, there was a review done in the late 80s in the 
Commercial Tribunal in New South Wales and from the report that they put out, they 
said that at that time they looked at what was happening in other States, at the time 
Victoria had the 48% cap, and there hadn’t been any great representations from credit 
providers in Victoria, that they couldn’t operate within that cap, or they had any concerns 
about the cap. So it seems to me that, based on that sort of information, the Tribunal in 
New South Wales went ‘Okay, let’s--- and also for issues of consistency and uniformity, 
that they looked at that issue of the 48% cap. (R2, p 4) 
 
This review referred to the then Credit Act; as noted above, the participants explained that 
the size of the cap was simply moved across to the UCCC regime.
194
  
 
On the other hand, one Victorian participant commented: 
 
I don't think there has of course been any – to my knowledge – open discussion except that 
which we're now generating in the Consumer Credit Review about whether or not for 
instance the 48 percent is pitched correctly, and it's 30 percent for secured credit here.(R6, 
pp2-3) 
 
In relation to an appropriate size for a cap, one Queensland participant commented: 
 
Well you’d think that even just for consistency you’d have to look first at why they 
shouldn’t be set at levels that are set interstate. Do you know why 48%? I understand that 
there was some legislation hidden in Victoria or New South Wales that had that amount.  
I mean … why would you set it at 48%, or 50% or 75%?  It’s a reasonably arbitrary figure 
... (R3, p8) 
 
The interest rate ceilings in the Credit Acts were ceilings on the interest rate only. There was 
no requirement to incorporate credit fees and charges when calculating whether the interest 
rate ceiling had been reached.  
                                                 
194
 (Note that the Credit Act 1984 was amended in 1993 to provide a cap that was linked to the Supreme Court 
Interest Rate (set at four times the Supreme Court rate). At the time of introduction of the UCCC, the Supreme 
Court rate was 12%; the maximum interest rate introduced in the Consumer Credit Regulation 1996 was set at 
48% (and not linked to the Supreme Court rate). 
  
 
Interest rate caps: protection or paternalism?  99 
 
 
In part, as the participants explained, this reflected the current state of the credit market at 
the time. Participants explained that, at the time of the introduction of the UCCC, there 
were few products with fees and charges included; and there was little evidence of fringe 
lending. One participant from NSW commented: 
 
Under the old Credit Act, we didn’t, there was only one interest rate allowed and no fees 
and charges. Everything had to be rolled up into that, so effectively that was fees and 
charges included. That was the total cost of credit. (R1, p 2) 
 
When the Credit Code was first introduced in New South Wales, we didn’t really have a 
lot of fringe lenders or we didn’t have any that we knew of. (R1, p 2) 
 
And in relation to the Victorian experience:  
 
As you are aware when the 48 percent was first introduced I think it's probably fair to say 
that pretty much all or close enough to all of the cost of credit was in the interest rate and 
therefore you didn't really need to apply the cap to anything other than interest. (R6, pp 
4-5) 
 
Subsequently, when the UCCC was introduced, and removed restrictions on the types of 
fees and charges that could be imposed on consumer credit, the question of incorporating 
fees and charges into the maximum ceiling calculation became an issue: 
 
It's only since the Consumer Credit Code came into being with the full capacity to 
decouple interest from fees and charges to assist kind of a user pays type thing; you don't 
have cross-subsidisation; you can levy the fees and charges that correspond with the 
underlying costs of a particular form of credit. It's only with this almost absolute freedom 
to levy whatever fees and charges you want, that we've suddenly been faced of course with 
the prospect of an increasingly irrelevant interest rate cap. (R6, pp 4-5) 
 
NSW has addressed this issue by imposing a 48% all inclusive cap, first to credit of up to 62 
days in duration, and subsequently, to all credit regulated by the UCCC: 
 
[What were the reasons for including or excluding fees and charges in calculating the 
cap?]  It’s really about avoidance of the maximum rate requirements. Because they were 
charging a low maximum rate, a low interest rate or a lower interest rate, and then 
imposing excessive fees, in our view. And it wasn’t really the fees that were charged up 
front, like establishment fees, although those were excessive for the amount of credit 
sought…. It was the practices, rather than interest rate and the upfront fee. The practices, 
which were about--I think I’m rolling about ten questions into one here--were about giving 
money to consumers who really couldn’t afford to repay it, And then when they defaulted, 
charging excessive default fees and all those things that went along with default, like 
enforcement fees and fees for writing letters. So, all of these costs were coming in down the 
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road from the consumer coming into the contract. [These costs] vastly exceeded the 
maximum rate, and therefore we thought it necessary, or we were certainly extensively 
lobbied, to extend the cap to include fees and charges. (R1, p 3) 
 
The all-inclusive cap was subsequently introduced to overcome the avoidance problem of 
loans being structured at 63 days in order to avoid the cap: 
 
By extending out the provision, the fees and charges were already included for under 62 
days, so it was extending out that provision to all loans regardless of the length of time, 
which makes sense when the lender goes for 63 days, it is just an extension of that current 
provision. (R2, p 8) 
 
In relation to Queensland (which, at the time of interview, did not have an interest rate 
ceiling), participants noted concerns that a 48% cap did not address the costs of small 
lending; might drive many lenders to charge that amount; and that unconscionability 
provisions were a more effective response to the concerns of the public. Referring to the 
Government‖s discussion paper on interest rate caps, and the explanation in this paper of a 
previous policy decision not to recommend an interest rate cap in Queensland,
195
 one 
participant noted: 
 
I recall that the reasons were that the concern was that there would be a de facto, 
acceptable limit on the no interest charged if we set the 48% ceiling…Because it was 
permissible by the legislation.  That was what the legislation said.  So there were concerns 
about that. It was thought the public interest could potentially be addressed through the 
unconscionable conduct provisions in the code.  It was also a concern that there was no 
recognition of the increased costs as a proportion of an amount.  (R3, p 1) 
       
Policy reasons for / against cap 
 
We asked participants for their views on the policy reasons for or against an interest rate 
ceiling, however, there was not necessarily a consensus view on this issue.  
 
For NSW participants, key concerns were around the vulnerability of the borrowers, and 
their inability to exercise market discipline on lenders: 
 
… that there really isn’t one [a market] in terms of this market, this fringe lending 
industry, because the consumer has no power and they have no choice. They don’t have 
any influence on the market there, so they can’t influence either prices or the development 
of the industry. (R1, pp 16-17) 
 
I think one of the things that concerns us most is that most of these people that they were 
lending to, probably the bulk of the people they were lending to, were consumers who 
should never have got that sort of credit in the first place, and couldn’t afford the 
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repayments. So that then it [the loan]  became really exploitative and leads that consumer 
into a spiral of debt that they really couldn’t escape from.  …  these people were really 
vulnerable. They had no alternatives, or didn’t think they had alternatives, and so were 
going further down the debt spiral all the time. (R1, p 13) 
 
 
Another participant commented on the effectiveness of competition in the market: 
 
But there are other parts of the credit market, which are I guess far less competitive and the 
small amount credit market has been said to be one of those, although competition 
continues to increase in that market. And is it the case that we're saying that there are 
very high fees and charges associated with credit from the likes of [microlenders] and the 
rest of them and some of the promissory note lenders, and the reason for that under the 
classic theory is there's less than full competition. So what we would be doing by 
intervening in the cost of credit is trying to bring about, or at least trying to remedy the 
fact that competition hasn't delivered fully as in other areas of the market, and it has in 
terms of keeping costs down. (R6, pp 5-6) 
 
One participant highlighted the difficulty in articulating the policy reasons for intervention: 
 
I mean in a sense you really can't go forward without saying what are we on about?  Is it 
just the usury, is it market power, is it credit exclusion, what is it? (R6, p7) 
 
 
There was also a suggestion that there was a universal view that there was a certain point 
beyond which the cost of credit was beyond the pale: 
 
I think there is still an etiquette around to the effect that there comes a point when the 
amount that it's costing somebody to borrow money goes from being a sort of a 
transaction into which both parties have entered into with their eyes wide open. And it 
becomes at some point just a little bit beyond the pale. And I suppose you eliminate at 
some point the nominal contract theory of two freely contracting parties. And you end up 
instead with somebody who pretty much has no effective choice but to borrow the money, 
at least on these rates and under those terms and conditions. (R6, p 2) 
 
 
Impact on fringe lenders 
 
Views on the impact on lenders of an interest rate ceiling were divided amongst participants. 
 
Some participants noted the potential for an all inclusive cap (along the lines of that in 
NSW) to make it very difficult (if not impossible) for credit providers to offer small, short-
term loans: 
 
  
 
Interest rate caps: protection or paternalism?  102 
 
I honestly can’t see how a credit provider would survive on a 48 per cent return on their 
money when you look at – when you consider that on average, from my understanding of 
the industry, about 10 per cent of loans go bad so you can cut 10 per cent off their profits 
straight way.  Because it’s not just the interest they’re going to lose.  It’s their capital 
outlay, or the principal they loaned – they loaned $1000 out.  They lose the interest but 
they then lose the $1000 they lent to that person.  So it’s not just the interest they lose.  They 
lose the principal as well. (R4, p 5) 
 
 
The credit providers I think it would – decimate is probably a pretty harsh word but I 
think it would greatly affect the industry.  I think you’d have a lot of people shutting 
down.  Only the bigger operators would survive.  (R4, p 6) 
 
 
On the other hand, one participant indicated that claims about the sustainability of business 
models in an interest rate caps environment had not been made out: 
 
We have heard of it, of course. They’ve supplied figures which you can dispute on a 
number of bases. They claim costs which you may dispute as being legitimate or not, or the 
actual figure that they supply you can actually dispute. But I think a lot depends on 
economies of scale and efficiencies as well. I don’t know that any of them have actually 
applied efficiencies to their processes. So that it’s very hard to know from what they supply 
to us, and of course they’re going to say that. They’re not going to get the same kind of 
profit margins that they did when they were operating without any cap. (R1, p 4)  
 
There was also a suggestion that a cap on interest alone has had, or would have, a lesser 
impact on credit providers: 
 
But in this environment that we've had of a small amount of cash loans being available, 
or  people seeking a small amount of cash loans without using a pawn to get them the 
48 percent clearly has had no impact on availability. (R6, pp 10-11) 
 
In part, this is likely to relate to the fact that additional return can be made through 
imposing fees and charges, which have no maximum ceiling. In this context, one participant 
referred to the potential for a ―reverse engineering process‖, where interest rates are reduced 
to comply with the ceiling, but fees and charges are increased, so that the cost of credit to 
the consumer is unchanged: 
 
City Finance we know for a fact and it's on the record and it was part of the submissions 
that were made to the tribunal here; we know for a fact that when it was pointed out to 
them by credit advocates and by us that they had exceeded the 30 percent ceiling in 
Victoria, I think they were thinking about 48 percent and forgetting about the fact that 
often they were securing their credit with motor vehicles and therefore we have the 
30 percent ceiling for secured credit. As soon as they discovered that they were going over 
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the 30 they simply re-engineered the figures so that they sat at 30 on the knocker for an 
interest rate, and then they recovered the money that they would otherwise have 'lost' by 
upping the fees and charges a bit. In discovery we actually got hold of documentation 
which was a description of a reverse engineering process where they simply said we still 
want this return, we still want 35 percent return or 49 if it was unsecured or whatever.  
Now we have to stick to 48 and 30 for unsecured and secured respectively, so what do we 
need to do or what charges do we need to introduce or what fees do we need to increase in 
order to keep the current rate of return? So I guess that's an example where the 48 percent 
interest rate has had a direct effect.  But it's only had an effect in terms of juggling your 
disclosures effectively and creating a few new fees.  It didn't have any effect on the actual 
cost of the credit to the consumer. (R6, p 9) 
 
This same participant also noted that a lack of clarity around the definitions of interest, fees 
and charges also creates some uncertainty about the applicability of a ceiling that applies 
only to the interest rate: 
 
There's a bit of grey sometimes as to what is properly classified as interest and what's 
properly classified as fees and charges, rather than just relying on the black and white in 
the credit contract.  So I suppose that's the other.  If we leave aside honest and proper – 
here's the interest, here's the fees and charges or there's no interest and there are fees and 
charges -  you have this difficult question of law sometimes as to what is properly to be 
regarded as a cost in the nature of interest. And so if you have a situation where it's not 
clear into which camp a particular element of the cost falls you have got yourself a real 
complication because you're unable to say whether 48 percent or 30 percent has been 
exceeded because you don't know which side of the ledger the amounts should sit under. 
(R6, pp 12-13) 
 
A major impact (or potential impact) of introducing an interest rate ceiling that was 
identified by all participants was an increase in avoidance of the Consumer Credit Code by 
credit providers: 
 
We do know that there have been impacts in other ways, that some of the lenders are 
trying to avoid it [the cap], by various means. (R1, p 6) 
 
In all jurisdictions that have an interest rate cap, the cap applies only to credit that is 
regulated by the UCCC. Thus, if a credit provider is able to avoid the application of the 
UCCC, it can avoid the application of the interest rate ceiling: 
 
… I’d suggest if people are taking opportunities of loopholes now, yet not under this 
legislation that we’ve enacted, they’re finding them under the [Consumer Credit Code]. 
(R2, p 11) 
 
In terms of mechanisms to avoid the Code, participants mentioned a number of examples: 
 
  
 
Interest rate caps: protection or paternalism?  104 
 
 One of those is bill facilities, and bills of sale, so there’s a move to actually bring those 
under the Code. There’s also business purpose declarations. Pawnbroking issues, where 
they’re calling it a pawnbroking function rather than credit provision. (R1, p 6) 
 
Setting up the brokerage…To do it as an intermediary, so you set up a brokerage so that 
you charge a fee as a broker and then the other part of your business is the credit provider. 
(R2,  p 6) 
 
Another mechanism mentioned was ―tiny terms‖ – where the arrangement is advertised as 
―interest free‖ (and thus outside the jurisdiction of the Code) but the deal effectively inflates 
the purchase price to compensate for the lack of interest: 
 
We’re seeing an increase of is what we call tiny terms loans and what that is, is typically 
car finance.  What it will be will be a car that’s worth about $2000 or $3000.  They sell to 
you for $7000 or $8000 and say that it’s interest free, no fees and charges and the car is 
worth $8000, so the car is truly worth $2000 or $3000.  The figures we are seeing is double 
or even triple the price of what the car is worth (see R4,  p 6) 
 
Impact on mainstream lenders 
 
There was general agreement amongst participants who addressed this question that an 
interest rate cap would have minimal impact on mainstream lenders, even if it were to 
include fees and charges: 
 
 
 
I think there’s less impact on mainstream lenders in terms of the cap, just for the sake that 
mainstream lenders mostly aren’t charging above it to start with. So bringing in fees and 
charges into the 48% hasn’t had as much of an impact on mainstream lenders as it has on 
fringe, because mainstream lenders haven’t been charging above that to start with. (R2, p 
8) 
 
However, NSW participants noted the specific exemption from the interest rate ceiling for 
Authorised Deposit Taking institutions (ADIs): 
 
… there’s  an exemption in New South Wales for ADIs, for those products which are 
unintentionally caught [by the cap], in a way, like overdrafts, where they slap on a large 
fee. We’re not suggesting that these credit providers are entitled to charge that [amount] for 
that product, but we’re saying that those consumers who go to those lenders and are 
charged this fee do it basically with the option of taking it or not taking it. It’s their choice. 
They could probably find other options. So we’re not so much concerned with that, and we 
don’t want to reduce the convenience of those products to that sort of consumer, who 
basically has their eyes open and can take it or leave it. (R1, p 8) 
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One participant also noted that some mainstream products can also be high cost if default 
fees are incurred: 
 
Now if you target the small amount market by itself though, how do you respond to the 
prospect – or what do you say to the consumer who has borrowed $100 on their credit card 
and then the direct debit comes in late or whatever, and in month number one they miss 
the payment date by one day, there goes $25, $30, $35 – depending on which institution 
they're with. And then in the following month because of the world of electronics they 
draw down beyond the limit - say they've got a very modest limit – and there goes another 
$35 in default fees.  So just in the space of two months they've already paid $70 for their 
$100 originally, without adding in the interest that they start to pay because they haven't 
repaid the amount in full at the end of the first month. (R6,  p 6) 
 
 
Impact on consumers 
 
In terms of the impact of an interest rate cap on consumers, participants raised a number of 
different issues. A number specifically acknowledged the potential for a decrease in the 
availability of credit choices for consumers who are unable to access mainstream lenders: 
 
The effect on the consumers I think you’ll find that they have reduced, or significantly 
reduced options.  (R4, pp 6-7) 
 
And in relation to other options: 
 
I suppose the problem is first of all they won’t be able to go to the banks because the banks 
won’t touch them.  … banks aren’t interested if it’s under $5,000.  You’ll find the 
consumers will want them – again the benefit of seeing from the point of view – from my 
point of view is I get to speak to consumers and you do get a lot of single mothers, 
unemployed people, people down literally to the last dollar.  You’ll find that they will find 
ways of getting credit.  (R4, p 8) 
 
In turn, there was a concern that this would lead to an increase in loan sharking: 
 
I would hazard a guess and say that a lot of loan sharking probably would increase if you 
brought in a cap on everything. (R4, p 4) 
 
On the other hand, one participant noted: 
 
People say on the other hand that introducing a cap would be throwing borrowers to the 
loan sharks, but the largest loan sharking case … has been with Queensland where there is 
no cap.
196
 (R3, p 3) 
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Another suggested that the availability of alternatives is likely to increase in the medium 
term: 
 
I mean I think that the way things are looking at the moment there's every chance, not in 
the short term, but in the medium term that there will be a much greater availability of 
small amount fixed-term credit on a more affordable basis than you can get it from 
[microlender] and that ilk. …  We can do some work on the education front here because 
there are some other avenues for getting small amounts, like Centrelink advances and so 
on. (R6, p 14) 
 
And, in terms of the impact to date in NSW: 
 
We’ve had nothing from consumers or consumer advocates to say ‘Look, we’re desperate, 
we can’t get credit’. So, we won’t really know yet, I think it’s too early to tell at this stage. 
(R1, pp 5-6) 
 
Another noted that the introduction of an interest rate ceiling might lead to an increased 
ruthlessness on the part of lenders: 
 
I believe that you’ll find, especially if – say again a figure, 48 per cent, say that 
hypothetically, I would assume that as a lender, if I was a short-term loan lender, I would 
then be utterly ruthless.  The moment someone missed a payment, bang, repossess the car.  
Give them a 30 day warning and then repossess it because I’m making minimal money on 
that as it is, that loan, so we’re currently, according to credit providers, are really nice 
people and they don’t repossess at the first notice I think you’ll find they’ll be utterly 
ruthless because they have to be to make money. (R4, p 8)  
 
 
In terms of benefits to consumers of interest rate ceilings, one participant wondered whether 
there was evidence to suggest that there are fewer high cost loans in the jurisdictions with 
interest rate caps than without: 
 
I don’t know what the research is to say whether there is less of a problem with unfair 
expensive loans in New South Wales and Victoria where they do have caps.  (R3, p 3) 
 
And another identified what might be seen as a paternalistic benefit for consumers: 
 
Or again are we saying here as a matter of public policy that really there are lots of people 
who it would be better if the stark choice is between credit at an incredible rate of knots, 
rate of dollar cost, versus doing without that credit then better that they do without the 
really expensive credit and cop the consequences, (R6, p 6) 
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And another commented that consumers would benefit because regulators, rather than 
individual consumers, would be expected to police the cost of loans and take action for 
breaches of the cap: 
 
[it] imposes the onus on the regulator, because you would make it an offence possibly to go 
over a cap.  That becomes a regulator’s responsibility. Whereas if it’s an unconscionable 
amount of interest, or fees and charges are imposed on the loan, then that’s a consumer 
responsibility and a lot of consumers won’t take that action because they don’t have the 
money to obviously, or they’re just not prepared to go to court over what may be a 
relatively small amount. (R3, p 6) 
 
In relation to consumer satisfaction with the loans and services offered by payday and 
microlenders, one participant noted the reported
197
 consumer preference for at least some of 
the characteristics common to high cost loan providers: 
 
The micro-lenders tell us that people prefer their convenient hours.  They’re open after 
hours.  Some of them don’t like banks, they don’t like credit cards, so they go to them.  (R3 
,p 4) 
 
Another noted that a lack of complaints did not necessarily indicate complete satisfaction: 
 
One thing too, just in relation to the consumers being happy. It may be less that they’re 
happy than that they don’t complain. There’s that vast body of consumers in this 
socioeconomic bracket who just don’t complain, because they’re so used to this sort of debt 
merry-go-round, and also being, if I can say, done over by everybody, that they just don’t 
complain anymore. They just put their head down and get on with it. There are also those 
who have been, in fact, warned off complaining. …--and there are those who don’t want 
the world to know about their gambling secrets, and so many things that actually prevent 
people from complaining. I think if it’s lack of complaint, yes, but whether they’re 
genuinely happy, I don’t know. (R1, p 14) 
 
 
Regulatory options 
 
In considering the various regulatory options available to manage the cost of consumer 
credit, participants highlighted the influence of factors such as the existing regulatory 
framework, the uniformity agreement on consumer credit, the practices of other 
jurisdictions, and the simplicity vs complexity of different options.  
 
For example, the existing regulatory framework, and the constraints imposed by the 
uniformity agreement influenced the extent to which governments could start with ―a clean 
slate‖ in making regulatory decisions: 
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One of the things that we had to take into consideration is that the legislation is there and 
has been in force and is uniform. So we’re actually constrained by the uniformity 
agreement, really, that allowed us to set a maximum rate. Everything else has been 
consequent on that …  we weren’t starting from scratch, we were starting from a baseline 
of legislation already in place … (R1, p 12) 
 
Another noted the influence that a major jurisdiction (like NSW) had on the decisions of 
other jurisdictions: 
 
It's enormously attractive to simply take the NSW approach not only because there's a 
degree of simplicity and ease of enforcement and everybody knows where they stand, but 
then secondly from Victoria's point of view you might as well say ‘it's already happened in 
NSW’.  NSW is a very large jurisdiction, so we've already got this regime in a quarter of 
the country population wise or more actually. So we might as well just follow suit. (R6, p 
7) 
 
A drive for uniformity on credit regulation is seen in many other areas, and it would not be 
unreasonable for the decisions of the largest jurisdiction (NSW) to have a significant 
influence on the decisions of the smaller jurisdictions.  
 
Despite this, the Consumer Credit Review in Victoria did not recommend the adoption of 
the approach taken in NSW. Instead, it recommended that all credit fees and charges should 
be reviewable on the grounds of unreasonableness.
198
 
 
… if fees and charges tend to be mostly what's doing the damage let's have a much great 
capacity to challenge them when they're ridiculous.(R6, p 15) 
 
However,  
 
But in a sense we're having a little bit of a dollar each way here because we have to say - 
and indeed I think we do somewhere in the report, in the narrative of the report – we do 
say that we'll keep a weather eye on the NSW situation and if it proved to be a spectacular 
success then we would clearly have to have another look at that technique. (R6, p 8) 
 
Simplicity in administration and enforcement was also an issue raised as a factor in 
determining the appropriate regulatory response, with a suggestion that caps vary according 
to the type of loan effectively dismissed because of implementation complexities: 
 
I think the authors of the report [Manning and de Jonge] sense that a simple plan is a good 
plan and this would be a complicated plan. And so I think they're almost sort of saying 
out loud to the reader that they can see that this would be a rather unlikely regulatory 
scenario. (R6, p 8) 
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In terms of the form of any cap, again, the participants‖ comments reflected the regulatory 
position in their individual jurisdictions.  
 
There was a clear acknowledgement that a cap on interest alone would not be effective in 
constraining the cost of credit: 
 
[Referring to the City Finance case]: I guess that's an example where the 48 percent 
interest rate has had a direct effect.  But it's only had an effect in terms of juggling your 
disclosures effectively and creating a few new fees.  It didn't have any effect on the actual 
cost of the credit to the consumer. (R6, p 9) 
 
I think fees and charges, if there was going to be a cap, your fees and charges would need to 
be included, otherwise it would just divert the profit which would normally be generated 
through interest for the fee and charges.  It makes it more difficult to compare prices.  
People tend to compare interest rates rather than interest rates and fees and charges.  So 
we’d need to include everything I think.  That’s reasonably ascertainable. (R3, pp 6-7) 
 
In NSW, the problem of the ineffectiveness of an interest only cap has been addressed by 
incorporating fees and charges: 
 
[In relation to interest only caps] Now NSW has said they're useless when they only 
attach to interest so let's add the rest of the cost of credit in there, at least that's what you 
can see from the front of the contract. (R6, p 15) 
 
In Victoria, as noted above, a different approach has been suggested by the Consumer Credit 
Review: 
 
It may be that more effective regulation can be deployed in exchange for the removal of 
ineffective interest rate ceilings. (R6, p 15, quoting from Consumer Credit Review 
Report) 
 
In addition, one participant referred to the recommendations from the Manning and de 
Jonge research report, which did not support a uniform cap for all consumer credit 
products: 
 
The research plums for and indeed says that there's a public policy justification for capping 
the cost of credit, and probably including fees and charges.  But then it says ‘well, the 
products are so different and underlying cost must be taken into account, otherwise it's 
not fair to the credit providers.  Therefore we couldn't have a single cap as has been 
implemented in NSW, but rather we would have to have different caps depending on the 
nature of the credit product.’  The nature of the sum market I suppose. So the research 
however certainly says that would be a rather complex ideal as it might be from the 
author's point of view, and it might be rather complicated and costly and difficult to have 
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a system where the cap involved was different depending on the nature of the product. 
(R6, pp 7-8) 
 
In Queensland, where no formal decision had been made about an interest rate ceiling at the 
time of interviews, participants also discussed possible alternative regulatory approaches to 
high cost credit and overcommitment, some which might need to proceed at the national 
level: 
 
That’s why the better approach might be to align it with the person’s ability to repay, and 
a realistic assessment of that [ability].  That would be more important I think, and that 
goes with the terms of the loan as opposed to any cap of interest and fees and charges. (R3, 
p 8) 
 
So the way I probably recommend to look at is from a time point of view.  A loan that is 
say between zero and two weeks or let’s say 14 days, has a cap of 1000 per cent.  A loan of 
between 14 days and say two months, that would be 60 days, has a cap of 500 per cent and 
then anything over that has a cap of under 500 per cent and they are just rough figures. 
(R4, p 11) 
 
One envisaged a more consultative process for determining the level of any cap: 
 
I think it has to be through industry consultation with lenders and consumer groups – not 
just consumer groups.  What they’re set at should be looked at as a reasonable return for 
their outlay and for their time. (R4, p 2) 
 
None of the participants provided any specific comments on whether caps should be fixed 
or floating, despite the fact that a number of references were made to the variation in 
underlying interest rates and costs of funds to providers over time.  
 
Compliance and regulator impacts 
 
Participants were briefly asked about regulator efforts to ensure compliance. 
 
One noted that a likely outcome of the introduction of an interest rate cap would be a need 
for a considerable increase in staff and resources for the regulator: 
 
Well we would be expected to police it obviously (R3, p 6) 
 
I think you will have to triple our staff at least to police it because you’ll find everyone 
will do all these dodgy loans or very questionable loans or bill of sales or lots of things and 
so from an investigator’s point of view – and there will be a lot of underground lending 
or loan sharking – so you’ll find that you’ll probably – I would recommend at least triple 
the staff in the government, probably even more. (R4, p 8) 
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In those jurisdictions where a cap already existed, participants indicated that compliance 
activities did tend to coincide with legislative changes: 
 
Well that really depends on a lot of things.  It depends on resources; it depends on whether 
credit is being prioritised in the organisation, which it has been for the last few years.  It 
depends on the attitude of the minister and so forth and it depends on the complaint load 
that we're getting. In essence the reason for that particular compliance-monitoring 
program was that it was at the tail-end of 2001 that payday lending was brought within 
the code and then that was a trigger for doing some compliance monitoring of what these 
characters were up to. Since then the only – it's really been a bit ad hoc and we've 
tendered just to be responding to actual complaints and there hasn't been another 
extensive review. (R6, p 11) 
 
 
One also reflected on the difficulties associated with actually identifying the lenders in the 
market: 
 
Yes, very hard. But I just thought, I talked to the other agencies we liaise with, like Legal 
Aid, and the Consumer Credit Legal Centre, through our customer service area, and then 
I spent maybe a month reading The Daily Telegraph, going to the ads and ringing up 
people to get details. So I would certainly say it’s not an exhaustive list. (R2, p 10) 
 
This clearly raises business awareness and compliance issues for regulatory agencies. 
 
Another raised concerns about getting sufficient evidence to prosecute, especially against 
loan sharks: 
 
My understanding is that loan sharking is even occurring … but I have tried to get 
witnesses and I can’t get people to come forward because they’re scared of these people. (R4, 
p 8) 
 
Credit reporting 
 
As seen in previous chapters, the credit reporting regime was also seen as having an impact 
on the relevant environment, both because of its focus on negative listings, but also because 
of inaccuracies. However, the regime was primarily covered by Commonwealth 
Government agencies, and so participants did not have direct input into, or knowledge of, 
the issues: 
 
I think some lenders argue that if the credit reporting system is loosened up and for 
example you can record positive loans instead of negative loans.  And by that I mean, at 
the moment I understand that all they can record is if there’s a failed loan, which may be 
one loan of a dozen that a person’s taken out.  If they have paid off another loan 
successfully and more recently, they should probably not be – have the capacity to do that.  
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They should probably not be excluded from the loan. But if they’re excluded from the loan 
and that drives them into the microlending market, which is a shame because they might 
be better off getting a credit card for example, or a short term loan or something through a 
major lender. I think the scope for the credit reporting system could be changed, but I’m 
also conscious that the consumer movement believes the current system should be fixed 
because there’s a lot of misreporting of data, and people are accused of having debts that 
they’ve never incurred.  Things like that.  They’ve paid it off and they’re still recorded as 
bad loans and things like that.  That’s another point. (R3, p 5) 
 
 
… yes, it’s desperately in need of review. If it went to a positive reporting system, fine, but 
it has to have the flaws fixed. (R1, pp 17-18)  
 
We’re always getting complaints about people in terms of, if they weren’t aware that 
they’d been listed or if it was an incorrect listing, how hard it is to get it off. If the credit 
provider’s not coming to your assistance with dealing with Baycorp, and if they’ve 
incorrectly listed you  or whatever, if they’re ignoring it and not assisting Baycorp, the 
consumer has a huge burden of proof on themselves to try and get enough information to 
get Baycorp interested in investigating it. (R2, pp 17-18)  
 
Relatedly, one participant noted the relevance of consumer behaviour and conduct in 
relation to credit applications: 
 
I mean a lot of – again consumers, they turn around and say ‘Oh, look, I had a $500 loan 
and all of a sudden I owe $700 now and it’s because of this high interest rate, say 300 or 
400 per cent per annum.’  But then when you look at the loan repayments the person 
missed four or five payments at the start and of course because your interest is such a high 
percentage on that the consumer is just as much to blame because if they miss payments 
they’re going to get off track.  Again there’s two sides of the argument there – you could 
turn around and say ‘Well gee should the consumer have even signed up for that loan if 
they can’t afford it?’  Maybe the short-term credit providers should be looking at that 
further.  However, if you speak to the short-term credit providers they’ll say ‘Well 
consumers don’t tell us the full story.  They don’t tell us about their three other loans 
they’ve got out there or they lied to me about the amount that they earn or they earn that 
much but then they lost their job two weeks later.  There are two sides to every story. (R4, 
p 14) 
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12. Discussion and conclusion 
 
 
 
In this report we have presented the views of some consumer advocates, micro-lenders, 
mainstream financial institutions and staff from regulatory agencies in relation to the 
benefits and harms of fringe credit products and the likely impacts of interest rate capping 
on this market. 
 
Consumer advocates spoke of their experiences with low income consumers who had 
suffered some harm as a result of micro credit products. While acknowledging that these 
problems may be “at the margins” in the sense that it may only be the most vulnerable 
consumers who encounter these harms when engaging with micro credit, these are problems 
which need to be acknowledged. In particular, consumer advocates referred to instances of 
micro credit providers lending to people without capacity to repay in accordance with the 
terms of the loan; lending without accurately describing to borrowers the cost of the loans; 
allowing rollovers and loan extensions creating unmanageable debt spirals; and the taking of 
security over household goods. They noted that these loans may bring some short-term 
benefit to consumers in that they meet an often urgent financial need however they argued 
that these loans were ultimately detrimental. They all supported the introduction of an 
interest rate cap, and while not all were convinced that a cap would mean that micro credit 
products could no longer be offered on a commercial basis due to cost, they took the view 
that even if that was the case, a cap was still desirable. Their view was that it was better not 
to have these products available on the market if they could only be offered at high cost, 
because of the potential harms of such high cost lending. They noted the need in the market 
place for safe, affordable credit alternatives for low income, financially excluded consumers.  
 
The micro-lenders interviewed (as opposed to the more extensive group surveyed) did not 
fall within the very short-term payday lender category, with most of them offering loans on 
6 to 12 month terms. It is likely that the greatest harms are associated with the short-term 2 
to 4 week payday style loans, where borrowers struggle to repay the full amount within 
such a short time period and where rollovers and loan renewals lead to “debt spirals” for 
these borrowers.
199
 The micro-lenders interviewed acknowledged that costs could become 
substantial where rollovers or loan renewals were offered. They maintained however that 
the standard high costs associated with their products reflected the true cost of delivering 
these loans due to the short term nature of the loans, the risky nature of the loans, and the 
lengthy application process, which one lender stated could involve anywhere between 3 ½ 
hours to 6 ½ hours.
200
 The overwhelming impression arising out of the interviews with the 
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 This may highlight inefficiency in delivery of this product, given that Fair Finance UK, who offer a sustainable 
small loans product at between 28% to 35% per annum in London, claim that the application process takes 
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micro-lenders was that they believed they provided a valuable service, delivered responsibly 
with a comprehensive process for assessing capacity to repay, as well as procedures in place 
for dealing with client hardship in a flexible way. They considered that they were providing 
an essential service for financially excluded consumers in a space that mainstream lenders 
were not interested in filling. That said there was no escaping the high cost of these loans. 
One lender acknowledged that their clients were not really concerned with cost, given that 
they were really ―lenders of last resort‖. Their clients needed finance urgently and liked the 
speed of service they received from these lenders. On the one hand they expressed concerns 
that the imposition of an interest rate cap would lead to a “gravitation” of lenders currently 
lending at less than that, towards that cap.
201
 On the other hand, they seemed to accept the 
need for a cap but a “realistic” higher cap, somewhere between 170% per annum and 250% 
per annum, or one cap on interest and a separate cap on fees and charges. They were critical 
of ―one size fits all‖ regulation in this area, given that the products they offered were very 
different to those offered by mainstream lenders, particularly in terms of the loan size and 
repayment period. They all maintained that a cap would prevent them from continuing to 
offer short term credit. 
 
Mainstream credit providers did not consider that a cap at 48% per annum would impact 
upon their products, as their rates and charges did not come close to the cap. They did see 
the need for some cost controls on credit to protect low income, vulnerable consumers, 
however, they took the view that any cap needed to be inclusive of fees and charges to be 
effective. Further, effective enforcement was crucial to avoid circumvention or avoidance by 
micro credit providers. Some endorsed the idea of scaling any interest rate cap to the size of 
the loan, recognising that different types of products should attract different regulatory 
responses. One mainstream credit provider expressed a view that it would be unfortunate if 
micro credit was “wiped out”, as there was clearly a need for that type of product, and it was 
not an area in which that provider wished to operate. The mainstream providers emphasised 
the need for government involvement to ensure the provision of affordable short term 
credit. This was not an issue that should be left to the private sector to sort out. 
 
The participants from regulatory agencies acknowledged the lack of science surrounding the 
choice of 48% for any cap- that this was a rate based on history more than science. They 
noted that for some people fringe credit represented a convenient service which was 
unlikely to get them into any trouble, but they also noted that there needed to be 
protections for low income, vulnerable consumers to prevent them finding themselves in a 
―debt spiral‖. Such protection was regarded as necessary because of a lack of competition as 
regards price in the micro credit market, and because there comes a point when the cost of 
credit is so high that it is simply unacceptable. Some participants in this group accepted that 
a cap would mean the end of the micro credit industry, while others questioned the 
                                                                                                                                                          
between 30 to 45 minutes. This information was delivered as part of a presentation by the Managing Director of 
Fair Finance UK at Foresters ANA Mutual Society Ltd, Brisbane on 8 July 2008. See also 
www.fairfinance.org.uk.  
201
 This seems unlikely given the reputational concerns of mainstream lenders, as confirmed by one of the 
mainstream lenders interviewed who commented that they did not want to go anywhere near the cap in terms of 
their interest rate. 
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likelihood of that outcome due to a lack of evidence. They acknowledged the ability of 
micro credit providers to circumvent regulation, and agreed that there would be 
considerable costs to government in effectively policing and enforcing the interest rate cap. 
Some alternatives to capping that were discussed included a strong regulatory response on 
the grounds of unreasonable terms, which would send a powerful signal to the market that 
extortionate charges would be pursued in the courts by government consumer agencies;  or 
different, ―structured‖ caps depending upon the nature of the credit product, for example the 
loan term and loan amount. Opinions were divided as to whether an interest rate cap was an 
appropriate regulatory response to the problems associated with micro credit. 
 
Apart from the possibility of an interest rate cap, some regulatory responses arising out of 
the research undertaken for this report include:- 
1. Consultation with the micro industry to arrive at an interest rate cap and other 
regulatory restrictions acceptable to the industry and to government. Consumer 
advocates would have issues with this model in that it ignores the cost level at which 
consumers will be safe by focusing on the cost level at which providers can make a 
profit. 
2. A focus on regulating against rollovers, loan renewals and the taking of household 
securities on the basis that they constitute the more insidious harms of micro credit. 
3. Focusing on a policy and regulatory framework to facilitate the provision of safe and 
affordable credit to create a truly competitive environment in this market and offer 
low income consumers real choice. 
 
While there was a divergence of views as between stakeholder groups in relation to some 
issues, some facts seem to be relatively uncontested:- 
 There is a demand for short term small amount credit products in the market; 
 Mainstream financial providers are not meeting this demand leaving a “gap”; 
 Micro credit providers are filling that gap, although at a high cost; 
 Micro loans provide at least some short-term benefit to people in meeting an 
immediate financial need; 
 The high cost may be a true cost for micro credit providers in which case a cap will 
put an end to their business, or alternatively there may be inefficiencies in their 
product delivery and it might be possible for them to continue to lend within the 
cap; 
 In any event, the high cost, coupled with features such as loan rollovers or renewals, 
do result in a worsening of some people‖s financial positions, particularly vulnerable, 
low income consumers; 
 If a cap were introduced and effectively enforced at some cost to government, it would 
prevent consumers paying exorbitantly high costs for short term credit; 
 On the other hand, the cap may result in a departure of micro products from the 
market, leaving a gap which has not yet been filled by no interest and low interest 
loans programs. 
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Within the current context, the decision ―to cap or not to cap‖ really seems to come down to 
weighing the benefits of having some products available to meet the demand for short-term 
credit amongst those financially excluded from the mainstream, as against the disadvantages 
flowing from the harms caused by some of these products to some consumers. The decision 
would be somewhat easier if we could ―have our cake and eat it too‖- if there could be 
sufficient products in the marketplace providing affordable short-term credit to those 
financially excluded from the mainstream, who could operate under a 48% (or some other 
more scientifically calculated) cap. Whether or not a state has decided to cap or might do so 
in the future, regulatory efforts must surely go into a policy and regulatory framework to 
promote the provision of safe affordable short-term credit for vulnerable low income 
consumers.  
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Appendix A: Participant categories 
 
 
Identifier Type 
C1 Consumer Advocate 
C2 Consumer Advocate 
C3 Consumer Advocate 
C4 Consumer Advocate 
C5 Consumer Advocate 
C6 Consumer Advocate 
C7 Consumer Advocate 
C8 Consumer Advocate 
C9 Consumer Advocate 
R1 Regulator 
R2 Regulator 
R3 Regulator 
R4 Regulator 
R5 Regulator 
R6 Regulator 
B1 Mainstream lender (bank) 
B2 Mainstream lender (bank) 
B3 Mainstream lender (bank) 
FC1 Mainstream lender (finance 
company) 
FC2 Mainstream lender (finance 
company) 
FC3 Mainstream lender (finance 
company) 
FC4 Mainstream lender (finance 
company) 
ML1 Micro-lender 
ML2 Micro-lender 
ML3 Micro-lender 
ML4 Microlender 
ML5 Micro-lender 
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Appendix B: Discussion guides 
 
 
For fringe lenders and lender associations:  
 
 Is there a need for controls on the cost of credit to protect low income and 
vulnerable consumers? Why / Why not? 
 
 What types of credit products do you / your members provide to consumers?  
 
 What are the key costs and terms?  
 
 Who are your / your members‖ customers? What are their reasons for seeking 
finance? 
 
 What has been / would be the impact on your business / your members if controls 
on the cost of consumer credit were to be introduced? What would be / has been the 
impact on availability of credit to your / your members‖ typical customer group?  
 
 What are the compliance costs? To what extent is compliance with interest rate caps 
monitored or enforced? 
 
 If controls are to be introduced or retained, what form should such controls take? At 
what level should interest rate caps be set? Should caps be fixed or floating? Should 
caps differ according to type of loan? To what extent should fees and charges be 
included in the cap? 
 
 
For mainstream lenders’ industry associations: 
 
 Is there a need for controls on the cost of credit to protect low income and 
vulnerable consumers? Why / Why not? 
 
 What has been the impact on credit providers of interest caps in those jurisdictions 
that have introduced them? Has there been any impact on mainstream lenders?  
 
 What are the compliance costs? To what extent is compliance with interest rate caps 
monitored or enforced? 
 
 Where controls exist, are the regulations sufficiently clear?  
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 What has been the impact on access to consumer credit for low income and 
vulnerable consumers? Have consumers benefited from the introduction/retention 
of interest rate caps? 
 
 If controls are to be introduced or retained, what form should such controls take? At 
what level should interest rate caps be set? Should caps be fixed or floating? Should 
caps differ according to type of loan? To what extent should fees and charges be 
included in the cap? 
 
For regulators and government policy makers in ACT, NSW and Victoria: 
 
 What were the reasons for introducing controls on the cost of credit in your 
jurisdiction? To what extent are those reasons still valid? 
 
 What were the reasons for choosing the particular level at which the cap was set? 
What were the reasons for including or excluding fees and charges in calculating the 
cap? 
 
 What types of products are available in the market to low income and vulnerable 
consumers? What are the typical costs / terms? Does the existence of the cap have 
any impact on mainstream lenders? 
 
 Has the introduction / retention of a cap reduced access to consumer credit for these 
groups? To what extent has the introduction of caps benefited consumers? 
 
 What has been the experience of compliance with the cap? What steps do agencies 
take to monitor compliance with the regulations, and/or to enforce the regulations? 
 
 Has experience with the cap demonstrated any loopholes or other practical problems 
with the legislation? What steps have been taken to address these issues? 
 
 If controls are to retained, what form should such controls take? At what level 
should interest rate caps be set? Should caps be fixed or floating? Should caps differ 
according to type of loan? To what extent should fees and charges be included in the 
cap? 
 
For regulators and government policy makers in Queensland: 
 
 What were the reasons for not introducing controls on the cost of credit in your 
jurisdiction? To what extent are those reasons still valid? 
 
 What types of products are available in the Queensland market to low income and 
vulnerable consumers? What are the typical costs / terms?  
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 What has Queensland learnt from experience in other jurisdictions (both in Australia 
and elsewhere) that have introduced interest rate caps or other controls? 
 
 What would be the impact on credit providers, consumers, and regulators if  controls 
on the cost of credit were to be introduced in Queensland? 
 
 If controls are to be introduced, what form should such controls take? At what level 
should interest rate caps be set? Should caps be fixed or floating? Should caps differ 
according to type of loan? To what extent should fees and charges be included in the 
cap? 
 
 
For consumer advocates and caseworkers in NSW, ACT and Victoria  
 
 Is there a need for controls on the cost of credit to protect low income and 
vulnerable consumers? Why / Why not? 
 
 What is the impact of high cost credit on consumers? 
 
 What has been the impact of interest caps on consumers? Overall, has it benefited 
consumers?  
 
 To what extent have low income and vulnerable consumers been excluded from the 
consumer credit market following the introduction of caps? To what extent have 
consumers turned to ―loan sharks‖ for finance? 
 
 What has been the impact on credit providers of the introduction of interest rate 
caps? Have members withdrawn from the industry, changed their products (and if 
so, in what way) following the introduction of caps? 
 
 Is there compliance with the cap? To what extent is the regulator monitoring and 
enforcing compliance? 
 
 Has experience with the cap demonstrated any loopholes or other practical problems 
with the legislation? What steps have been, or should be taken to address these 
issues? 
 
 If controls are to retained, what form should such controls take? At what level 
should interest rate caps be set? Should caps be fixed or floating? Should caps differ 
according to type of loan? To what extent should fees and charges be included in the 
cap? 
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For consumer advocates in Queens land 
 
 What are the types of credit products available to low income and vulnerable 
consumers in Queensland? What are the typical interest rates, fees, charges and 
terms? 
 
 Is there a need for controls on the cost of credit to protect low income and 
vulnerable consumers? Why / Why not? 
 
 What is the impact of high cost credit on consumers? 
 
 What has Queensland learnt from experience in other jurisdictions (both in Australia 
and elsewhere) that have introduced interest rate caps or other controls? 
 
 If controls were to be introduced, what would the impact been on consumers? On 
credit providers? On the regulator? To what extent have low income and vulnerable 
consumers be excluded from the consumer credit market if caps were to be 
introduced? 
 
 If controls are to be introduced, what form should such controls take? At what level 
should interest rate caps be set? Should caps be fixed or floating? Should caps differ 
according to type of loan? To what extent should fees and charges be included in the 
cap? 
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